Jobst Heitzig

Bio: Jobst Heitzig is an academic researcher from Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. The author has contributed to research in topics: Complex network & Earth system science. The author has an hindex of 28, co-authored 123 publications receiving 3231 citations. Previous affiliations of Jobst Heitzig include Leibniz University of Hanover & Federal Statistical Office.

How basin stability complements the linear-stability paradigm

Abstract: Linear-stability measures for assessing the state of a dynamical system are inherently local, and thus insufficient to quantify stability against substantial perturbations. The volume of a state’s basin of attraction offers a powerful alternative—and points towards a plausible explanation for regularity in real-world networks.

How dead ends undermine power grid stability

Abstract: The cheapest and thus widespread way to add new generators to a high-voltage power grid is by a simple tree-like connection scheme. However, it is not entirely clear how such locally cost-minimizing connection schemes affect overall system performance, in particular the stability against blackouts. Here we investigate how local patterns in the network topology influence a power grid's ability to withstand blackout-prone large perturbations. Employing basin stability, a nonlinear concept, we find in numerical simulations of artificially generated power grids that tree-like connection schemes--so-called dead ends and dead trees--strongly diminish stability. A case study of the Northern European power system confirms this result and demonstrates that the inverse is also true: repairing dead ends by addition of a few transmission lines substantially enhances stability. This may indicate a topological design principle for future power grids: avoid dead ends.

Escaping the Curse of Dimensionality in Estimating Multivariate Transfer Entropy

Abstract: Multivariate transfer entropy (TE) is a model-free approach to detect causalities in multivariate time series. It is able to distinguish direct from indirect causality and common drivers without assuming any underlying model. But despite these advantages it has mostly been applied in a bivariate setting as it is hard to estimate reliably in high dimensions since its definition involves infinite vectors. To overcome this limitation, we propose to embed TE into the framework of graphical models and present a formula that decomposes TE into a sum of finite-dimensional contributions that we call decomposed transfer entropy. Graphical models further provide a richer picture because they also yield the causal coupling delays. To estimate the graphical model we suggest an iterative algorithm, a modified version of the PC-algorithm with a very low estimation dimension. We present an appropriate significance test and demonstrate the method's performance using examples of nonlinear stochastic delay-differential equations and observational climate data (sea level pressure).

Comparison of correlation analysis techniques for irregularly sampled time series

Abstract: . Geoscientific measurements often provide time series with irregular time sampling, requiring either data reconstruction (interpolation) or sophisticated methods to handle irregular sampling. We compare the linear interpolation technique and different approaches for analyzing the correlation functions and persistence of irregularly sampled time series, as Lomb-Scargle Fourier transformation and kernel-based methods. In a thorough benchmark test we investigate the performance of these techniques. All methods have comparable root mean square errors (RMSEs) for low skewness of the inter-observation time distribution. For high skewness, very irregular data, interpolation bias and RMSE increase strongly. We find a 40 % lower RMSE for the lag-1 autocorrelation function (ACF) for the Gaussian kernel method vs. the linear interpolation scheme,in the analysis of highly irregular time series. For the cross correlation function (CCF) the RMSE is then lower by 60 %. The application of the Lomb-Scargle technique gave results comparable to the kernel methods for the univariate, but poorer results in the bivariate case. Especially the high-frequency components of the signal, where classical methods show a strong bias in ACF and CCF magnitude, are preserved when using the kernel methods. We illustrate the performances of interpolation vs. Gaussian kernel method by applying both to paleo-data from four locations, reflecting late Holocene Asian monsoon variability as derived from speleothem δ18O measurements. Cross correlation results are similar for both methods, which we attribute to the long time scales of the common variability. The persistence time (memory) is strongly overestimated when using the standard, interpolation-based, approach. Hence, the Gaussian kernel is a reliable and more robust estimator with significant advantages compared to other techniques and suitable for large scale application to paleo-data.

The geometry of chaotic dynamics – a complex network perspective

Abstract: Recently, several complex network approaches to time series analysis have been developed and applied to study a wide range of model systems as well as real-world data, e.g., geophysical or financial time series. Among these techniques, recurrence-based concepts and prominently e-recurrence networks, most faithfully represent the geometrical fine structure of the attractors underlying chaotic (and less interestingly non-chaotic) time series. In this paper we demonstrate that the well known graph theoretical properties local clustering coefficient and global (network) transitivity can meaningfully be exploited to define two new local and two new global measures of dimension in phase space: local upper and lower clustering dimension as well as global upper and lower transitivity dimension. Rigorous analytical as well as numerical results for self-similar sets and simple chaotic model systems suggest that these measures are well-behaved in most non-pathological situations and that they can be estimated reasonably well using e-recurrence networks constructed from relatively short time series. Moreover, we study the relationship between clustering and transitivity dimensions on the one hand, and traditional measures like pointwise dimension or local Lyapunov dimension on the other hand. We also provide further evidence that the local clustering coefficients, or equivalently the local clustering dimensions, are useful for identifying unstable periodic orbits and other dynamically invariant objects from time series. Our results demonstrate that e-recurrence networks exhibit an important link between dynamical systems and graph theory.

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Abstract: 抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

Phd by thesis

Abstract: Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Random graphs

Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.

Abstract: Impatti, adattamento e vulnerabilita Le cause e le responsabilita dei cambiamenti climatici sono state trattate sul numero di ottobre della rivista Cda. Approfondiamo l’argomento presentando il documento: “Cambiamenti climatici 2007: impatti, adattamento e vulnerabilita” votato ad aprile 2007 dal secondo gruppo di lavoro del Comitato Intergovernativo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). Si tratta del secondo di tre documenti che compongono il quarto rapporto sui cambiamenti climatici.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index