Johan E. Gustafsson

Bio: Johan E. Gustafsson is an academic researcher from University of Gothenburg. The author has contributed to research in topics: Argument & Value (mathematics). The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 44 publications receiving 271 citations. Previous affiliations of Johan E. Gustafsson include Swedish Defence Research Agency & Royal Institute of Technology.

In Defence of My Favourite Theory

Abstract: One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value.

Conflicting Reasons in the Small‐Improvement Argument

Abstract: Essay I develops a new framework for preference relations, that makes further preference relations beyond the trichotomy of preference, dispreference and indifference conceptually possible. The new framework models relations in terms of swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. With this new preference framework the essay presents a fitting-attitude analysis of new value relations that avoids some problems of earlier proposals. Essay II examines the small-improvement argument that is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, that is, the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required to either prefer one of the alternatives to the other or be indifferent between them. The essay argues that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises. Essay III develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed that is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument

Abstract: In this article, I argue that the small-improvement fails since some of the comparisons involved in the argument might be indeterminate. I defend this view from two objections by Ruth Chang, namely the argument from phenomenology and the argument from perplexity. There are some other objections to the small-improvement argument that also hinge on claims about indeterminacy. John Broome argues that alleged cases of value incomparability are merely examples of indeterminacy in the betterness relation. The main premise of his argument is the much-discussed collapsing principle. I offer a new counterexample to this principle and argue that Broome's defence of the principle is not cogent. On the other hand, Nicolas Espinoza argues that the small-improvement argument fails as a result of the mere possibility of evaluative indeterminacy. I argue that his objection is unsuccessful.

Scattering and Polarization Properties of the Scarab Beetle Cyphochilus insulanus cuticle

Abstract: Optical properties of natural photonic structures can inspire material developments in diversified areas, such as the spectral design of surfaces for camouflage. Here, reflectance, scattering, and ...

A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences

Abstract: The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is the pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a money-pump only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump agents who violate transitivity but without a cycle of strict preferences, one needs to somehow induce such a cycle. Methods for inducing cycles of strict preferences from non-cyclic violations of transitivity have been proposed in the literature, based either on offering the agent small monetary transaction premiums or on multi-dimensional preferences. This paper argues that previous proposals have been flawed and presents a new approach based on the dominance principle.

Stokes-vector and Mueller-matrix polarimetry [Invited].

Abstract: This paper reviews the current status of instruments for measuring the full 4×1 Stokes vector S, which describes the state of polarization (SOP) of totally or partially polarized light, and the 4×4 Mueller matrix M, which determines how the SOP is transformed as light interacts with a material sample or an optical element or system. The principle of operation of each instrument is briefly explained by using the Stokes-Mueller calculus. The development of fast, automated, imaging, and spectroscopic instruments over the last 50 years has greatly expanded the range of applications of optical polarimetry and ellipsometry in almost every branch of science and technology. Current challenges and future directions of this important branch of optics are also discussed.

Identity, Consciousness and Value.

Abstract: The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life.