American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

political attitudes. Jurisprudential regimes identify relevant case factors and/or set the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices will use. These jurisprudential regimes have the potential to make a significant difference in the decisions of the justices. We identify a candidate jurisprudential regime, content-neutrality, which appears to govern the general area of free expression law. The Court applies the strictest standard of review to regulations of expression that target the content or viewpoint of expression. Relying on a series of statistical tests using logistic regression, we find that the justices take seriously this jurisprudential regime. oes law influence the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court as they decide cases? Some leading scholars of the Supreme Court assert that law makes little difference. According to the most extreme version of this position, justices largely follow their personal ideological preferences-a view that the Supreme Court itself did much to enhance in Bush v. Gore (2000). If this is true, then the Supreme Court differs from a small legislative body only in the selection and tenure of its members, its technical rules of procedure, and its inability, at least formally, to initiate issues to consider. Whether or not courts generally, and the Supreme Court specifically, differ from legislative bodies has major implications for how we think about the role of courts and analyze their processes and outputs. We contend that courts, including the Supreme Court, are different, and that part of this difference is the role of law in decision making. In this article, we describe and test a new approach to incorporating law into statistical models of Supreme Court decision making. At the same time, we do not reject the importance, or even the dominance, of attitudinal influences on the Court's decisions. However, we argue that one must move beyond the images of the role of law as a mechanistic, autonomous force to arrive at a legal model that is relevant at the Supreme Court level. Segal and Spaeth (1993, 1994; Spaeth and Segal 1999), the leading proponents of the attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision making, argue that justices of the Court are free to decide cases solely in line with their policy (attitudinal) preferences and almost always do so decide. According to this interpretation the justices' freedom to pursue their own policy goals is due to their specific institutional situation: They possess life tenure, sit at the pinnacle of the judicial hierarchy, seldom have ambition for higher office, choose which cases they will decide, and have little fear of being overturned by the elected branches of government, particularly in constitutional interpretation cases (Spaeth and Segal 1999). We do not dispute that the Supreme Court's institutional setting frees justices from the kinds of constraints that are faced by lower court judges, elected officeholders, or appointees serving either fixed terms of office or at the pleasure of some other officeholder. However, freedom from review or electoral accountability does not prevent the justices themselves from erecting other constraints that shape

http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/courses.judpol.Richards.pdf

Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making

This course introduces students to the nature of research and the library's role in research. It emphasizes the development of information competency skills (the ability to find, evaluate, and organize information) for papers, presentations, and other research assignments. Students learn about a variety of information resources, including print, electronic databases, and the World Wide Web. LIBR 201: Media & Information Literacy Units: 3 Prerequisites: None Enrollment Limitation: Not open to students with prior credit in LIBR 201H. Acceptable for Credit: CSU, UC Lecture 3 hours. Course Typically Offered: Fall, Spring

https://pediatricdentistry.ucsf.edu/printpdf/391

Full-Time Faculty

The recent revision of the International Health Regulations, say Wilson and colleagues, is both long overdue and eminently necessary to face the challenges of an increasingly globalized world.

/pdf/the-new-international-health-regulations-and-the-federalism-4xwablv0p0.pdf

The new International Health Regulations and the federalism dilemma.

Title of Dissertation: CULTURE WARRIORS GO TO COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BATTLE FOR THE “SOUL” OF AMERICA Michael Odell Spivey, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015 Dissertation Directed by: Professor Wayne McIntosh Department of Government and Politics The notion of a “culture war” has become a fixture in the academic writing about current American politics, in the popular press and in the cultural zeitgeist. Theorists have suggested that there is a cultural fault line dividing cultural progressives and religious traditionalists. This fault line, it is argued, stems from a basic epistemological disagreement as to whether there is transcendent “truth.” According to James Davidson Hunter, these different worldviews lead to policy polarization and cultural warfare. Hunter goes on to suggest that courts (and especially the Supreme Court) are focal points for this conflict. This work analyzes the nature and scope of battles over culture war issues in the United Supreme Court. It relies on a popular description of key culture war issues: God, guns and gays. The Supreme Court’s treatment of each of these issues is analyzed in turn. In addition, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is also examined. With respect to each issue, key Supreme Court cases are identified. The briefs filed by the parties are then summarized and coded, identifying key “modalities” of arguments and specific arguments themselves. All amicus briefs are similarly analyzed and coded. The key Supreme Court decisions are then analyzed in light of arguments raised by parties and amici. Based upon this analysis, it appears that there is not one culture war but rather an interrelated set of cultural battles. Relatedly, there has been an evolution of cultural warfare over time. Some issues have become largely settled (at least within the Court’s jurisprudence); others are on their way to being settled and still others present continuing opportunities for cultural clashes. The work concludes by suggesting that the sexual revolution lies at the heart of cultural warfare. Moreover, cultural battles are over the “meaning” of America, that is, what social values will be protected under law. CULTURE WARRIORS GO TO COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BATTLE FOR THE “SOUL” OF AMERICA by Michael Odell Spivey Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2015 Advisory Committee: Professor Wayne McIntosh, Chair Professor Karen Kaufmann Professor Frances Lee Professor Irwin Morris Professor Susan Dwyer ©Copyright by Michael Odell Spivey 2015

Culture Warriors Go To Court: The Supreme Court and the Battle for the "Soul" of America

The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy: The 2007 combined supplement to their constitutional law casebook,

The mini-revolution in 1994 that gave Republicans control of Congress for the first time in forty years, and which led to the enactment of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) as part of the Contract with America, was designed in part to revive some foundational constitutional principles, including federalism, enumerated powers, and the non-delegation of lawmaking authority. This Article considers how successful the UMRA has been in furthering these principles and how shortcomings of the UMRA that have become evident over the past seven years might be corrected to further these principles still further. Part II of the Article elaborates on the general federalism principles that are at issue. Part III briefly summarizes the key provisions of the UMRA and discusses recent testimony in Congress about the effectiveness of those provisions. Part IV addresses in greater detail how the Act has fared in the regulatory agencies and suggests some amendments that will increase its effectiveness. Finally, in Part V, the Article conducts a similar analysis with respect to the Act's implementation in Congress itself.

Re-Entering the Arena: Restoring a Judicial Role for Enforcing Limits on Federal Mandates

In the past decade, a number of state courts have found a new "fundamental right" to education in centuries-old state constitutional provisions. These courts have then used the fundamental rights determinations to establish levels of educational funding that, in the court's view, are required to be constitutionally "adequate", and even to mandate the content of the curriculum itself, ignoring considered legislative judgments to the contrary in the process. In this paper, I explore the historical understanding of the actual language of the state constitutional provisions on which these new state court decisions rest, concluding that in almost every instance the original provisions were designed to set only hortatory goals for the legislature, not to confer judicially-enforceable individual rights to certain levels of financial support for, or quality of, public education. I next consider some recent constitutional amendments that might be read as supporting the "fundamental rights" holdings, and conclude that in most cases these amendments, too, fall short of conferring a judicially enforceable right to a constitutionally mandated "adequate" public education. Finally, I take issue with the judicial holdings that have, through the use of "fundamental rights" determinations, injected themselves into what is inherently a policy judgment, reserved by the state constitutions to the political branches of government, and conclude with a cautionary note about the threat to participatory democracy these holdings might pose.

Adequacy and the Rights Revolution: Reinterpreting the Education Clauses in State Constitutions

Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (Sept. 29, 2005) contends that the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment has been misconstrued as mandating birthright citizenship. Rather, the clause was a codification of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which quite clearly exempted from the automatic citizenship provisions children of parents who owed allegiance to a foreign power - i.e., those who were in the U.S. only temporarily (and particularly those who were in the U.S. illegally). This was the understanding of those who drafted and those who ratified the 14th Amendment, and was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the first two cases to address the clause. In 1898, the Court reversed course, though, holding that the Clause mandated birthright citizenship, resulting in a repudiation of the principle of bilateral consent as the foundation for citizenship.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID905570_code394734.pdf?abstractid=905570&mirid=1

Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11

Prepared to commemmorate the bicentennial of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison, this article explores the limits of the original holding, its expansive interpretation in the 20th Century to claims of judicial supremacy, even exclusiveness, in constitutional interpretation, and the various theories that would support such claims. The article explores in some detail the particularly troubling claim of judicial power to create new, unenumerated rights when the Court itself has rejected the foundational, natural rights principles that would lend legitimacy to the enterprise.

John C. Eastman

Papers

The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Philosophy: The 2007 combined supplement to their constitutional law casebook,

Re-Entering the Arena: Restoring a Judicial Role for Enforcing Limits on Federal Mandates

Adequacy and the Rights Revolution: Reinterpreting the Education Clauses in State Constitutions

Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11

Judicial Review of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury's Holding Apply in a Post-Warren Court World?