John M. Darley

Bio: John M. Darley is an academic researcher from Princeton University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Retributive justice & Criminal law. The author has an hindex of 47, co-authored 122 publications receiving 15633 citations. Previous affiliations of John M. Darley include University of California, Berkeley.

An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment

Abstract: The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.

Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies.

Abstract: Male undergraduates found themselves in a smoke-filling room either alone, with 2 nonreacting others, or in groups of 3. As predicted, Ss were less likely to report the smoke when in the presence of passive others (10%) or in groups of 3 (38% of groups) than when alone (75%). This result seemed to have been mediated by the way 5s interpreted the ambiguous situation; seeing other people remain passive led Ss to decide the smoke was not dangerous.

Expectancy confirmation processes arising in the social interaction sequence.

Abstract: Psychologists have begun to use Merton's concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy to explain a wide variety of social phenomena and problems. The present article further develops the theory behind this and related concepts. The core of our argument is that self-fulfilling prophecy effects occur when any one of many possible forces distort the processes occurring in normal social interactions. To elucidate this argument, we describe a model of simple social interactions that involves (a) a perceiver's formation of an expectancy about a target person, (b) his or her behavior congruent with the expectancy, (c) the target's interpretation of this behavior, (d) the target's response, (e) the perceiver's interpretation of the response, and (/) the target's interpretation of his or her own response. We discuss the biasing factors that may lead to self-fulfilling prophecy effects at each step of this sequence. In addition, we suggest several other forms of expectancy confirmation that may occur via the social interaction process. Our presentation has two major purposes: to increase the theoretical clarity of the self-fulfilling prophecy and related effects and to identify needs for future research on the topic. The concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy continues to generate research (e.g., Crano & Mellon, 1978; Snyder & Swann, 1978), theory (R. A. Jones, 1977), and controversy (Archibald, 1974; Wilkins, 1977). This activity is certainly a testimony to the importance of the construct, which is central to many of the practical implications of psychological knowledge for real-world settings (Rosenhan, 1973; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Partly because of this enormous practical importance, the majority of empirical investigations of the selffulfilling prophecy have involved its occurrence in classroom settings. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) contended that the induction of a teacher's expectation of improvement in certain children's achievement performance caused such an improvement. Despite the controversy regarding this initial research (Elashoff & Snow, 1971; Jensen, 1969; Thorndike, 1968), subsequent experimental investiVol. 35, No. 10, 867-881 gations (e.g., Meichenbaum, Bowers, & Ross, 1969; Zanna, Sheras, Cooper, & Shaw, 1975) have confirmed that teacher expectations affect student achievement. Several recent studies, aimed at documenting the workings of the teacher-student expectancy confirmation in nonexperimental social interaction settings, have provided some estimates of the magnitude and generality of the effect. A series of correlational studies showed that naturally occurring teacher expectancies are related to students' achievement (e.g., Palardy, 1969; Rist, 1970; Seaver, 1973; Sutherland & Goldschmid, 1974). For example, Seaver (1973) suggested that teachers form expectations about a younger sibling on the basis of the older sibling's performance. He found a greater relationship between the achievement scores of two siblings taught by the same teacher than between the achievement scores of control siblings taught by different teachers. Such correlational findings are always open to question concerning causal direction. A recent cross-lagged panel analysis suggests, however, that it is the teacher expectations that affect student performance. Crano and Mellon (1978) found that teacher attitudes affected children's achievement to a greater degree than students' performance impinged on the teachers' attitudes. This is impressive testimony to the practical importance of

Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment

Abstract: One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.

The Brain's Default Network Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease

Abstract: Thirty years of brain imaging research has converged to define the brain’s default network—a novel and only recently appreciated brain system that participates in internal modes of cognition Here we synthesize past observations to provide strong evidence that the default network is a specific, anatomically defined brain system preferentially active when individuals are not focused on the external environment Analysis of connectional anatomy in the monkey supports the presence of an interconnected brain system Providing insight into function, the default network is active when individuals are engaged in internally focused tasks including autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others Probing the functional anatomy of the network in detail reveals that it is best understood as multiple interacting subsystems The medial temporal lobe subsystem provides information from prior experiences in the form of memories and associations that are the building blocks of mental simulation The medial prefrontal subsystem facilitates the flexible use of this information during the construction of self-relevant mental simulations These two subsystems converge on important nodes of integration including the posterior cingulate cortex The implications of these functional and anatomical observations are discussed in relation to possible adaptive roles of the default network for using past experiences to plan for the future, navigate social interactions, and maximize the utility of moments when we are not otherwise engaged by the external world We conclude by discussing the relevance of the default network for understanding mental disorders including autism, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer’s disease

The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance.

Abstract: because observed behavior is the result of interactions between environmental factors and genes during the extended period of development. Therefore, to better understand expert and exceptional performance, we must require that the account specify the different environmental factors that could selectively promote and facilitate the achievement of such performance. In addition, recent research on expert performance and expertise (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991a) has shown that important characteristics of experts' superior performance are acquired through experience and that the effect of practice on performance is larger than earlier believed possible. For this reason, an account of exceptional performance must specify the environmental circumstances, such as the duration and structure of activities, and necessary minimal biological attributes that lead to the acquisition of such characteristics and a corresponding level of performance. An account that explains how a majority of individuals can attain a given level of expert performance might seem inherently unable to explain the exceptional performance of only a small number of individuals. However, if such an empirical account could be empirically supported, then the extreme characteristics of experts could be viewed as having been acquired through learning and adaptation, and studies of expert performance could provide unique insights into the possibilities and limits of change in cognitive capacities and bodily functions. In this article we propose a theoretical framework that explains expert performance in terms of acquired characteristics resulting from extended deliberate practice and that limits the role of innate (inherited) characteristics to general levels of activity and emotionality. We provide empirical support from two new studies and from already published evidence on expert performance in many different domains.

The human brain is intrinsically organized into dynamic, anticorrelated functional networks

Abstract: During performance of attention-demanding cognitive tasks, certain regions of the brain routinely increase activity, whereas others routinely decrease activity. In this study, we investigate the extent to which this task-related dichotomy is represented intrinsically in the resting human brain through examination of spontaneous fluctuations in the functional MRI blood oxygen level-dependent signal. We identify two diametrically opposed, widely distributed brain networks on the basis of both spontaneous correlations within each network and anticorrelations between networks. One network consists of regions routinely exhibiting task-related activations and the other of regions routinely exhibiting task-related deactivations. This intrinsic organization, featuring the presence of anticorrelated networks in the absence of overt task performance, provides a critical context in which to understand brain function. We suggest that both task-driven neuronal responses and behavior are reflections of this dynamic, ongoing, functional organization of the brain.

Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental health

Abstract: Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para