https://ccrma.stanford.edu/workshops/mir2009/references/ROCintro.pdf

An introduction to ROC analysis

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=931686

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Background The public perception that mental disorder is strongly associated with violence drives both legal policy (eg, civil commitment) and social practice (eg, stigma) toward people with mental disorders. This study describes and characterizes the prevalence of community violence in a sample of people discharged from acute psychiatric facilities at 3 sites. At one site, a comparison group of other residents in the same neighborhoods was also assessed. Methods We enrolled 1136 male and female patients with mental disorders between the ages of 18 and 40 years in a study that monitored violence to others every 10 weeks during their first year after discharge from the hospital. Patient self-reports were augmented by reports from collateral informants and by police and hospital records. The comparison group consisted of 519 people living in the neighborhoods in which the patients resided after hospital discharge. They were interviewed once about violence in the past 10 weeks. Results There was no significant difference between the prevalence of violence by patients without symptoms of substance abuse and the prevalence of violence by others living in the same neighborhoods who were also without symptoms of substance abuse. Substance abuse symptoms significantly raised the rate of violence in both the patient and the comparison groups, and a higher portion of patients than of others in their neighborhoods reported symptoms of substance abuse. Violence in both patient and comparison groups was most frequently targeted at family members and friends, and most often took place at home. Conclusions "Discharged mental patients" do not form a homogeneous group in relation to violence in the community. The prevalence of community violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric facilities varies considerably according to diagnosis and, particularly, co-occurring substance abuse diagnosis or symptoms.

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/articlepdf/203874/yoa7148.pdf

Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighborhoods.

Rethinking Risk Assessment tells the story of a pioneering investigation that challenges preconceptions about the frequency and nature of violence among persons with mental disorders, and suggests an innovative approach to predicting its occurrence.

Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence

Preface List of Contributors 1: Toward a Rejuvenation of Risk Assessment Research John Monahan, Henry J. Steadman. 2: Anger as a Risk Factor for Violence among the Mentally Disordered Raymond W. Novaco 3: Impulsiveness and Aggression Ernest S. Barratt 4: Psychopathy as a Risk Marker for Violence: Development and Validation of a Screening Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist Stephen D. Hart, Robert D. Hare, Adelle E. Forth. 5: Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence: An Epidemiological Approach Jeffrey W. Swanson 6: Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls Bruce G. Link, Ann Stueve. 7: Delusions and Violence Pamela J. Taylor, Philippa Garety, Alec Buchanan, Alison Reed, Simon Wessely, Katarzyna Ray, Graham Dunn, Don Grubin. 8: Hallucinations and Violence Dale E. McNiel 9: Personality Disorders and Violence Thomas A. Widiger, Timothy J. Trull. 10: Demographic and Case History Variables in Risk Assessment Deidre Klassen, William A. O'connor. 11: Social Networks, Social Support, and Violence among Persons with Severe, Persistent Mental Illness Sue E. Estroff, Catherine Zimmer. Designing a New Generation of Risk Assessment Research Henry J. Steadman, John Monahan, Paul S. Appelbaum, Thomas Grisso, Edward P. Mulvey, Loren H. Roth, Pamela Clark Robbins, Deidre Klassen. Index

Violence and mental disorder: Developments in risk assessment.

John A. Swets, Robyn M. Dawes, and John Monahan BBN Technologies (emeritus), Cambridge, Massachusetts; Radiology Department, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and School of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia

/pdf/psychological-science-can-improve-diagnostic-decisions-54nu7rycnm.pdf

Psychological Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/47/4/511.pdf

John Monahan

Papers

Violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric inpatient facilities and by others in the same neighborhoods.

Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence

Violence and mental disorder: Developments in risk assessment.

Psychological Science Can Improve Diagnostic Decisions

Mental disorder and violent behavior. Perceptions and evidence.