https://ccrma.stanford.edu/workshops/mir2009/references/ROCintro.pdf

An introduction to ROC analysis

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=931686

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients

Approximately half the people receiving treatment in the public sector for mental disorder have experienced some form of "leverage" in which deprivations such as jail or hospitalization have been avoided, or rewards such as money or housing have been obtained, contingent on treatment adherence. We argue in this Essay that framing the legal debate on mandated community treatment primarily in terms of "coercion" has become counterproductive and that the debate should be re-framed in terms of "contract." Language derived from the law of contract often yields a more accurate account of the current state of the law governing mandated community treatment, is more likely to be translated into a useful descriptive vocabulary for empirical research, and is more likely to clarify the policy issues at stake than the currently stalemated form of argumentation based on putative rights. Our hope is that adopting the language of contract may help to identify those types and features of mandated community treatment that are genuinely problematic, rather than perpetuating the unhelpful and misleading assumption that all types of leverage amount to "coercion."

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1758839_code1612332.pdf?abstractid=1758839&mirid=5&type=2

From Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on Mandated Community Treatment for People with Mental Disorders

Trial by data: Psychological research as legal evidence.

I: Incompetency to Stand Trial.- 1. Incompetency to Stand Trial: Developments in the Law.- 2. Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial.- II: Acquittal by Reason of Insanity.- 3. Acquittal by Reason of Insanity: Developments in the Law.- 4. Defendants Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity.- III: Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders.- 5. Special Dispositional Alternatives for Abnormal Offenders: Developments in the Law.- 6. Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders.- IV: Prison-Mental Hospital Transfers.- 7. The Transfer of Inmates to Mental Health Facilities: Developments in the Law.- 8. Prisoners Transferred to Mental Hospitals.- V: A Compendium of United States Statutes on Mentally Disordered Offenders.- 9. Mental Disability in the American Criminal Process: A Four Issue Survey.

Mentally Disordered Offenders: Perspectives from Law and Social Science

After almost four decades of “just deserts,” the past several years have seen a remarkable resurgence of risk assessment as an essential component of criminal sanctioning. In this article, we review current practice in the incorporation of risk assessment into the sanctioning systems of several illustrative states, and describe the major dimensions on which state practices differ. We then elaborate the various meanings ascribed to the foundational concept of “risk” in criminal sanctioning, and contrast “risk” with what are now often called “criminogenic needs,” the fulfillment of which ostensibly reduce an offender’s level of “risk.” Finally, we address the choice of an approach to risk assessment in sentencing, particularly in the resource-starved state of current correctional practice.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/10.1525/fsr.2014.26.3.158

John Monahan

Papers

A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients

From Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on Mandated Community Treatment for People with Mental Disorders

Trial by data: Psychological research as legal evidence.

Mentally Disordered Offenders: Perspectives from Law and Social Science

Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in Criminal Sanctioning