John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.

Gun violence and victimization of strangers by persons with a mental illness: data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study

Abstract: Objective:Highly publicized incidents in which people with apparent mental illnesses use guns to victimize strangers have important implications for public views of people with mental illnesses and the formation of mental health and gun policy. The study aimed to provide more data about this topic.Methods:MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study data were analyzed to determine the prevalence of violence by 951 patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital, including gun violence, violence toward strangers, and gun violence toward strangers.Results:Two percent of patients committed a violent act involving a gun, 6% committed a violent act involving a stranger, and 1% committed a violent act involving both a gun and a stranger.Conclusions:When public perceptions and policies regarding mental illness are shaped by highly publicized but infrequent instances of gun violence toward strangers, they are unlikely to help people with mental illnesses or to improve public safety.

A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment

Abstract: With the United States Supreme Court's decision to hear Addington v. Texas,' the issue of the required standard ofproof in civil commitment cases has finally come to the fore. Addington was involuntarily committed for an indefinite period under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. His commitment was upheld by the Texas Supreme Court. Now, Addington is arguing on appeal that his committability must be supported by evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt." In its present posture, Addington is not concerned with the proper substantive standard for commitment. Instead, appellant assumes2 the constitutionality of the Texas test, which authorizes the indefinite commitment of a mentally ill person found to require hospitalization "for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others."3 When a commitment statute speaks, as does the Texas one, of the "protection of others," it requires mental health and judicial decision-makers to assess an individual's potential for future dangerousness. That public protection rationale is part and parcel of modern commitment statutes. This essay will briefly explore the criterion of dangerousness and will begin to probe the relationship between standards of proof and the dangerousness standard of commitment. According to Alan Stone, President-elect of the American Psychiatric Association, "the predictive success appropriate to a legal decision can be described in three levels of increasing certainty: preponderance of the evidence, 51 percent successful; clear and convincing proof, 75 percent successful; beyond a reasonable doubt, at least 90 percent successful" (1975, p. 33). Based on his review of the research literature,

Dangerousness and Commitment of the Mentally Disordered in the United States

Abstract: This article describes recent developments in mental health laws in the United States, especially as they relate to uses of the concept of "dangerousness" in the civil and criminal commitment of the mentally ill. In addition to providing a brief overview of the U.S. legal system and noting the importance of the Rule of Law, we review the historical development and current status of the relevant laws, provide some basic epidemiological statistics, and refer to some of the considerable body of extant empirical research in the field.

Effects of Self-Instruction on Rule-Breaking Behavior:

Abstract: Two experiments were conducted to analyze factors related to the control of motor behavior by self-instruction and to replicate O'Leary's (1968) finding on the effectiveness of self-instruction in reducing rule-breaking behavior. The length of the temporal interval between the self-instruction and the opportunity to break the rules, and the amount of prior training in self-instruction were the variables under study. The effectiveness of self-instruction in reducing rule-breaking behavior was demonstrated in Exp. I, but no differences were found between groups which instructed either 1 or 9 sec. before the opportunity to respond motorically. As assessed by group differences in Exp. II, there was no evidence for the effectiveness of self-instruction or for the amount of prior training in self-instruction. However, in Exp. II, as in Exp. I, there were strong and significant correlations between the frequency of self-instruction and the absence of rule-breaking behavior. In addition, a serendipitous finding i...

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.