John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.

Predicting non-familial major physical violent crime perpetration in the US Army from administrative data

Abstract: Background. Although interventions exist to reduce violent crime, optimal implementation requires accurate targeting. We report the results of an attempt to develop an actuarial model using machine learning methods to predict future violent crimes among US Army soldiers. Method. A consolidated administrative database for all 975 057 soldiers in the US Army in 2004–2009 was created in the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS). Of these soldiers, 5771 committed a first founded major physical violent crime (murder-manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated assault, robbery) over that time period. Temporally prior administrative records measuring socio-demographic, Army career, criminal justice, medical/pharmacy, and contextual variables were used to build an actuarial model for these crimes separately among men and women using machine learning methods (cross-validated stepwise regression, random forests, penalized regressions). The model was then validated in an independent 2011–2013 sample. Results. Key predictors were indicators of disadvantaged social/socioeconomic status, early career stage, prior crime, and mental disorder treatment. Area under the receiver-operating characteristic curve was 0.80–0.82 in 2004–2009 and 0.77 in the 2011–2013 validation sample. Of all administratively recorded crimes, 36.2–33.1% (male-female) were committed by the 5% of soldiers having the highest predicted risk in 2004–2009 and an even higher proportion (50.5%) in the 2011–2013 validation sample. Conclusions. Although these results suggest that the models could be used to target soldiers at high risk of violent crime perpetration for preventive interventions, final implementation decisions would require further validation and weighing of predicted effectiveness against intervention costs and competing risks.

Contextual evidence of gender discrimination: the ascendance of “social frameworks”

Abstract: In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit upheld the certification of the largest employment discrimination class in history, with more than 1.5 million women employees seeking over $1.5 billion in damages. A crucial piece of evidence supporting class certification came from a sociologist who testified that he performed a social framework analysis to evaluate Wal-Mart against what social science research shows to be factors that create and sustain bias and found the company wanting. As authority for introducing this analysis, the expert and the Ninth Circuit relied on our prior work introducing the concept of social framework to refer to the use of general social science research to provide a context for the determination of specific factual issues in litigation. In this article, we review and recast the procedures originally proposed for apprising juries of general research results to assist in resolving the case before them. We then apply these updated procedures to the expert testimony in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, which promises to be a template for future employment discrimination litigation.Experience over the past 20 years has shown that that courts will typically allow general contextual information from social science research to be conveyed to the jury by expert witnesses rather than via instructions, as originally envisioned. Where this occurs, we believe it essential that courts limit expert testimony to a description of the findings of relevant and reliable research and of the methodologies that produced those findings, and preclude the witness from linking the general research findings to alleged policies and practices of a specific firm. The landmark class action of Dukes v. Wal-Mart illustrates the centrality of social framework evidence to modern employment litigation, as well as the need for courts to clarify and circumscribe the role of the experts who introduce them.

Violence to Others, Violent Self-Victimization, and Violent Victimization by Others Among Persons With a Mental Illness.

Abstract: Objective:This research examined the frequency of and characteristics associated with three forms of violence among persons with mental illness—violence directed at others, self-directed violence, and violence directed at them by others.Methods:Previously unreported data from a follow-up sample of 951 patients from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study were analyzed to characterize involvement in violence directed at others, self-directed violence, and violence directed at them by others.Results:Most patients (58%) experienced at least one form of violence, 28% experienced at least two forms, and 7% experienced all three forms. Several diagnostic, social, and historical variables distinguished the groups.Conclusions:Given the substantial overlap among the three forms of violence, clinicians should routinely screen patients who report one form for the occurrence of the other two. Co-occurrence of several forms of violence may require a package of interventions with components geared to each.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.