John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.

Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commitment and the California Dangerousness Standard: Operational Comparison

Abstract: • Professional opposition to making "dangerousness" the primary criterion for involuntary civil commitment has galvanized in support of the proposed "new medical model." The Stone-Roth criteria for commitment were applied to patients being committed under California's version of the dangerousness standard. Results showed that 86% of the patients committed under the California statute were viewed by the examining psychiatrists as committable under the Stone-Roth procedures as well.

Age, risk assessment, and sanctioning: Overestimating the old, underestimating the young.

Abstract: While many extoll the potential contribution of risk assessment to reducing the human and fiscal costs of mass incarceration without increasing crime, others adamantly oppose the incorporation of risk assessment in sanctioning. The principal concern is that any benefits in terms of reduced rates of incarceration achieved through the use of risk assessment will be offset by costs to social justice-which are claimed to be inherent in any risk assessment process that relies on variables for which offenders bear no responsibility, such as race, gender, and age. Previous research has addressed the variables of race and gender. Here, based on a sample of 7,350 federal offenders, we empirically test the predictive fairness of an instrument-the Post Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA)-that includes the variable of age. We found that the strength of association between PCRA scores and future arrests was similar across younger (i.e., 25 years and younger), middle (i.e., 26-40 years), and older (i.e., 41 years and older) age groups (AUC values .70 or higher). Nevertheless, rates of arrest within each PCRA risk category were consistently lower for older than for younger offenders. Despite its inclusion of age as a risk factor, PCRA scores overestimated rates of recidivism for older offenders and underestimated rates of recidivism for younger offenders. (PsycINFO Database Record

Coercion to Inpatient Treatment

Abstract: Debate over the role of coercion in mental hospital admission frequently invokes the prospective patient’s moral right to decision-making autonomy and individual dignity (e.g., Blanch & Parrish, 1993; Wertheimer, 1993). But empirical arguments for or against coercion are often pressed as well. The empirical issue most often raised is whether coerced treatment “works.” On one side, some patient advocates argue that the alleged benefits of treatment to the patient or others can be negated by patients’ feelings of alienation and dissatisfaction, as a result of which patients become unlikely to comply with treatment as soon as the coercion is lifted (cf. National Center for State Courts, 1986). Even if coerced treatment benefits those on whom it is imposed, other prospective patients may be deterred from seeking treatment voluntarily for fear that they too will be committed (Campbell & Schraiber, 1989). On the other side, a recent report by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (1994), though it grants that “there seems to be a kind of embarrassment about situations in which the patient did not enter treatment entirely on his or her own initiative” (p. x), concludes that “sometimes involuntary psychiatric treatment is necessary, can be effective, and can lead to freedom from the constraints of illness. Conversely, tight restrictions against coercive treatment can have disastrous consequences” (p. 43).

Social Policy Implications of the Inability to Predict Violence

Abstract: Much current social policy in the areas of mental health and criminal justice is based on the supposition that psychologists and psychiatrists can accurately predict those who will be physically violent to another A review of the empirical literature, however, reveals that violence is vastly overpredicted, regardless of who is doing the predicting or how the predictions are made This predictive inaccuracy has several immediate social policy implications: Indeterminate prison sentencing should be abolished, civil commitment and preventive detention should be substantially curtailed, and legal safeguards should be infused into early intervention programs Language: en

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.