John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.

Reducing Violence Risk

Abstract: A great deal of work in mental health law has been addressed to improving the assessment of violence risk among people with mental disorder (Borum, 1996; Monahan et al., in press; Steadman et al., in press). It is clear, however, as a number of researchers have recently emphasized, that risk assessment is only the first step in dealing with violence by people with mental disorder and must be followed by effective risk reduction (Carson, 1994; Heilbrun, 1997). The clinical and empirical literatures on risk reduction have been reviewed in a number of important sources (Eichelman & Hartwig, 1995; McNiel, 1998; Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998; Rice & Harris, 1997; Roth, 1987; Wettstein, 1998). A fair summary of that literature is that mental health professionals (particularly when assisted by actuarial instruments) appear to be better at estimating an individual’s level of violence risk than lowering that estimated level of violence risk.

Judicial appraisals of risk assessment in sentencing

Abstract: The assessment of an offender's risk of recidivism is emerging as a key consideration in sentencing policy in many US jurisdictions. However, little information is available on how actual sentencing judges view this development. This study surveys the views of a population sample of judges in Virginia, the state that has gone further than any other in legislatively mandating risk assessment for certain drug and property offenders. Results indicate that a strong majority of judges endorse the principle that sentencing eligible offenders should include a consideration of recidivism risk. However, a strong majority also report the availability of alternatives to imprisonment in their jurisdictions to be inadequate at best. Finally, most judges oppose the adoption of a policy requiring them to provide a written reason for declining to impose alternative interventions on "low-risk" offenders.

Mentally Ill and Non-Mentally Ill Defendants’ Abilities to Understand Information Relevant to Adjudication: A Preliminary Study

Abstract: The legal construct of competence to stand trial, or “adjudicative competence,” is based on the premise that some mentally disordered defendants have impaired abilities when compared with most defendants and that adjudication should be barred if these competence-related abilities are significantly impaired. Where the line is drawn between sufficient and insufficient abilities has important consequences: as a result of being adjudicated incompetent, defendants may be detained and treated involuntarily and their trials will be delayed. However, no studies have systematically compared the capacities of relevant groups of defendants. In this studv. 84 criminal defendants—42 of whom were hospitalized as incompetent and 42 of whom were regarded as unquestionably competent—were administered three instruments measuring capacity to understand legally relevant information. Incompetent defendants performed more poorly on all measures of understanding. Twenty-eight incompetent defendants were administered the measures a second time, after restoration to competence. Restored defendants improved their performance on all measures of understanding and their performance was similar to that of normal, competent defendants.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.