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John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Pretrial risk assessment instruments are used in many jurisdictions to inform decisions regarding pretrial release and conditions as mentioned in this paper, and many are concerned that the use of pre-trial risk assessment instru...
Abstract: Pretrial risk assessment instruments are used in many jurisdictions to inform decisions regarding pretrial release and conditions. Many are concerned that the use of pretrial risk assessment instru...

10 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1983
TL;DR: This paper found very few studies directed explicitly at the topic of prison-to-mental hospital transfer and found that the justices and their clerks simply could find no relevant empirical data on which to rely.
Abstract: It is becoming commonplace for the United States Supreme Court to cite social science research when it decides cases of relevance to the criminal justice (Ballew v. Georgia)1 or mental health systems (Addington v. Texas).2 Against this background, the first thing to strike a social scientist in the Vitek 3 prison-to-mental hospital transfer case is that the Court cited not a single piece of psychological or sociological data. This lack of attention to research on “social facts” (Saks, 1980) regarding prisoners who are transferred to mental hospitals bespeaks no general retreat by the Court from the incorporation of social science in judicial decisions. Rather, the more probable explanation is that the justices and their clerks simply could find no relevant empirical data on which to rely. Indeed, in our extensive search for material for this chapter, we have found very few studies directed explicitly at the topic of prison-to-mental hospital transfer. We shall, therefore, consider in some detail the results of our own recent national survey (see Introduction), as well as an in depth interim study of transfer procedures in six states.

9 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors demonstrate that none of the ASA’s defenses of the expert's method has merit and that the expert violated basic methodological rules set out by the ASA.
Abstract: The American Sociological Association (ASA) filed an amicus brief in Wal-Mart v. Dukes in which the ASA defended the testimony of the plaintiffs’ sociological expert. Unfortunately, the ASA’s portrayal and defense of the method and opinions of this expert do not match the actual method used, and opinions offered, by the expert in the Wal-Mart case. The authors demonstrate that none of the ASA’s defenses of the expert’s method has merit and that the expert violated basic methodological rules set out by the ASA’s own sources. The opinions to which the expert testified, therefore, lacked a scientific foundation.

9 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The purpose of this article is to serve as an introduction to ROC graphs and as a guide for using them in research.

17,017 citations

Book
01 Jul 2002
TL;DR: In this article, a review is presented of the book "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman".
Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

3,642 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap, including performance errors, computational limitations, the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and a different construal of the task by the subject.
Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

3,068 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: There is general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties, and support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality.
Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

3,055 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: This article addresses the important questions of how to infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"?
Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.

3,046 citations