John Monahan

Bio: John Monahan is an academic researcher from University of Virginia. The author has contributed to research in topics: Poison control & Risk assessment. The author has an hindex of 72, co-authored 313 publications receiving 21833 citations. Previous affiliations of John Monahan include University of California, San Francisco & City University of New York.

Vitek and Beyond: The Empirical Context of Prison-to-Hospital Transfers

Abstract: In the 1980 case of Vitek v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court held that the transfer of a prison inmate to a mental hospital required an administrative hearing to determine whether the transfer was appropriate. This decision "broke new ground in the area of corrections law" since it concluded that "at least one change in a prisoner's status, by its very nature, could not be accomplished without some formal factfinding procedure."2 A recent and comprehensive analysis of Vitek precludes the necessity of reviewing the legal precedents or reasoning of the case here.3 The Supreme Court decided Vitek, however, without the benefit of any descriptive and analytic account of the empirical context in which decisions are made to transfer prisoners to mental hospitals. Without such information it is not possible to assess the extent to which Vitek addresses the central issues in the transfer process. This article, after summarizing the very limited existing research on the prison-to-mental hospital transfer process, presents the results of a study undertaken to fill that informational gap. The study gathered statistical data on the types of transfers that occur in six of the United States, the nature of the facilities to which prisoners are transferred, and the perceptions of the staff at the prisons and mental hospitals involved in the transfer of prisoners. One conclusion from this study is that Vitek must be read broadly as applying to the transfer of prisoners to mental health facilities operated by departments of corrections (DOCs), and not just to the transfer of prisoners to hospitals operated by departments of mental health (DMHs). This is essential

Valid or voodoo? A qualitative study of attorney perceptions of risk assessment in sentencing and plea bargaining.

Abstract: Prior research largely has explored judicial perceptions of risk assessment in sentencing. Little is known about how other court actors, specifically, prosecutors and defense attorneys, perceive risk assessments in the sentencing process. Here, we report a qualitative study on the use of risk assessment by prosecutors and defense attorneys in Virginia. A prior survey (n = 70) pointed to a statistically significant difference in how prosecutors and defense attorneys view the role of recidivism risk in sentencing. On the basis of the results of this quantitative study, we collected follow-up qualitative data via interview (n = 30) to explain this unexpected difference. Analysis confirmed the survey findings that prosecutors and defense attorneys differ in their perceptions of risk assessment in sentencing. Results suggest that court actor perceptions vary as a function of professional role in the service of the identified client (the community or the defendant) and their interests. Although perceptions diverged on utility risk assessment in sentencing, both prosecutors and defense attorneys were outspoken in their skepticism of the Nonviolent Risk Assessment instrument that is used to predict recidivism risk in Virginia. This latter finding identifies obstacles that may emerge as jurisdictions adopt a risk-based approach to sentencing. We conclude with recommendations for addressing these barriers that may provide useful guidance on the implementation process.

The Classification of Violence Risk.

Abstract: The Classification of Violence Risk (COVR®) is an interactive software program designed to estimate the risk that a person hospitalized for mental disorder will be violent to others. The software l...

Case-Specific Sociological Inference: Meta-Norms for Expert Opinions

Abstract: This essay responds to comments on our earlier paper discussing the American Sociological Association’s amicus brief in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes case. We identify areas of agreement and disagreement with the commentators and close with proposed meta-norms that should govern experts who seek to apply social science research to the facts of a particular case.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Abstract: A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Peer relations and later personal adjustment: Are low-accepted children at risk?

Abstract: In this review, we examine the oft-made claim that peer-relationship difficulties in childhood predict serious adjustment problems in later life. The article begins with a framework for conceptualizing and assessing children's peer difficulties and with a discussion of conceptual and methodological issues in longitudinal risk research. Following this, three indexes of problematic peer relationships (acceptance, aggressiveness, and shyness/withdrawal) are evaluated as predictors of three later outcomes (dropping out of school, criminality, and psychcpathology). The relation between peer difficulties and later maladjustment is examined in terms of both the consistency and strength of prediction. A review and analysis of the literature indicates general support for the hypothesis that children with poor peer adjustment are at risk for later life difficulties. Support is clearest for the outcomes of dropping out and criminality. It is also clearest for low acceptance and aggressiveness as predictors, whereas a link between shyness/withdrawal and later maladjustment has not yet been adequately tested. The article concludes with a critical discussion of the implicit models that have guided past research in this area and a set of recommendations for the next generation of research on the risk

Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality

Abstract: Modern theories in cognitive psychology and neuroscience indicate that there are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend risk. The analytic system uses algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus, formal logic, and risk assessment. It is relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious control. The experiential system is intuitive, fast, mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness. The experiential system enabled human beings to survive during their long period of evolution and remains today the most natural and most common way to respond to risk. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad). This system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it's safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses to risk as irrational. Current wisdom disputes this view. The rational and the experiential systems operate in parallel and each seems to depend on the other for guidance. Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning cannot be effective unless it is guided by emotion and affect. Rational decision making requires proper integration of both modes of thought. Both systems have their advantages, biases, and limitations. Now that we are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion and reason that is essential to rational behavior, the challenge before us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the one hand, how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events? On the other hand, how do we infuse needed "doses of feeling" into circumstances where lack of experience may otherwise leave us too "coldly rational"? This article addresses these important questions.