John R. Gauvin

Bio: John R. Gauvin is an academic researcher from University of Rhode Island. The author has contributed to research in topics: Enforcement & Groundfish. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 190 citations.

Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries

Abstract: This article focuses on measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed U.S. fisheries. Novel measurement techniques are used to characterize the extent and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. According to the authors’ estimates, noncompliance increased substantially in 1986 and remained high through 1988 in the groundfish fishery. On Georges Bank during 1987, a quarter to a half of all groundfish vessels were identified as frequent violators, committing closed area violations on about one‐third of their trips and using illegal mesh on nearly all trips. Illegal earnings by a typical frequent violator operating in the groundfish fishery on Georges Bank amounted to $225,000 per year in 1987. A theory of compliance in fisheries is developed and applied to explain the trends and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. Biological and economic forces are shown to be dominant causes of the recent deterioration in compliance. Other contributin...

An Econometric Study of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance in the Commercial Inshore Lobster Fishery of Massachusetts

Abstract: The economics literature is replete with studies of the economic consequences of various property rights and regulatory schemes in fisheries. Practical experience with such schemes has shown that the enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations is a troublesome and expensive enterprise. Yet, studies of the economic aspects of regulatory enforcement in fisheries have only recently appeared in the literature.1

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

Abstract: An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.

Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries

Abstract: This study adds to the limited body of empirical evidence on the effect that legitimacy and deterrence have on compliance behavior. The theoretical models of compliance behavior tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for legitimacy, deterrence, and other motivations expected to influence indiv duals' decisions whether to comply. Probit and Tobit econometric estimators are used to examine the compliance behavior of 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishermen who face a regulation banning them from fishing in a zone along the coast. The results of the empirical analysis provide additional evidence on the relationship of deterrence and legitimacy to compliance. The findings are also used to draw implications for compliance policy for regulated fisheries. According to normative compliance theory, people tend to obey laws made and implemented by authorities perceived to be legitimate. A key determinant of perceived legitimacy, according to the procedural justice literature, is the fairness built into the procedures used to develop and implement laws and regulations.l Paternoster et al. (1997) note that while there are numerous theoretical perspectives suggesting that legitimacy is an important determinant of compliance, the empirical evidence making that connection is meager.2 Our study adds to this limited body of empirical evidence. The subjects of our study are fishermen. Fishermen are excellent subjects for the study of compliance. They are subject to numerous regulations that constrain their opportunities to earn income, and temptations and opportunities for offending repeatedly occur.3 Passion, inadvertence, and accident rarely cause a fishery violation; most are the result of deliberate choice. The behavior of fishermen offers good evidence on which to test the role deterrence, legitimacy, and other factors play in explaining compliance. Studying the compliance behavior of such regulated economic agents as fishermen is important for other reasons. Achieving compliance in regulated industries is both costly and difficult. Expenditures on enforcement commonly constitute the largest cost element in governmental regulatory programs. The viability of environmental protection and resource management programs is often threatened by low rates of compliance and high enforcement costs. This raises questions whether there are ways to improve the cost effectiveness of traditional enforcement and whether there are ways to secure compliance without heavy reliance on costly enforcement. Central to improving the cost effectiveness of enforcement and compliance programs is understanding the compliance behavior of the economic agents subject to regulations. To this end, we present tests of alternative models of compliance behavior. The models tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations influencing individuals' decisions whether to comply.4 The tests are conducted on data from interviews with fishermen in Peninsular Malaysia (selfreports of violations). Becker (1968) was the first to develop a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity. Following Smith (1966 [1759], 1985 [1776]) and Bentham (1967 [1789]), Becker assumes that criminals behave basically like other individuals in that they attempt to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In Becker's model, an individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity.5 The basic deterrence framework used in these studies assumes that the threat of sanctions is the only policy mechanism available to improve compliance with regulations. …

Fleet dynamics and fishermen behavior: lessons for fisheries managers

Abstract: We review fleet dynamics and fishermen behavior from an economic and sociological basis in developing fisheries, in mature fisheries near full exploitation, and in senescent fisheries that are over...

The sleeping policeman: understanding issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation

Abstract: Rules governing human behaviour are at the heart of every system of natural resource management. Without compliance, however, rules are meaningless so effective enforcement is essential if conservation is to be successful. There is a large body of theory concerning enforcement and compliance with rules spread over several disciplines, including psychology, economics and sociology. However, there have been few attempts to extend this theory to conservation applications and there is little practical guidance for managers and conservation planners on the optimal design of enforcement programmes. We review approaches to understanding why individuals break rules and how optimal policy choices can reduce rule-breaking, highlighting research which has specifically dealt with natural resources. Because of the difficulty of studying rule-breaking behaviour directly, modelling approaches have been particularly important and have been used to explore behaviour at the individual, group and institutional levels. We illustrate the application of models of enforcement and compliance to conservation using the African elephant Loxodonta africana as a case study. Further work is needed to create practical tools which can be applied to the design of enforcement measures in conservation. Particular challenges include understanding the importance of violations of rationality assumptions and incorporating intertemporal choice in models of decision making. In conclusion, we argue that a new field of robust theory and practice is urgently needed to ensure that issues of enforcement and compliance do not undermine conservation initiatives.

Normative and social influences affecting compliance with fisheries regulations

Abstract: Economic models of regulatory compliance in fisheries usually assume an instrumental determination of individual behavior in which the decision to comply or to violate depends primarily on the expected monetary costs and benefits. Policy implications tend, as a result, to focus only on deterrence, that is, increasing the expected monetary costs of violation. More complete models of compliance behavior take into account factors such a social influence, moral values, and the perceived legitimacy of regulations and the regulatory authority. The paper describes an investigation into the non-monetary factors affecting compliance with output (quota) restrictions among fishermen in the United Kingdom.