It is argued that (a) social identification is a perception of oneness with a group of persons; (b) social identification stems from the categorization of individuals, the distinctiveness and prestige of the group, the salience of outgroups, and the factors that traditionally are associated with group formation; and (c) social identification leads to activities that are congruent with the identity, support for institutions that embody the identity, stereotypical perceptions of self and others, and outcomes that traditionally are associated with group formation, and it reinforces the antecedents of identification. This perspective is applied to organizational socialization, role conflict, and intergroup relations.

Social Identity Theory and the Organization

The growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult. If decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem, how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions? What factors shape their behavior? Under conditions of uncertainty, what are the origins of international institutions? And how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge? While a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation, the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights. At its core, the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed. Among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system-level factors, unit-level factors, or some complex interplay between the two; whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent; and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create, defend, or expand their own wealth and power, to enhance collective material benefits, or to promote nonmaterial values.' A related question of

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Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination

Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

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International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

There has been a great deal of research in recent years concerning the use of substantive policy analysis in public policy-making. This paper seeks to integrate those findings - e.g., the ‘enlightenment function’ of policy research - into a more general model of policy-making over periods of a decade or more. The conceptual framework focuses on the belief systems of advocacy coalitions within policy subsystems as the critical vehicle for understanding the role of policy analysis in policy-oriented learning and the effect, in turn, of such learning on changes in governmental programs.

An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein

Is human life expectancy approaching its limit? Many--including individuals planning their retirement and officials responsible for health and social policy--believe it is, but the evidence presented in the
 Policy Forum
 suggests otherwise. For 160 years, best-performance life expectancy has steadily increased by a quarter of a year per year, an extraordinary constancy of human achievement. Mortality experts have repeatedly asserted that life expectancy is close to an ultimate ceiling; these experts have repeatedly been proven wrong. The apparent leveling off of life expectancy in various countries is an artifact of laggards catching up and leaders falling behind.

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Broken Limits to Life Expectancy

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The Cybernetic Theory of Decision

List of Figures ix Preface to the Second Paperback Edition xi Preface xxi Chapter 1: Introduction 3 PART ONE: PARADIGMS OF THE DECISION PROCESS Chapter 2: The Analytic Paradigm 25 Chapter 3: The Cybernetic Paradigm 47 Chapter 4: Cognitive Processes 88 Chapter 5: Politics and Policy 140 PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR SHARING 1956-1964 Chapter 6: Strains in the Alliance: Genesis of a Two-Value Problem 153 Chapter 7: The Development of Nuclear Sharing Proposals: 1956-1960 173 Chapter 8: The Rise of the Multilateral Force: 1961-1963 199 Chapter 9: Asendancy and Sudden Death of the Multilateral Force: 1963-1964 327 Chapter 10: Epilogue: Conclusions and Implications 327 Bibliography 343 Index 361

The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis

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Climate and social stress: implications for security analysis.

At the moment, the revision of security policy and the formation of a new consensus to support it are still at an early stage of development. The idea of comprehensive security cooperation among the major military establishments to form an inclusive international security arrangement has been only barely acknowledged and is only partially developed. The basic principle of cooperation has been proclaimed in general terms in the Paris Charter issued in November of 1990. Important implementing provisions have been embodied in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Except for the regulation of U.S. and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces, however, these arrangements apply only to the European theater and even there have not been systematically developed. The formation of a new security order requires that cooperative theaters of military engagement be systematically developed. Clearly that exercise will stretch the minds of all those whose thinking about security has been premised on confrontational methods.Nonetheless, such a stretching is unavoidable. The new security problems are driven by powerful forces, reshaping the entire international context. They impose starkly different requirements. They will deflect even the impressive momentum of U.S. military traditions. The eventual outcome is uncertain. It turns upon political debates yet to be held, consensus judgements yet to form, and events and their implications yet to unfold. Fundamental reconceptualization of security policy is a necessary step in the right direction, and it is important to get on with it. Getting on with it means defining the new concept of cooperative security, identifying the trends that motivate it, outlining its implications for practical policy action, and acknowledging its constraints. These tasks are the purpose of this essay.

A New Concept of Cooperative Security

David G. Victor is a Professor at Stanford Law School, Director of Stanford's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. M. Granger Morgan is Head of Carnegie Mellon University's Department of Engineering and Public Policy and Director of the Climate Decision Making Center. Jay Apt is Professor of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University. John Steinbruner is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Katharine Ricke is a doctoral student at Carnegie Mellon University. Additional materials are available online at www.cfr.org/geoengineering.

John Steinbruner

Papers

The Cybernetic Theory of Decision

The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis

Climate and social stress: implications for security analysis.

A New Concept of Cooperative Security

The Geoengineering Option