John T. Parry

Abstract: Recent scholarship in international law – for example, recent books by Mary Ellen O’Connell and Michael Scharf – relies on the idea of a “Grotian tradition” or of “Grotian moments” to provide normative foundations for significant parts of the contemporary international legal system. Despite the significant value of this scholarship, the underlying claim of a Grotian tradition is deeply flawed. The Grotian tradition itself was invented by mid-twentieth century scholars such as Hersch Lauterpacht to serve the goals of post-war liberal internationalism. There is no reason to believe that there is any more longstanding and normatively attractive tradition of engagement with the ideas of Hugo Grotius in international law and/or international relations. Indeed, many of the foundational ideas of Grotius’s own system of international law are deeply at odds with liberal or progressive approaches to contemporary international law. “What Is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?” examines the claims made by and on behalf of the Grotian tradition and exposes the ways in which it fails to match up with the actual life and writings of Hugo Grotius. The article historicizes Grotius to demonstrate that much of his work – as propagandist, government official, attorney for the Dutch East India Company, and author of The Law of Prizes, The Free Sea, and The Rights of War and Peace – functioned to legitimate a violent and imperial conception of international law that served the interests of a simultaneously vulnerable and expansionist Dutch Republic. The result is not simply that the Grotian tradition is a fraud, or that Grotius is an inapt figure for any desirable conception of international law. Even more, a behind the scenes account of the Grotian tradition serves as a cautionary tale: international legal argument and international legal theory should reject the effort to claim deep historical foundations for the goals associated with liberal and progressive approaches to international law. A more self-conscious and critical stance holds out far better prospects of advancing those goals.

Abstract: Recent scholarship in international law – for example, recent books by Mary Ellen O’Connell and Michael Scharf – relies on the idea of a “Grotian tradition” or of “Grotian moments” to provide normative foundations for significant parts of the contemporary international legal system. Despite the significant value of this scholarship, the underlying claim of a Grotian tradition is deeply flawed. The Grotian tradition itself was invented by mid-twentieth century scholars such as Hersch Lauterpacht to serve the goals of post-war liberal internationalism. There is no reason to believe that there is any more longstanding and normatively attractive tradition of engagement with the ideas of Hugo Grotius in international law and/or international relations. Indeed, many of the foundational ideas of Grotius’s own system of international law are deeply at odds with liberal or progressive approaches to contemporary international law. “What Is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?” examines the claims made by and on behalf of the Grotian tradition and exposes the ways in which it fails to match up with the actual life and writings of Hugo Grotius. The article historicizes Grotius to demonstrate that much of his work – as propagandist, government official, attorney for the Dutch East India Company, and author of The Law of Prizes, The Free Sea, and The Rights of War and Peace – functioned to legitimate a violent and imperial conception of international law that served the interests of a simultaneously vulnerable and expansionist Dutch Republic. The result is not simply that the Grotian tradition is a fraud, or that Grotius is an inapt figure for any desirable conception of international law. Even more, a behind the scenes account of the Grotian tradition serves as a cautionary tale: international legal argument and international legal theory should reject the effort to claim deep historical foundations for the goals associated with liberal and progressive approaches to international law. A more self-conscious and critical stance holds out far better prospects of advancing those goals.

Abstract: Legal prohibitions against torture cannot prevent state violence. Prohibiting torture will not end it. In "Understanding Torture", John T. Parry explains that torture is already a normal part of the state coercive apparatus. Torture is about dominating the victim for a variety of purposes, including public order; control of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities; and, domination for the sake of domination. Seen in this way, Abu Ghraib sits on a continuum with contemporary police violence in U.S. cities; violent repression of racial minorities throughout U.S. history; and the exercise of power in a variety of political, social, and interpersonal contacts. Creating a separate category for an intentionally narrow set of practices labeled and banned as torture, Parry argues, serves to normalize and legitimate the remaining practices that are 'not torture'. Consequently, we must question the hope that law can play an important role in regulating state violence. No one who reads this book can fail to understand the centrality of torture in modern law, politics, and governance.

Abstract: This commentary considers the current international debate over torture through a framework of modern state power. Most pointedly, the commentary suggests that several aspects of torture and related abuse practised by the United States and other countries, such as its hidden quality, its status as an exception, and its total domination of the victim, reflect the workings of the modern state. This commentary suggests that international and US law on torture and coercion enable rather than prevent the modern practice of state torture. Finally, this commentary considers the ways in which the use of extraordinary rendition and the creation of a class of people known as 'ghost detainees' exemplify the characteristics of modern torture, and asks whether these examples have more general application.

Abstract: My goal in this essay is to combine two ways of thinking about torture and related forms of coercive treatment and interrogation. The first way is a legal analysis of some of the issues surrounding torture, with particular reference to the practice of extraordinary rendition (the use of force rather than legal process to take suspected "terrorists" from one country to another for purposes of detention and interrogation) and the existence of so-called "ghost detainees" (people who are secretly held and interrogated by the U.S or its allies in undisclosed locations and who are outside the protections of domestic or international law in any practical sense). Although some of my arguments and conclusions on these issues may be surprising or at least debatable, they will be set largely within a familiar context of legal argument and analysis. The second is an effort to think more conceptually or theoretically, albeit sketchily, about what torture is and how it operates within and as a part of modern societies. By "modern," I mean simply societies governed as centralized, often democratic nation states and the social and psychological dynamics associated with them - such things as "bureaucracies and corporations, the nuclear family with its bourgeois mores, human and social sciences and the institutions that support them." Although we often think of these things positively, as reflecting the progress of enlightenment values, the experience of modernity also generates concerns about the ways in which these structures can "ingrain destructive patterns of thinking and acting" that result in a level of dehumanization or subjection of people that is different in degree and kind from what is arguably inherent in the relationship between individual and society. My point in undertaking this second type of analysis is to get a broader perspective on the reasons that torture and its close equivalents are practiced by countries such as the U.S., and at the ways in which they are practiced - including the ways in which law makes room for these practices. As I hope will become clear in this essay, one of the most important aspects of modern torture is the creation of doubt as to whether torture has happened at all. Extraordinary rendition and the creation of ghost detainees serve this function well.

Abstract: American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

Abstract: dimensions of global law and includes critical perspectives from various religious and philosophical traditions. Two dozen leading scholars discuss the constituent principles of this new global legal order historically, comparatively, and currently. The first part uses a historicalbiographical approach to study a few of the major Christian architects of global law and transnational legal theory, from St. Paul to Jacques Maritain. The second part distills the deep Christian sources and dimensions of the main principles of global law, historically and today, separating out the distinct Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Christian contributions as appropriate. Finally, the authors address a number of pressing global issues and challenges, where a Christian-informed legal perspective can and should have deep purchase and influence. The work makes no claim that Christianity is the only historical shaper of global law, nor that it should monopolize the theory and practice of global law today. But the book does insist that Christianity, as one of the world’s great religions, has deep norms and practices, ideas and institutions, prophets and procedures that can be of benefit as the world struggles to find global legal resources to confront humanity’s greatest challenges. The volume will be an essential resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of law and religion, transnational law, legal philosophy, and legal history.

Abstract: We live in times when, as Conor Gearty has pointed out, ‘legal scholars in the US are being taken seriously when they float the idea of torture warrants as a reform to what they see as the unacceptably uncodified system of arbitrary torture that they believe currently prevails’. And he is right when he goes on to add that ‘This is like reacting to a series of police killings with proposals to reform the law on homicide so as to sanction officially approved pre-trial executions.' It is because the general public is taking these academics seriously that there is an urgent need to expose how spurious their ideologically driven arguments are. The “respectability” they confer on the argument that so-called ticking bombs justify torture, and that it had therefore better be regulated, needs to be countered. Otherwise there is a real danger that western politicians will succeed in persuading us to go along with them when they insist that another basic freedom – freedom from torture – is yet one more value we must abandon in the endless “war on terrorism”. It is a short road from legalising torture intended to gain information to accepting torture as a legitimate weapon and for all sorts of purposes. The “intellectual respectability” conferred by the academy is essential for that enterprise. Thus, since Alan Dershowitz’s carefully constructed proposal to introduce torture warrants is both the most prominent and the most sophisticated of today’s attempts to make torture respectable, it is his proposal we need to focus on. In the Introduction, I say something about both the intellectual and the political contexts of the so-called ticking bomb scenario that is the basis of these proposals. In chapter two I argue that the “ticking bomb” scenario remains in crucial respects a fantasy; and that the grounds it is said to offer for justifying interrogational torture so as to avoid a putative catastrophe are spurious. In chapter three I argue that, whatever you think of those arguments, the consequences of legalising interrogational torture, and thus institutionalising it, would be so disastrous as to outweigh any such catastrophes anyway. Finally, in chapter four, I draw together what the details of my argument imply about torture in general and interrogational torture in particular; and about why any even semi-decent society must abhor torture -– in all circumstances, always, everywhere.

Abstract: This thesis explores how Anglophone literature debated the rise of modern international law since the late nineteenth century, including the founding of the United Nations and the 1948 declaration of human rights. While international law has its origins in the early modern period, it was largely at the turn of the century, with the Berlin Conference, that it began taking shape as a colonial and then a postcolonial, global ethics. In this thesis, I lay claim to literature’s capacity to legislate by examining instances where Anglophone novelists—including Joseph Conrad, Bryher, Vladimir Nabokov, Chinua Achebe, and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie—work through the promises and problems of international jurisprudence. More than a mere reflection of international law’s evolving theory and practice, the literature I treat registers the law’s presumptions and first principles while interrogating its capacity to follow through with its declarations. In spreading the law’s claims while also submitting them to the scrutiny of close reading, these novels are both advocates of and at times stubborn liabilities for international law’s normative worlds. Collectively, these Anglophone novelists scrutinize international law’s ability to shape the ways we come to know ourselves and one another as rights-bearing individuals, international actors, advocates, and activists. Recent work in the humanities has begun to address the ways in which international law is a set of interlocked narratives that claim

Abstract: Despite the general prohibition of using inter-state force imposed by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, force has been used under the auspices of self-defence, collective security and humanitarian crises. Such use of force has brought challenges to international law regarding its existence and efficacy. Although no state has denied the validity of such prohibition, many attempts have been made to legitimise use of such force on different grounds, namely exception, expansion and explanation. Unlike Public international law, Islamic law of Nations (Siyar) does not provide for a general prohibition of use of force but recognises circumstances in which such force can be legitimately used. The compatibility of these conflicting provisions of legitimate inter-state use of force offered by these two systems are significant for the prevention of aggressive use of force. The assessment of legitimacy of these conflicting provisions shall reveal where the legitimacy lies - is it in Islamic international law or Public international law or both or none of them? The results of the legitimacy assessment demonstrate that these two systems could sit in plural fashion by complementing each other’s legitimacy-deficits. However, the legitimacy and compatibility of Public international law and Islamic international law significantly depend on the development of an underlying pluralistic legal framework of international law with a healthy dose of legitimacy. Therefore, a comparative analysis of these two systems reveals the extent to which a complementary legal framework could be compatible and legitimate. The comparative analysis of the legitimacy of use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law includes examination of classical and contemporary sources to identify the existing legitimacy deficits of the two systems. The analysis follows on an inquiry into the the compatibility of these potentially two conflicting legal systems to complement each other. In this regard, the research expands on another inquiry into how the existing legitimacy deficits of the two systems could be overcome. Generally, this thesis seeks to address three fundamental and interrelated research questions, namely - (1) To what extent use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law is legitimate? (2) How the legitimacy deficits of Public international law and Islamic international law could be overcome? (3) Whether use of force in Public international law and Islamic international law can be compatible in modern world to secure higher degree of legitimacy?