Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

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The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review

Development is often taken to mean rising incomes. Discussions of the "goals of development" now often emphasize the reduction of poverty, rather than raising average incomes per se. The role of social services—particularly basic health and education—has also received greater emphasis in the 1980s, viewed mainly as instruments for raising the incomes of the poor. But, in all these approaches, income growth of one sort or another is what development is all about. A rather different view of the meaning of development has recently found expression in the 1990 Human Development Report (HRD) produced by the United Nations Development Programme. A conceptual underpinning for this approach can be found in the work of Amartya Sen. The essence of this view is that human development—what people can actually do and be—is the overriding purpose of economic development. Underdevelopment is viewed as the lack of certain basic capabilities, rather than lack of income per se. We do not aim here to advocate one of these approaches over the other, but rather to explore their implications for development policy. For instance, what does the human development approach imply about the role of economic growth and, in particular, about reducing income poverty? Should development priorities shift toward the provision of public services in poor countries, even if such a shift is at the expense of income growth?

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.7.1.133

Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services

Human senescence has been delayed by a decade. This finding, documented in 1994 and bolstered since, is a fundamental discovery about the biology of human ageing, and one with profound implications for individuals, society and the economy. Remarkably, the rate of deterioration with age seems to be constant across individuals and over time: it seems that death is being delayed because people are reaching old age in better health. Research by demographers, epidemiologists and other biomedical researchers suggests that further progress is likely to be made in advancing the frontier of survival — and healthy survival — to even greater ages.

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Biodemography of human ageing.

In the beginning was the story Or rather: many stories, of many places, in many voices, pointing toward many ends.

/pdf/a-place-for-stories-nature-history-and-narrative-21wszhxpvp.pdf

A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative

ion: The grounding relations are relations of abstraction. The derivative entities, in order to be an ‘‘ontological free lunch’’ and count as no further addition, ought to be already latent within the substances. In other words, the grounding relations should just be ways of separating out aspects that are implicitly present from the start.37 Here is the sort of picture of substances that these diagnostics converge upon: Priority Monism: There is exactly one substance, the whole concrete cosmos. Insofar as there can be no difference in the world without a difference somewhere in the cosmos, priority monism delivers a complete roster of substances.38 This roster is trivially minimal, since the only proper subset of {the cosmos} is Ø, which obviously is not complete. Moreover, this roster is clearly metaphysically general—the ways the cosmos could be just are the ways the world could be.39 And this roster is empirically specifiable since advanced physics is field theoretic physics, and field theory has a natural monistic interpretation in terms of a spacetime bearing properties.40 These diagnostics also converge on: Thick Particularism: Substances are thick particulars (concrete things). 37 Scaltsas imputes a similar view to Aristotle: ‘‘for Aristotle a substance is complex, not because it is a conglomeration of distinct abstract components like matter, form, or properties; a substance is complex because such items can be separated out by abstraction, which is a kind of division of the unified substance’’ (1994: 109) 38 To see the bite of completeness, note that a pluralistic roster comprising point particles in spatiotemporal relations would fail completeness if the whole had emergent features, as are arguably present in entangled quantum systems (Schaffer forthcoming–a: §2.2). 39 In contrast, a pluralistic roster of mereological simples fails generality, since the world could be gunky. That would be a way the world that could be that is not a way that any roster of simples could be (Schaffer forthcoming–a: §2.4). 40 For instance, general relativistic models are <M, g, T> triples, where M is a four-dimensional continuously differentiable point manifold, g is a metric-field tensor, and t is a stress-energy tensor (with both g and t defined at every point of M). The obvious ontology here is that of a spacetime manifold bearing fields. Thus Norton notes: ‘‘a spacetime is a manifold of events with certain fields defined on the manifold. The literal reading is that this manifold is an independently existing structure that bears properties’’ (2004). Quantum field theory invites a similar monistic reading. As d’Espagnat explains: ‘‘Within [quantum field theory] particles are admittedly given the status of mere properties, ... But they are properties of something. This something is nothing other than space or space-time, ...’’ (1983: 84) See Schaffer (manuscript) for some further defense of the spacetime-bearing-fields view of what is fundamental. on what grounds what 379 That is, substances have both a that-aspect—the thin particular, the substratum—and a what-aspect—the thickening features, the modes (c.f. Armstrong 1997: 123–6). Plugging in priority monism, the that-aspect of the cosmos is spacetime, and the what-aspect of it is its fields. So among the derivative categories are those of substratum and mode: Substratum and Mode as Derivative: substratum and mode are abstractions from thick particulars. Another derivative category will be the partialia, abstracted via: Universal Decomposition: The cosmos may be arbitrarily decomposed into parts. From priority monism plus universal decomposition, the entirety of the actual concrete mereological hierarchy of thick particulars is generated (whether or not the world is gunky). Wholes are complete and concrete unities, and partialia their incomplete aspects, arising from a process of ‘‘one-sided abstraction’’ (Bradley 1978: 124). With the partialia thus grounded, it remains to ground abstracta (such as numbers and possibilia) in the actual concrete realm. Here matters are too complicated to discuss further within the scope of this paper. But perhaps I have said enough to illustrate how at least one of the many possible neo-Aristotelian programs might look. To conclude: metaphysics as I understand it is about what grounds what. It is about the structure of the world. It is about what is fundamental, and what derives from it.41

On What Grounds What

The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.

Jonathan Aristotle

Papers

The Complete Works of Aristotle the Revised Oxford Translation

The Complete Works of Aristotle the Revised Oxford Translation /Edited by Jonathan Barnes. --