José A. Cuesta

TL;DR: In this paper, a review of non-mean-field effects in evolutionary game dynamics is presented, focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics.

TL;DR: This review discusses temporal and spatial effects focusing on the non-trivial modifications they induce when compared to the outcome of replicator dynamics, and the hypothesis of linearity and its relation to the choice of the rule for strategy update is analyzed.

TL;DR: The largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a lattice and a scale-free network suggest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans.

TL;DR: It is found that the cooperation level declines to an asymptotic state with low but nonzero cooperation, and an agent-based model based on the coexistence of these different strategies that is in good agreement with all the experimental observations is proposed.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors performed a systematic and exhaustive simulation in the different degrees of freedom of the problem and found that the robustness of spatial structure against changes in the update rule, or offer new insights into the subject, e.g., the relation between the intensity of selection and the asymmetry between the effects on games with mixed equilibria.