José M. Jiménez Gómez

Bio: José M. Jiménez Gómez is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Bankruptcy & Redistribution (cultural anthropology). The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 4 publications receiving 7 citations.

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

Abstract: It is well known that, in distributions problems, "Fairness" rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see Young (1994) and Moulin (1988) among many others). This paper provides, in this context, interesting basis in defense of intermediate agreements when two prominent proposals, representing different sets of "Equity Principles", highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifically, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a "natural" cooperative game, called the Bifocal Distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus, introduced by Schmeidler (1969), and the Shapley value, proposed by Shapley (1953), agree on recommending the "average of the two focal solutions". Finally, applying our analysis to bankruptcy problems, which have been analyzed extensively by Thomson (2003) and Moulin (2002), provides new "reasonable" solutions.

Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules

Abstract: In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems Specifially, by using, on the one hand, the Unanimous Concessions mechanism we justify Piniles' and the Constrained Egalitarian rules, and, on the other hand, with the Diminishing Claims procedure we retrieve the Dual of Pinile's and the Dual of Constrained Egalitarian rules

Why people reach intermediate agreements?: Axiomatic and strategic justifications

Abstract: As Roemer (1986) points out, things become more interesting once we include information. In this paper, following the line started by Jimenez-Gomez and Marco-Gil (2008), we define both a lower and an upper bounds on awards in the framework of the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem (Gadea et al. (2010)), which is an extended bankruptcy problem enriched with a Commonly Accepted Equity Principles set and the idea of treat everybody as evenly as possible (Dutta and Ray (1989) and Arin (2007), among others). Moreover, we contribute with the definition of the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive procedure, which consists on the recursive imposition of both bounds, providing a natural way of justifying the convex combination of bankruptcy rules. Specifically, we retrieve the midpoint of extreme and opposite well known ways of distributing the resource. Finally, we complete our analysis from the strategic viewpoint, obtaining similar results.

Fair bounds based solidarity.

Abstract: How should scholarships be distributed among the (public) higher education students? We raise this situation as a redistribution problem. Following the approach developed in Fleurbaey (1994) and Bossert (1995), redistribution should be based on the notion of solidarity and it re-allocates resources taking into account only agents' relevant characteristics. We also follow Luttens (2010a), who considers that compensation of relevant characteristics must be based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves. In doing so, we use the so-called fair bound (Moulin 2002) to define an egalitarian redistribution mechanism and characterize it in terms of non-negativity, priority in lower bound and solidarity. Finally, we apply our approach to the scholarships redistribution problem.

Non-price Competition, Real Rigidities and Inflation Dynamics

Abstract: In the last decade, the analytical progress achieved in the New Keynesian literature has been remarkable. Many of the early assumptions have been relaxed, leading to medium-scale macroeconomic models that are now able to capture many features of real-world data. Nevertheless, modern-day New Keynesian models still assume, as did their early counterparts, that firms compete in the market with no tools other than their relative prices. In particular, this literature has so far neglected the consequences of extending competition between firms to the non-price dimension. This paper tries to fill this gap by enriching the canonical New Keynesian framework to include both price and non-price competition. This has important consequences for the analysis of inflation dynamics, modifying in particular the inflation-marginal cost relationship. As a general result, we show that any activity by firms that boosts demand for their products, without directly affecting their prices, dampens the overall degree of real rigidities in price-setting.

Matlab code for "Solving the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty using the Krusell-Smith algorithm"

Abstract: Code to find the solution to the heterogeneous agents model in Den Haan, Judd and Juillard (2008). To solve for the individual policy rules, we use an Euler-equation method iterating on a grid of prespecified points. To compute the aggregate law of motion, we use the stochastic-simulation approach of Krusell and Smith (1998).

A Way to Play Claims Problems

Abstract: Commitment among agents is always difficult, especially when a scarce resource is to be shared. On the one hand, there are many possible ways to assign the available amount; on the other hand, each agent is motivated to propose a distribution that maximizes her award. In this paper, we propose a mechanism that combines the diminishing claims (Chun in Math Soc Sci 17(3):245–261, 1989) and the unanimous concessions (Herrero in Advances in economic design. Springer, Berlin, 2003) procedures, thereby obtaining a new justification of rules based on averaging.

Labour status and involuntary employment: family ties and part-time work in Spain

Abstract: Financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia and Feder Funds under project SEJ-2007-62656.

Bankruptcy problems with two references: an impartial compromise

Abstract: Pulido et al. (Annals Oper Res 158:133–141, 2008) present an extension of the classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill in Math Social Sci 2:345–371, 1982) where the involved agents have, apart from the claims vector, an additional reference vector. To analyze this extended problem, they propose the extreme and the diagonal approaches, both of them restricted to the case in which the reference vector is lower than the claims vector. We note that if the claims and the reference vectors are interchanged, the allocation proposed by the extreme approach varies. Therefore, by introducing the idea of impartiality, in the current approach, we propose an extension of their model in which no relation is assumed between the claims and reference vectors.