J
Josep Balasch
Researcher at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Publications - 55
Citations - 1642
Josep Balasch is an academic researcher from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The author has contributed to research in topics: Side channel attack & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 18, co-authored 53 publications receiving 1316 citations.
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
An In-depth and Black-box Characterization of the Effects of Clock Glitches on 8-bit MCUs
TL;DR: This work thoroughly analyse how clock glitches affect a commercial low-cost processor by performing a large number of experiments on five devices, and explains how typical fault attacks can be mounted on this device, and describes a new attack for which the fault injection is easy and the cryptanalysis trivial.
Book ChapterDOI
On the Cost of Lazy Engineering for Masked Software Implementations
TL;DR: In this article, a simple reduction from security proofs obtained in a (usual but not always realistic) model where leakages depend on the intermediate variables manipulated by the target device, to security proofs in a more realistic model where the transitions between these intermediate variables are leaked.
Proceedings Article
PrETP: privacy-preserving electronic toll pricing
Josep Balasch,Alfredo Rial,Carmela Troncoso,Bart Preneel,Ingrid Verbauwhede,Christophe Geuens +5 more
TL;DR: This work presents PrETP, a privacy-preserving ETP system in which on-board units can prove that they use genuine data and perform correct operations while disclosing the minimum amount of location data.
Journal ArticleDOI
PriPAYD: Privacy-Friendly Pay-As-You-Drive Insurance
TL;DR: This work presents PriPAYD, a system where the premium calculations are performed locally in the vehicle, and only aggregated data are sent to the insurance company, without leaking location information.
Proceedings Article
Gone in 360 seconds: Hijacking with Hitag2
TL;DR: Several weaknesses in the design of the cipher are revealed and three practical attacks that recover the secret key using only wireless communication are presented, which allow an adversary to bypass the cryptographic authentication, leaving only the mechanical key as safeguard.