This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.“Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

/pdf/minds-brains-and-programs-1okdg3cku7.pdf

Minds, brains, and programs

This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4. "Could a machine think?" On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

/pdf/minds-brains-and-programs-ejxgbkm7hu.pdf

Minds, Brains, and Programs

Mother Nature knows best--How engineered organizations of the future will resemble natural-born systems.

Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and Do

ELIZA is a program operating within the MAC time-sharing system of MIT which makes certain kinds of natural language conversation between man and computer possible. Input sentences are analyzed on the basis of decomposition rules which are triggered by key words appearing in the input text. Responses are generated by reassembly rules associated with selected decomposition rules. The fundamental technical problems with which ELIZA is concerned are: (1) the identification of key words, (2) the discovery of minimal context, (3) the choice of appropriate transformations, (4) generation of responses in the absence of key words, and (5) the provision of an editing capability for ELIZA “scripts”. A discussion of some psychological issues relevant to the ELIZA approach as well as of future developments concludes the paper.

/pdf/eliza-a-computer-program-for-the-study-of-natural-language-3vl73xxsrd.pdf

ELIZA — a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine

This paper describes a computer system for understanding English. The system answers questions, executes commands, and accepts information in an interactive English dialog. It is based on the belief that in modeling language understanding, we must deal in an integrated way with all of the aspects of language—syntax, semantics, and inference. The system contains a parser, a recognition grammar of English, programs for semantic analysis, and a general problem solving system. We assume that a computer cannot deal reasonably with language unless it can understand the subject it is discussing. Therefore, the program is given a detailed model of a particular domain. In addition, the system has a simple model of its own mentality. It can remember and discuss its plans and actions as well as carrying them out. It enters into a dialog with a person, responding to English sentences with actions and English replies, asking for clarification when its heuristic programs cannot understand a sentence through the use of syntactic, semantic, contextual, and physical knowledge. Knowledge in the system is represented in the form of procedures, rather than tables of rules or lists of patterns. By developing special procedural representations for syntax, semantics, and inference, we gain flexibility and power. Since each piece of knowledge can be a procedure, it can call directly on any other piece of knowledge in the system.

Understanding Natural Language

I had some strong reactions to Joe Weizenbaum's book, Computer Power and Human Reason. The book mentions some important concerns which are obscured by harsh and sometimes shrill accusations against the Artificial Intelligence research community. On the whole, it seems to me that the personal attacks distract and mislead the reader from more valuable abstract points. I strongly recommend Samuel Florman's article "In Praise of Technology" in the November, 1975, issue of Harper's Magazine to see a different opinion about the role of technology in modern society.

Computer Power and Human Reason

Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation.

From the Publisher:
Computer Power and Human Reason is a distinguished computer scientist's elucidation of the impact of scientific rationality on man's self-image.

Computer Power And Human Reason: From Judgement To Calculation

Mir wurde die Aufgabe gegeben uber verschiedene Folgen der Veroffentlichung meines Buches 
„Die Macht der Computer“
zu berichten.

Joseph Weizenbaum

Papers

ELIZA — a computer program for the study of natural language communication between man and machine

Computer Power and Human Reason

Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgement to Calculation.

Computer Power And Human Reason: From Judgement To Calculation

Die Rezeption des Buches Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft