/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

https://www.uh.edu/%7Ebsorense/RestucciaRogersonRED2008.pdf

Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with heterogeneous establishments

relationship. All subsequent studies confirmed it (see for example King and Levine, 1993, and the review in: Pagano, 1993). Goldsmith used a sample of 35 countries for the period between 1860 and 1963 to show the relationship between income and financial depth measured by the ratio between bank's assets and GDP. He also showed that in periods of rapid growth, financial depth grows faster than income. More details about measuring financial depth can be found in this paper. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH Velimir Šonje

/pdf/financial-development-and-economic-growth-1933kuo17q.pdf

Financial development and economic growth

Explaining levels of economic development hinges on explaining TFP dierences across coun- tries. In poor countries, total factor productivity (TFP) is particularly low in sectors producing tradable goods. We document that an important dierence between tradable and non-tradable sectors is their average establishment size: Tradable establishments operate at much larger scales. We develop a model co-determining aggregate TFP, sectoral TFP, and scales across industrial sectors. In our model, …nancial frictions disproportionately aect TFP in tradable sectors where production requires larger …xed costs. Our quantitative exercises show that …- nancial frictions explain a substantial part of the observed cross-country relationship between aggregate TFP, sectoral TFP, and output per worker.

/pdf/finance-and-development-a-tale-of-two-sectors-3e9cu3ezir.pdf

Finance and Development: A Tale of Two Sectors †

We use producer-level data to evaluate the role of financial frictions in determining total factor productivity (TFP). We study a model of establishment dynamics in which financial frictions reduce TFP through two channels. First, finance frictions distort entry and technology adoption decisions. Second, finance frictions generate dispersion in the returns to capital across existing producers and thus productivity losses from misallocation. Parameterizations of our model consistent with the data imply fairly small losses from misallocation, but potentially sizable losses from inefficiently low levels of entry and technology adoption. (JEL E32, E44, F41, G32, L60, O33, O47)

/pdf/finance-and-misallocation-evidence-from-plant-level-data-ltsh4hed8n.pdf

Finance and Misallocation: Evidence from Plant-Level Data

Sovereign default and maturity choice

The information technology (IT) revolution coincided with the transformation of the U.S. unsecured credit market. Households' borrowing increased rapidly and there was an even faster increase in bankruptcy filings. A risk of default model with asymmetric information and costly screening is introduced to study this period. When information costs are high, the design of contracts under private information prevents some households from borrowing with a risk of default. As information costs drop, households borrow more and bankruptcy filings increase. Quantitative exercises suggest that the IT revolution may have played an important role in the transformation of the unsecured credit market. (JEL E43, E44, G33)

The information technology revolution and the unsecured credit market

The two channels of default on unsecured consumer debt are (i) bankruptcy, which legally grants partial or complete removal of unsecured debt under certain circumstances, and (ii) delinquency, which is informal default via nonpayment. In the United States, both channels are used routinely. This paper introduces a model of unsecured consumer credit in the presence of both bankruptcy and delinquency. Our model yields three new findings: First, with respect to the choice between bankruptcy and delinquency, labor income shocks matter. Specifically, we find delinquency is readily used by borrowers with the worst labor market outcomes, even those with relatively minor levels of debt. In contrast, bankruptcy is used by households with relatively high debts, but whose long-run earnings prospects are high enough to make interest rate penalties from delinquency too large. Second, financial distress is persistent: households in poor financial conditions stay in that state for several quarters. Third, in broad terms, bankruptcy and delinquency are “substitutes,” with bankruptcy increasing as delinquency costs rise.

/pdf/bankruptcy-and-delinquency-in-a-model-of-unsecured-debt-1kntnu6e5e.pdf

Bankruptcy and Delinquency in a Model of Unsecured Debt

Consumer debt and bankruptcy are central issues today because of their explosive trends over the last 20 years in the U.S. economy. However, there is no convincing explanation for these facts. A drop in information costs, a potential cause, has not been evaluated mainly because there is no quantitative theory of consumer debt and bankruptcy where the cost of information plays an important role. This paper provides such a theory and quantifies how much of the rise in debt and bankruptcy can be attributed to the drop in information costs. In the model, lenders offer contracts specifying both interest rates and borrowing limits. In equilibrium, the contracts with low interest rates have tight borrowing limits, while those with high interest rates have loose borrowing limits. Despite being borrowing constrained, low-risk individuals prefer to borrow at the low interest rate. Conversely, high-risk individuals prefer to borrow more at higher interest rates. As the costs of information drop, it may be possible to explicitly condition loans on an individual’s risk. This allows previously borrowing constrained individuals to borrow more. As a result, there is also more bankruptcy because the benefits of filing bankruptcy are increasing in the debt size. The quantitative importance of this mechanism is then investigated by calibrating the model’s parameters to match moments for the years 1983 and 2004. The model can successfully match key data moments for both years varying only the cost of information and the income distribution. To quantify the effect of the drop in information costs over the last 20 years, two counterfactual economies are computed. The main finding is that the drop in information costs alone generates around 40% of the total rise in consumer bankruptcy.

/pdf/the-role-of-information-in-consumer-debt-and-bankruptcy-1r9ri2k3lb.pdf

The Role of Information in Consumer Debt and Bankruptcy

https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-9.pdf

Juan M. Sánchez

Papers

Sovereign default and maturity choice

The information technology revolution and the unsecured credit market

Bankruptcy and Delinquency in a Model of Unsecured Debt

The Role of Information in Consumer Debt and Bankruptcy

Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market