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Author

Julia Siripurapu

Bio: Julia Siripurapu is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Supreme court. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 16 citations.
Topics: Supreme court

Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the nature and causes of unanimity in the Supreme Court of Canada and find substantially more support for the perspectives of the justices than for the perspective derived from the attitudinal model on unanimity.
Abstract: . Most of the empirical work on the decision making of justices on the Supreme Court of Canada has taken as its exclusive focus the divided decisions of the Court. In contrast to this extensive body of research on divided decision, the much more limited knowledge of unanimous decisions is troubling because such decisions constitute nearly three-quarters of all of the formal decisions of the Court. The analysis reported below provides a first step towards understanding the neglected nature of unanimous decisions. This investigation of the nature and causes of unanimity in the Supreme Court of Canada explores two competing explanations: one drawn from the most widely accepted general explanation of judicial voting (that is, the attitudinal model) and the other from the perspectives of the justices themselves. To determine that perspective, the author interviewed ten of the current or recent justices on the Court. After describing these two alternative accounts of unanimity, empirical tests are conducted of the implications of each view. We find substantially more support for the perspectives of the justices than for the perspective derived from the attitudinal model on unanimity.Resume. La majeure partie du travail de recherche empirique portant sur la maniere dont les juges de la Cour supreme du Canada prennent leurs decisions se concentre exclusivement sur les decisions divisees de cette institution. En contraste avec cette foison d'etudes sur les decisions divisees, le corpus beaucoup plus limite de connaissances sur les decisions unanimes pose un probleme important, car celles-ci representent presque les trois quarts de la totalite des decisions formelles de la Cour supreme. L'analyse presentee ci-dessous se veut un premier pas vers une meilleure connaissance de la nature, trop negligee jusqu'a present, de ces decisions unanimes. Cette investigation sur la nature et les causes de l'unanimite dans les decisions de la Cour supreme du Canada explore deux voies se trouvant en competition : l'une qui resulte de l'explication la plus largement acceptee du vote judiciaire (soit le modele attitudinal), et l'autre qui decoule de la perspective personnelle des juges. Pour elucider cette perspective propre des juges, les auteurs ont interviewe dix juges actuels et recents de la Cour supreme du Canada. Apres avoir decrit ces deux explications alternatives de l'unanimite, ils effectuent des tests empiriques sur les implications respectives du modele attitudinal et des perspectives propres des juges. L'etude revele que les perspectives propres des juges ont beaucoup plus de poids que la perspective derivee du modele attitudinal en ce qui concerne l'unanimite.

16 citations


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Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2005

49 citations

11 Nov 2009
TL;DR: The work of as discussed by the authors describes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing its internal environment and processes, while situating the institution in its broader governmental and societal context.
Abstract: This dissertation describes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing its internal environment and processes, while situating the institution in its broader governmental and societal context. In addition, it offers an assessment of the behavioural and rational choice models of judicial decision making, which tend to portray judges as primarily motivated by their ideologically-based policy preferences. The dissertation adopts a historical institutionalist approach to demonstrate that judicial decision making is far more complex than is depicted by the dominant approaches within the political science literature. Drawing extensively on 28 research interviews with current and former justices, former law clerks and other staff members, the analysis traces the development of the Court into a full-fledged policy-making institution, particularly under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This analysis presents new empirical evidence regarding not only the various stages of the Court’s decision-making process but the justices’ views on a host of considerations ranging from questions of collegiality (how the justices should work together) to their involvement in controversial and complex social policy matters and their relationship with the other branches of government. These insights are important because they increase our understanding of how the Court operates as one of the country’s more important policy-making institutions. The findings have significant implications for debates over judicial activism and the relationship between courts and the other branches of government when dealing with the Charter. The project also concludes that the justices’ role perceptions – the ideas, norms and rules that govern their role as judges and that of the institution – both shape and constrain their decision making behaviour. Understanding judicial behaviour with a focus on role perceptions allows for bridge-building between the competing explanations of judicial decision making and for theory-building in the broader judicial politics literature.

23 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that judicial systems that limit policy-making authority also discourage the politicization of courts, encouraging judges to think narrowly about the interests of litigating parties.
Abstract: How does a court’s policy-making authority shape the nature of judicial behavior? We argue that judicial systems that limit policy-making authority also discourage the politicization of courts, encouraging judges to think narrowly about the interests of litigating parties. In contrast, granting a court high policy-making authority -- affecting potentially thousands of cases and other branches of government -- naturally encourages judges to consider broader ideological principles. Typically, unraveling cause and effect would be difficult, as judicial behavior and institutions are usually stable and endogenous. But an especially stark sequence of political and institutional changes in Brazil affords analytic leverage to explore these questions. A series of judicial reforms greatly expanded the Brazilian Supreme Court’s authority, and our analysis of judicial decisions shows the emergence of a political cleavage on the court after these reforms.

19 citations