What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

We experimentally investigate the extent to which social observability and the possibility of social judgment affect the decision to engage in theft, bribery and embezzlement conditional on individuals' cultural background. We involve a student sample characterized by cultural heterogeneity due to immigration of their ancestors to the US. We show that people with different cultural heritages respond differently to increased social observability of their actions. In particular, we find that the possibility of social judgment reduces rule breaking of individuals who identify culturally with high rule of law countries but not those who identify with low rule of law countries.

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Corruption, Social Judgment and Culture: An Experiment

This paper aims to examine the informal mechanisms and factors of corporate crime in Brazil that contribute to the persistence of political corruption. For this analysis, official records, e.g. closed criminal trials produced by Operation Carwash, one of the biggest cases of white-collar crime and political corruption in Brazil's history, will be used. The focus of the analysis is on the criminal trials, generated in the early phases of the investigation, which revealed the illegal activities of large Brazilian construction companies as well as its cartel-building to defraud the Petrobras' contracts. The analysis on the modus operandi of this cartel served to reconstruct the unwritten rules inside organizations that are involved in the bribery-scheme. The analysis showed that Brazilian private enterprises, represented by its senior executives and top managers, used the lack of regulation and informal rules, rooted in the political system, to achieve illegal profits.

Organizational crime and corruption in Brazil a case study of the “Operation Carwash” court records

Die Manipulationen der Wartelisten fur ein Organ durch Transplantationsmediziner haben in den letzten Jahren in Deutschland Aufsehen erregt Der Artikel behandelt die Frage, wie sich diese Manipulationen erklaren lassen Er tut dies mittels der Analyse von Gerichtsakten und Prufberichten sowie der Durchfuhrung von Interviews Er legt die theoretische Perspektive organisationaler Devianz zugrunde und pruft, inwiefern sich die Manipulationen durch individuelle und/oder organisationale Devianz erklaren lassen Dazu werden die inhaltsanalytisch gewonnenen Strukturdaten mit den in einer Deutungsmusteranalyse herausgearbeiteten Deutungs- und Handlungsregeln in diesem Feld verbunden Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Haufigkeit und Art der Manipulationen fur ein organisiertes Handeln sprechen, das sich mittels des medizinischen Wettbewerbsdrucks, der straffen fachautoritaren Hierarchien und der Sozialisation in einem Pionierfeld der Medizin etablieren konnte Dazu waren nach bisherigem Kenntnisstand keine personliche Bereicherung und keine kriminelle Energie notwendig Diese Form organisationaler und „professioneller“ Devianz kann stattdessen durch organisationale Anreizstrukturen und professionsbezogene Autonomie und Reputationsorientierungen erklart werden Sie unterscheidet sich masgeblich von der Wirtschaftskriminalitat, weil der okonomische Nutzen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt und die tragische Wahlsituation unter der Bedingung der Organknappheit dafur sorgt, dass sowohl bei Regeleinhaltung als auch bei Regelabweichung bestimmte Patienten sterben

Manipulationen in der Transplantationsmedizin. Ein Fall von organisationaler Devianz

Previous research indicates that the depletion of self-regulatory resources can promote unethical behavior that benefits the self. Extending this literature, we focus on norm-transgressing behavior that is intended to primarily benefit others. In particular, we predicted a differing effect of self-regulatory resource depletion on dishonesty that benefits one’s group, depending on the degree of identification with the group. Following a dual process approach, we argue that if identification with the group is strong, then people may have an automatic inclination to benefit their group even perhaps by lying. In contrast, if identification with the group is weak, then the default, uncontrolled impulse may be to tell the truth. Accordingly, identification with the social group should interact with self-regulatory resource depletion in predicting group-benefiting dishonesty. Focusing on pro-organizational dishonesty, we tested our hypotheses in one field study with 1269 employees and in one experimental study with 71 university students. As predicted, the results revealed a highly significant interaction of organizational identification and self-control strength: Depletion of self-regulatory resources increased the level of pro-organizational dishonesty among those who identify highly with the organization, but decreased the level of such behavior among those who identify less.

Unable to Resist the Temptation to Tell the Truth or to Lie for the Organization? Identification Makes the Difference

Corrupt practices in organizations are commonly explained via the rational choice of individual employees, with the benefits of deviant actors at the heart of the theoretical approach. This Article challenges the rational choice perspective with reference to cases of corruption in which the organizational benefits are crucial and personal gains negligible. The authors propose to embed the concept of “useful illegality” (Luhmann) into an institutional theory framework and develop a set of indicators for the systematic comparison of individual case studies. Exemplary analyses of two landmark cases of corporate bribery on behalf of German corporations' subsidiaries abroad (Siemens Argentina and Magyar Telekom) show that active corruption was neither simply a function of individual deviance, nor of personal gain. In contrast, institutional theory allows the modeling of organizational deviance as a function of unwritten rules that lend legitimacy to the deviant behavior of bribe payers. Despite plentiful opportunities in the periphery of these two multinational corporations, the few instances of personal gain were either in line with the organizational incentive structures (as in Telekom) or attributable to the loss of membership (as in Siemens). Mostly high-ranking employees, loyal to their organization, committed those crimes at high personal risks. The discussion of factors that explain why these “company men” nonetheless complied with the unwritten rules, in support of organizational benefits, leads the authors to conclude with likely consequences for effective regulation. They argue that it is the usefulness of the illegal behavior for the organization, its entrenchment in organizational cultures, and amplified adaptation problems with regard to changing institutional environments that explain what makes corrupt practices so hard to control and to regulate in a formal legal organization.

Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption

Corruption, organizational deviance and corporate compliance

Zusammenfassung Mittels einer Online-Befragung von Managern in führenden Positionen werden Hypothesen über den Einfluss von Normen und Werten auf die Korruptionsbereitschaft überprüft. Dabei wird zwischen organisationaler und individueller Korruption sowie zwischen informellen und formellen Normen unterschieden. Bei der organisationalen Korruption steht der erwartete Nutzen für die Organisation und die Relevanz informeller Organisationsnormen im Vordergrund. Bei der individuellen Korruption sind der Nutzen des Akteurs und formale Normen handlungsrelevant, wohingegen informelle Normen organisationaler Nützlichkeit in den Hintergrund treten. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass die Bereitschaft zur organisationalen Korruption quantitativ bedeutsamer ist als die Bereitschaft zu individueller Korruption. Die Ablehnung von Konformität, Tradition, Wohlwollen, Universalismus und Selbstbestimmung, die Präferenz für leistungs- und machtorientierte Werte und Hedonismus sowie die Zustimmung zu den informellen Normen in einem Unternehmen sind die wichtigsten Bedingungen für die Bereitschaft zu organisationaler Korruption. Diese Ergebnisse stützen die voluntaristische Kriminalitätstheorie und sie untermauern institutionentheoretische Annahmen der Organisationssoziologie.

Julian Klinkhammer

Papers

Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption

Corruption, organizational deviance and corporate compliance

Grenzen formaler Regulierung: Wie informelle Normen und kriminogene Werte die Korruptionsbereitschaft von Managern beeinflussen