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Julie L. Allen

Bio: Julie L. Allen is an academic researcher from All Saints' College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Syllogism & Belief bias. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 182 citations.

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TL;DR: It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.

191 citations


Cited by
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TL;DR: Data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement, and were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory.

466 citations

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TL;DR: Differences emerged against a background of similar reasoning tendencies across cultures in the absence of conflict between formal and intuitive strategies.

434 citations

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TL;DR: It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases.
Abstract: The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process of human reasoning, and many use the paradigm principally to study pragmatic and probabilistic processes. It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases.

364 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists’ proposals and argues in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify the different forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.
Abstract: Current theories propose that reasoning comprises two underlying systems (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The systems are identified as having functionally distinct roles, differ according to the type of information encoded, vary according to the level of expressible knowledge, and result in different responses. This article evaluates the arguments and the evidence from a select number of key tasks that have been supportive of dual-reasoning theorists’ proposals. The review contrasts the dualist approach with a single-system framework that conjectures that different types of reasoning arise through the graded properties of the representations that are utilized while reasoning, and the different functional roles that consciousness has in cognition. The article concludes by arguing in favor of the alternative framework, which attempts to unify the different forms of reasoning identified by dual-process theorists under a single system.

360 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds, and found that the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions.
Abstract: In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.

353 citations