Secure management of information systems is crucially important in information intensive organizations. Although most organizations have long been using security technologies, it is well known that technology tools alone are not sufficient. Thus, the area of end-user security behaviors in organizations has gained an increased attention. In information security observing end-user security behaviors is challenging. Moreover, recent studies have shown that the end users have divergent security views. The inability to monitor employee IT security behaviors and divergent views regarding security policies, in our view, provide a setting where the principal agent paradigm applies. In this paper, we develop and test a theoretical model of the incentive effects of penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness of employee actions that enhances our understanding of employee compliance to information security policies. Based on 312 employee responses from 77 organizations, we empirically validate and test the model. Our findings suggest that security behaviors can be influenced by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators. Pressures exerted by subjective norms and peer behaviors influence employee information security behaviors. Intrinsic motivation of employee perceived effectiveness of their actions was also found to play an important role in security policy compliance intentions. In analyzing the penalties, certainty of detection was found to be significant while surprisingly, severity of punishment was found to have a negative effect on security behavior intentions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice.

Encouraging information security behaviors in organizations: Role of penalties, pressures and perceived effectiveness

There is broad consensus that the main problem facing fisheries globally is too many boats chasing too few fish Unfortunately it is also possible to argue that there are too many proposed solutions and not enough practical answers to improving fisheries management There is a deepening divide between those who propose alternative regulatory controls on fishers, including establishing large areas permanently closed to fishing, and those who argue for better alignment of incentives combined with broad participation of resource users in fishery management decisions (in simple terms, between top down and bottom up systems of governance) However despite the choice of policy instruments used, a consistent outcome is that resource users behave in a manner that is often unintended by the designers of the management system Hence whilst uncertainty is broadly recognized as a pervasive feature of fisheries management, to date most of the attention has focussed on only part of that uncertainty - scientific uncertainty about the status of exploited resources The effect of uncertainty generated on the human side of fisheries science and management has received much less attention However, the uncertainty generated by unexpected resource user behaviour is critical as it has unplanned consequences and leads to unintended management outcomes Using empirical evidence of unexpected resource user behaviour and reviewing current responses to unexpected management outcomes, we identify different approaches that both improve prediction of human behaviour in fisheries systems and identify management measures that are more robust to these sources of uncertainty However, unless the micro scale drivers of human behaviour that contribute to macro scale implementation uncertainty are communicated effectively to managers and considered more regularly and in greater depth, unanticipated responses to management actions will continue to undermine management systems and threaten the sustainability of fisheries

Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management

A combination of calculated, normative, and social motivations as well as awareness of rules and capacity to comply are thought to foster compliance with regulations. Hypotheses about these factors were tested with data concerning Danish farmers' compliance with agro-environmental regulations. Three key findings emerge: that farmers' awareness of rules plays a critical role; that normative and social motivations are as influential as calculated motivations in enhancing compliance; and that inspectors' enforcement style affects compliance differently from that posited in much of the literature. It was also found that formalism in inspection can be helpful to a point, while coercion by inspectors can backfire. Taken together, these findings counter arguments concerning the harm of legalism and the benefits of flexible enforcement. This study contributes to the understanding of factors that shape compliance with social and environmental regulations. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations

A Comparison of Marine Protected Areas and Alternative Approaches to Coral-Reef Management

In an effort to deliver better outcomes for people and the ecosystems they depend on, many governments and civil society groups are engaging natural resource users in collaborative management arrangements (frequently called comanagement). However, there are few empirical studies demonstrating the social and institutional conditions conducive to successful comanagement outcomes, especially in small-scale fisheries. Here, we evaluate 42 comanagement arrangements across five countries and show that: (i) comanagement is largely successful at meeting social and ecological goals; (ii) comanagement tends to benefit wealthier resource users; (iii) resource overexploitation is most strongly influenced by market access and users' dependence on resources; and (iv) institutional characteristics strongly influence livelihood and compliance outcomes, yet have little effect on ecological conditions.

https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/109/14/5219.full.pdf

Comanagement of coral reef social ecological systems

An enriched theoretical model of regulatory compliance is developed in this paper. The body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides only a partial explanation of compliance behavior. To offer a more complete explanation, the model developed herein integrates economic theory with theories from psychology and sociology to account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. While cast in a natural resource management context, the theory developed here is applicable to a variety of institutional conditions. The resulting framework enables the design and implementation of more efficient compliance and regulatory programs than was heretofore possible.

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

This study adds to the limited body of empirical evidence on the effect that legitimacy and deterrence have on compliance behavior. The theoretical models of compliance behavior tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for legitimacy, deterrence, and other motivations expected to influence indiv duals' decisions whether to comply. Probit and Tobit econometric estimators are used to examine the compliance behavior of 318 Peninsular Malaysian fishermen who face a regulation banning them from fishing in a zone along the coast. The results of the empirical analysis provide additional evidence on the relationship of deterrence and legitimacy to compliance. The findings are also used to draw implications for compliance policy for regulated fisheries. According to normative compliance theory, people tend to obey laws made and implemented by authorities perceived to be legitimate. A key determinant of perceived legitimacy, according to the procedural justice literature, is the fairness built into the procedures used to develop and implement laws and regulations.l Paternoster et al. (1997) note that while there are numerous theoretical perspectives suggesting that legitimacy is an important determinant of compliance, the empirical evidence making that connection is meager.2 Our study adds to this limited body of empirical evidence. The subjects of our study are fishermen. Fishermen are excellent subjects for the study of compliance. They are subject to numerous regulations that constrain their opportunities to earn income, and temptations and opportunities for offending repeatedly occur.3 Passion, inadvertence, and accident rarely cause a fishery violation; most are the result of deliberate choice. The behavior of fishermen offers good evidence on which to test the role deterrence, legitimacy, and other factors play in explaining compliance. Studying the compliance behavior of such regulated economic agents as fishermen is important for other reasons. Achieving compliance in regulated industries is both costly and difficult. Expenditures on enforcement commonly constitute the largest cost element in governmental regulatory programs. The viability of environmental protection and resource management programs is often threatened by low rates of compliance and high enforcement costs. This raises questions whether there are ways to improve the cost effectiveness of traditional enforcement and whether there are ways to secure compliance without heavy reliance on costly enforcement. Central to improving the cost effectiveness of enforcement and compliance programs is understanding the compliance behavior of the economic agents subject to regulations. To this end, we present tests of alternative models of compliance behavior. The models tested include the basic deterrence model, which focuses on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, and models which integrate economic theory with theories from social psychology to account for both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations influencing individuals' decisions whether to comply.4 The tests are conducted on data from interviews with fishermen in Peninsular Malaysia (selfreports of violations). Becker (1968) was the first to develop a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity. Following Smith (1966 [1759], 1985 [1776]) and Bentham (1967 [1789]), Becker assumes that criminals behave basically like other individuals in that they attempt to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In Becker's model, an individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity.5 The basic deterrence framework used in these studies assumes that the threat of sanctions is the only policy mechanism available to improve compliance with regulations. …

K. Kuperan

Papers

A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance

Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries