Katherine S. Button

Bio: Katherine S. Button is an academic researcher from University of Bath. The author has contributed to research in topics: Beck Depression Inventory & Mood. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 63 publications receiving 7693 citations. Previous affiliations of Katherine S. Button include University of Bristol.

Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience

Abstract: A study with low statistical power has a reduced chance of detecting a true effect, but it is less well appreciated that low power also reduces the likelihood that a statistically significant result reflects a true effect. Here, we show that the average statistical power of studies in the neurosciences is very low. The consequences of this include overestimates of effect size and low reproducibility of results. There are also ethical dimensions to this problem, as unreliable research is inefficient and wasteful. Improving reproducibility in neuroscience is a key priority and requires attention to well-established but often ignored methodological principles.

A manifesto for reproducible science

Abstract: Improving the reliability and efficiency of scientific research will increase the credibility of the published scientific literature and accelerate discovery. Here we argue for the adoption of measures to optimize key elements of the scientific process: methods, reporting and dissemination, reproducibility, evaluation and incentives. There is some evidence from both simulations and empirical studies supporting the likely effectiveness of these measures, but their broad adoption by researchers, institutions, funders and journals will require iterative evaluation and improvement. We discuss the goals of these measures, and how they can be implemented, in the hope that this will facilitate action toward improving the transparency, reproducibility and efficiency of scientific research.

Deep Impact: Unintended consequences of journal rank

Abstract: Most researchers acknowledge an intrinsic hierarchy in the scholarly journals (“journal rank”) that they submit their work to, and adjust not only their submission but also their reading strategies accordingly. On the other hand, much has been written about the negative effects of institutionalizing journal rank as an impact measure. So far, contributions to the debate concerning the limitations of journal rank as a scientific impact assessment tool have either lacked data, or relied on only a few studies. In this review, we present the most recent and pertinent data on the consequences of our current scholarly communication system with respect to various measures of scientific quality (such as utility/citations, methodological soundness, expert ratings or retractions). These data corroborate previous hypotheses: using journal rank as an assessment tool is bad scientific practice. Moreover, the data lead us to argue that any journal rank (not only the currently-favored Impact Factor) would have this negative impact. Therefore, we suggest that abandoning journals altogether, in favor of a library-based scholarly communication system, will ultimately be necessary. This new system will use modern information technology to vastly improve the filter, sort and discovery functions of the current journal system.

Minimal clinically important difference on the Beck Depression Inventory--II according to the patient's perspective.

Abstract: Background The Beck Depression Inventory, 2nd edition (BDI-II) is widely used in research on depression. However, the minimal clinically important difference (MCID) is unknown. MCID can be estimated in several ways. Here we take a patient-centred approach, anchoring the change on the BDI-II to the patient's global report of improvement. Method We used data collected (n = 1039) from three randomized controlled trials for the management of depression. Improvement on a 'global rating of change' question was compared with changes in BDI-II scores using general linear modelling to explore baseline dependency, assessing whether MCID is best measured in absolute terms (i.e. difference) or as percent reduction in scores from baseline (i.e. ratio), and receiver operator characteristics (ROC) to estimate MCID according to the optimal threshold above which individuals report feeling 'better'. Results Improvement in BDI-II scores associated with reporting feeling 'better' depended on initial depression severity, and statistical modelling indicated that MCID is best measured on a ratio scale as a percentage reduction of score. We estimated a MCID of a 17.5% reduction in scores from baseline from ROC analyses. The corresponding estimate for individuals with longer duration depression who had not responded to antidepressants was higher at 32%. Conclusions MCID on the BDI-II is dependent on baseline severity, is best measured on a ratio scale, and the MCID for treatment-resistant depression is larger than that for more typical depression. This has important implications for clinical trials and practice.

Low statistical power in biomedical science: a review of three human research domains

Abstract: Studies with low statistical power increase the likelihood that a statistically significant finding represents a false positive result. We conducted a review of meta-analyses of studies investigating the association of biological, environmental or cognitive parameters with neurological, psychiatric and somatic diseases, excluding treatment studies, in order to estimate the average statistical power across these domains. Taking the effect size indicated by a meta-analysis as the best estimate of the likely true effect size, and assuming a threshold for declaring statistical significance of 5%, we found that approximately 50% of studies have statistical power in the 0–10% or 11–20% range, well below the minimum of 80% that is often considered conventional. Studies with low statistical power appear to be common in the biomedical sciences, at least in the specific subject areas captured by our search strategy. However, we also observe evidence that this depends in part on research methodology, with candidate gene studies showing very low average power and studies using cognitive/behavioural measures showing high average power. This warrants further investigation.

Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science

Abstract: Reproducibility is a defining feature of science, but the extent to which it characterizes current research is unknown. We conducted replications of 100 experimental and correlational studies published in three psychology journals using high-powered designs and original materials when available. Replication effects were half the magnitude of original effects, representing a substantial decline. Ninety-seven percent of original studies had statistically significant results. Thirty-six percent of replications had statistically significant results; 47% of original effect sizes were in the 95% confidence interval of the replication effect size; 39% of effects were subjectively rated to have replicated the original result; and if no bias in original results is assumed, combining original and replication results left 68% with statistically significant effects. Correlational tests suggest that replication success was better predicted by the strength of original evidence than by characteristics of the original and replication teams.

Thinking fast and slow.

Abstract: In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Cluster failure: Why fMRI inferences for spatial extent have inflated false-positive rates

Abstract: The most widely used task functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analyses use parametric statistical methods that depend on a variety of assumptions. In this work, we use real resting-state data and a total of 3 million random task group analyses to compute empirical familywise error rates for the fMRI software packages SPM, FSL, and AFNI, as well as a nonparametric permutation method. For a nominal familywise error rate of 5%, the parametric statistical methods are shown to be conservative for voxelwise inference and invalid for clusterwise inference. Our results suggest that the principal cause of the invalid cluster inferences is spatial autocorrelation functions that do not follow the assumed Gaussian shape. By comparison, the nonparametric permutation test is found to produce nominal results for voxelwise as well as clusterwise inference. These findings speak to the need of validating the statistical methods being used in the field of neuroimaging.