Kathleen Newland

Bio: Kathleen Newland is an academic researcher from Migration Policy Institute. The author has contributed to research in topics: Refugee & Global governance. The author has an hindex of 5, co-authored 8 publications receiving 165 citations.

The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes, and Institutions

Abstract: This article explains how the global governance of international migration has evolved as a policy issue on the international agenda over the past decade while noting that there is still no consensus on whether global governance is really required, what type of global governance would be appropriate, and how it should develop. The article reviews a series of policy options that have been proposed to fill the governance gap in international migration; namely, to create a new agency, to designate a lead agency, to bring the International Organization for Migration into the UN system, a coordination model, a leadership model, a World Trade Organization model, and an evolutionary model.

Family Unity and Refugee Protection

Abstract: This chapter, after introducing the issues that arise in discussions of family unity and examining the role of the family in refugee protection, reviews the position of the refugee family in international law, both in relation to the right to family unity and the issue of family reunification. It then examines how these legal norms have been reflected in State practice, through the legal framework on the one hand, and policy and practice on the other hand. The chapter concludes by reviewing the emerging consensus on family reunification as a right of refugees.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: An Unlikely Achievement

Abstract: The most remarkable thing about the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Migration Compact) is that it exists at all. Two years ago, when the Compact process began, many observers doubted that negotiations among all 193 members of the United Nations (UN) would produce anything other than a bland, least-commondenominator document. Although the United States dropped out of the negotiation process in December 2017, the other 192 UN Member States agreed on a substantive and fairly comprehensive text. It was adopted in December 2018 (although several other countries announced after negotiations were concluded that they would not endorse the Compact). That the Compact is not legally binding undoubtedly helped to reach this degree of consensus, but it is still a notable achievement. What characteristics of the negotiations and the final text made this outcome possible? Part of the explanation lies in the process itself. Although the negotiations were among all 193 UN Member States (until the US dropped out), the two co-facilitators of the process, the ambassadors to the UN in New York of Mexico and Switzerland, kept a tight grip on the text. During a year of wide-ranging consultations culminating in a stocktaking meeting in December 2017, no drafts were circulated publicly. When the first draft appeared, many States complained that their views on particular issues had not been taken into account. But the draft demonstrated an understanding of the ‘red lines’ that could not be crossed without losing additional States. European States, for example, required a strong statement about the obligation of States to take back their nationals who had no legal right to remain in another country, while countries of origin insisted on a more robust commitment to reintegration assistance. Both appeared in the Compact’s Objective 21. Late in the negotiations, the African bloc demanded a commitment to increased international cooperation, which was added as Objective 23. Such trade-offs and compromises characterize the Compact as a whole. All participating States got something they wanted; none got everything. The Compact’s 23 objectives can be thought of as falling into three baskets:

Lost in transition

Abstract: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been the greatest disruption to the movement of people since World War II. Many who had plans—and permission—to move permanently from one country to another have seen their transition put on hold. Worldwide, the flows of tourists, business and professional travelers, and students are all affected. But those most vulnerable to the virus and virus-related policies are low-paid migrant workers who have lost their jobs, and refugees or displaced people. Their lives were precarious even before the pandemic spread. Migrant workers suffer as they struggle to return home with little or no money, often in the face of travel restrictions and suspension of transport links. In India, after Prime Minister Modi imposed a country-wide lockdown on 24 March, hundreds of thousands of internal migrants crowded the roads on foot, creating the very conditions that the lockdown was meant to prevent. Many foreigners are being summarily expelled, such as in India and Saudi Arabia. Others are stranded in foreign countries. Losing jobs creates a cascade of other losses for migrant workers—of legal status and access to health care and other public services. Only a few places, including Portugal and New York state, have opened their health care systems to migrants regardless of legal status (as Thailand has done since 2013 in response to the AIDS epidemic and other infectious diseases brought to the country by migrant workers). These migrants' families back home will suffer too, from the loss of remittances that fund health care, housing, education, and better nutrition. The departure of temporary migrant workers also creates risks for the native population. Agricultural producers in Europe, for example, are predicting crippling labor shortages this spring and summer. Refugee camps are densely packed—the largest one in the world, in the Cox's Bazar District of Bangladesh, has three times the population density of New York City, without a single high-rise building. Social distancing is impossible in such a setting. Clean water for handwashing is scarce. Medical resources are thin, although humanitarian agencies are ramping up hand-washing stations, protective gear, isolation units, and ambulance services. Conditions in European “reception centers” for refugees and asylum seekers, like that near Moria village on the Greek island of Lesvos, are worse than in many refugee camps in poor countries. Moria holds about 22,000 people in a site built for 3000. There are 1300 residents per water tap. So far, the only refugee camps known to have confirmed cases of COVID-19 (Ritsona and Malakasa) are in Greece. Perhaps the most critical resource is information. The 120,000 people in Jordan's two main refugee camps are taking preventive measures (avoiding crowds) after a blizzard of electronic messages from the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). For most refugees and poor migrants who live in urban areas rather than camps, access to authoritative information is a lifeline. But many, especially in remote rural areas, do not have internet access. In the Cox's Bazar camps, the government forbids mobile phones. In every country, rich or poor, the provision of accurate and timely information is among the most urgent responsibilities of governments. Unlike most natural disasters, COVID-19 has so far affected rich and upper-middle-income countries (including China, Iran, Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa) more than poorer ones. But that will quickly change in countries whose health care systems are ill-equipped to cope. Displaced people and poor migrants are often the last in line for health services. The virus cannot be suppressed if vulnerable migrants and refugees are not integrated into COVID-19 responses. UN organizations, particularly the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, and a host of national and global humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are working frantically with national governments to stop COVID-19 from taking hold in refugee settings and to educate migrant populations and host communities on prevention. The special appeals have gone out: The UN Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19 is asking for $2.01 billion dollars to cover the actions of all its agencies and NGO partners. These organizations have experience in suppressing epidemics in deprived settings: ebola, cholera, dengue fever, and more. It is vital to everyone's safety that governments give them the funds they need in this global crisis.

Welcome to work?: legal migration pathways for low-skilled workers

Abstract: In countries whose native-born workforce has become ever more educated and ever more concentrated in mediumand high-skilled industries, many low-wage jobs that cannot be outsourced or automated—such as child and elder care, agriculture, and construction—are filled by immigrants. Yet legal migration pathways are most readily available not to workers who might fill such positions, but to highly skilled professionals with formal qualification. Where legal pathways for low-skilled migrants are too narrow to meet demand, employers and foreign-born workers alike often look to illegal migration to bridge the gap.

Global Migration Governance

Abstract: 1. Introduction: Global Migration Governance 2. Low-Skilled Migration 3. High-Skilled Labour Migration 4. Irregular Migration 5. International Travel 6. Lifestyle Migration 7. Environmental Migration 8. UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees 9. Internally Displaced Persons 10. Human Trafficking and Smuggling 11. Remittances 12. Diasporas 13. Root Causes Conclusion

Diaspora Institutions and Diaspora Governance

Abstract: Why do governments form institutions devoted to emigrants and their descendants in the diaspora? Such institutions have become a regular feature of political life in many parts of the world: Over half all United Nations Member States now have one. Diaspora institutions merit research because they connect new developments in the global governance of migration with new patterns of national and transnational sovereignty and citizenship, and new ways of constructing individual identity in relation to new collectivities. But these institutions are generally overlooked. Migration policy is still understood as immigration policy, and research on diaspora institutions has been fragmented, case-study dominated, and largely descriptive. In this article, I review and extend the relevant theoretical literature and highlight empirical research priorities. I argue that existing studies focus too exclusively on national-level interests and ideas to explain how individual states tap diaspora resources and embrace these groups within the nation-state. However, these approaches cannot explain the global spread of diaspora institutions. This, I argue, requires a comparative approach and greater attention to the role of efforts to create a coherent but decentralized system of global governance in the area of international migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Organisations and the Politics of Migration

Abstract: The last two decades have seen major shifts in the way international organisations (IOs) address migration. While state sovereignty remains central in the politics of migration, IOs are increasingly developing their visions regarding how the cross-border movements of people should be governed (or ‘managed’) and, in some cases, they have become important actors in the design and implementation of migration policy. Research on the role and functions of IOs remains scarce, however, and there are major uncertainties, concerning not only their actual influence, but also the political context in which they operate and the outcome of their initiatives. According to their advocates, the involvement of IOs would enable greater international cooperation, which would lead to policies that pay greater attention to human rights and development imperatives. Yet, at times, interventions by IOs seem to reinforce existing imbalances, as these organisations primarily tend to align themselves with the interests and agenda o...

Should we have a WTO for international migration

Abstract: The international movement of labour remains much more restricted than movement of goods or capital, and the worldwide economic gains to liberalizing migration are large. This paper asks whether those gains could be realized through better international cooperation on migration along the lines of the WTO for trade. Although public opinion is marginally more negative towards the liberalization of migration than of trade, the key impediment is the lack of a basis for reciprocity in negotiations over migration. And this is because migration is largely driven by absolute advantage rather than by comparative advantage as in the case of trade. Consequently there is no basis for WTO-style negotiations over migration and therefore no grounds for reforming the international architecture in the hope of fostering liberalization. — Timothy J. Hatton

The Securitization of Migration and Refugee Women

Abstract: This research contributes a gendered analysis of the securitisation of migration by focusing on women‟s experiences of irregular migration. The Central Mediterranean European Union Member State of Malta finds itself on the frontline of policing and securing Europe‟s southern external borders against transnational migrant subjects (Gil-Bazo 2006; Klepp 2010). Through qualitative interviews with refugee women in Malta, and members of law enforcement agencies and representatives of non-government organisations operating in the Maltese context, this thesis seeks to understand how the securitisation of migration impacts upon women‟s experiences across four key stages of migration – exit, transit, arrival and onward migration. Malta is the geographical site at which the four stages of the border crossing process are examined. The securitisation of migration, underpinned by familiar criminal justice practices of deterrence, punishment and risk-reduction as examined here conflicts with the central tenets of refugee protection. This thesis explores the gendered dimensions of the tensions between these two legal frameworks and how they relate to women‟s experiences of crossing international borders from Somalia into Malta to seek refugee protection. Women‟s agency and resilience are enacted within frames of violence, punishment, containment and control. The securitisation of migration influences complex decision-making at each stage along the migratory path, produces layered and gendered vulnerabilities, and can culminate in the deteriorating mental and physical health of refugee women, particularly at the stage of arrival in Malta. This research contributes a micro account of the securitisation of migration to refocus the debate on the everyday life experiences of those most directly affected by this restrictive apparatus – transnational migrant subjects.