Industry 4.0: A Survey on Technologies, Applications and Open Research Issues

We evaluate two decades of proposals to replace text passwords for general-purpose user authentication on the web using a broad set of twenty-five usability, deployability and security benefits that an ideal scheme might provide. The scope of proposals we survey is also extensive, including password management software, federated login protocols, graphical password schemes, cognitive authentication schemes, one-time passwords, hardware tokens, phone-aided schemes and biometrics. Our comprehensive approach leads to key insights about the difficulty of replacing passwords. Not only does no known scheme come close to providing all desired benefits: none even retains the full set of benefits that legacy passwords already provide. In particular, there is a wide range from schemes offering minor security benefits beyond legacy passwords, to those offering significant security benefits in return for being more costly to deploy or more difficult to use. We conclude that many academic proposals have failed to gain traction because researchers rarely consider a sufficiently wide range of real-world constraints. Beyond our analysis of current schemes, our framework provides an evaluation methodology and benchmark for future web authentication proposals.

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The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes

Digital Twin technology is an emerging concept that has become the centre of attention for industry and, in more recent years, academia. The advancements in industry 4.0 concepts have facilitated its growth, particularly in the manufacturing industry. The Digital Twin is defined extensively but is best described as the effortless integration of data between a physical and virtual machine in either direction. The challenges, applications, and enabling technologies for Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things (IoT) and Digital Twins are presented. A review of publications relating to Digital Twins is performed, producing a categorical review of recent papers. The review has categorised them by research areas: manufacturing, healthcare and smart cities, discussing a range of papers that reflect these areas and the current state of research. The paper provides an assessment of the enabling technologies, challenges and open research for Digital Twins.

Digital Twin: Enabling Technologies, Challenges and Open Research

An important open problem in the area of Traitor Tracing is designing a scheme with constant expansion of the size of keys (users' keys and the encryption key) and of the size of ciphertexts with respect to the size of the plaintext. This problem is known from the introduction of Traitor Tracing by Chor, Fiat and Naor. We refer to such schemes as traitor tracing with constant transmission rate. Here we present a general methodology and two protocol constructions that result in the first two public-key traitor tracing schemes with constant transmission rate in settings where plaintexts can be calibrated to be sufficiently large. Our starting point is the notion of copyrighted function which was presented by Naccache, Shamir and Stern. We first solve the open problem of discrete-log-based and public-key-based copyrighted function. Then, we observe the simple yet crucial relation between (public-key) copyrighted encryption and (public-key) traitor tracing, which we exploit by introducing a generic design paradigm for designing constant transmission rate traitor tracing schemes based on copyrighted encryption functions. Our first scheme achieves the same expansion efficiency as regular ElGamal encryption. The second scheme introduces only a slightly larger (constant) overhead, however, it additionally achieves efficient black-box traitor tracing (against any pirate construction).

Traitor Tracing with constant transmission rate

We present a new 128-bit block cipher called Camellia. Camellia sup- ports 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key lengths, i.e. the same interface specifications as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Camellia was carefully designed to withstand all known cryptanalytic attacks and even to have a sufficiently large security leeway for use of the next 10-20 years. There are no hidden weakness inserted by the designers. It was also designed to have suitability for both software and hardware implementations and to cover all possible encryption applications that range from low-cost smart cards to high-speed network systems. Compared to the AES finalists, Camellia offers at least comparable encryption speed in software and hardware. An optimized implementation of Camellia in assembly language can en- crypt on a PentiumIII (800MHz) at the rate of m ore than 276 Mbits per second, which is much faster than the speed of an optimized DES implementation. In ad- dition, a distinguishing feature is its small hardware design. The hardware design, which includes key schedule, encryption and decryption, occupies approximately 11K gates, which is the smallest among all existing 128-bit block ciphers as far as we know. It perfectly meet current market requirements in wireless cards, for instance, where low power consumption is a mandaroty condition.

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Camellia: A 128-Bit Block Cipher Suitable for Multiple Platforms

In this paper, we formally prove that padding the plaintext with a random bit-string provides the semantic security against chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) for the McEliece (and its dual, the Niederreiter) cryptosystems under the standard assumptions. Such padding has recently been used by Suzuki, Kobara and Imai in the context of RFID security. Our proof relies on the technical result by Katz and Shin from Eurocrypt '05 showing "pseudorandomness" implied by the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. We do not need the random oracles as opposed to the known generic constructions which, on the other hand, provide a stronger protection as compared to our scheme--against (adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack, i.e., IND-CCA(2). In order to show that the padded version of the cryptosystem remains practical, we provide some estimates for suitable key sizes together with corresponding workload required for successful attack.

Semantic security for the McEliece cryptosystem without random oracles

This paper describes truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis of the 128-bit block cipher Camellia, which was proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Our work improves on the best known truncated and impossible differential cryptanalysis As a result, we show a nontrivial 9-round byte characteristic, which may lead to a possible attack of reduced-round version of Camellia without input/output whitening, FL or FL-1 in a chosen plain text scenario Previously, only 6-round differentials were known, which may suggest a possible attack of Camellia reduced to 8-rounds Moreover, we show a nontrivial 7-round impossible differential, whereas only a 5-round impossible differential was previously known This cryptanalysis is effective against general Feistel structures with round functions composed of S-D (Substitution and Diffusion) transformation

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Security of Reduced Version of the Block Cipher Camellia against Truncated and Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

In this paper, we propose a simple security framework for MQTT (for short, AugMQTT) by incorporating the AugPAKE protocol [16]. As a distinguishing feature, AugMQTT does not require any certificate validation checks and certificate revocation checks on both publishers/subscribers and broker sides. Also, we discuss several aspects of AugMQTT followed by performance overhead of the AugPAKE protocol. Finally, we explain implementation details of AugMQTT that makes use of MQTT open source project Mosquitto 1.4.9 [8] in order to incorporate the AugPAKE protocol.

A security framework for MQTT

Cyber-attacks and cybersecurity used to be the issues for those who use Internet and computers. The issues, however, are expanding to anyone who does not even use them directly. The society is gradually and heavily depending on networks and computers. They are not closed within a cyberspace anymore and having interaction with our real world with sensors and actuators. Such systems are known as CPS (Cyber Physical Systems), IoT/E (Internet of Things/Everything), Industry 4.0, Industrial Internet, M2M, etc. No matter what they are called, exploitation of any of these systems may cause a serious influence to our real life and appropriate countermeasures must be taken to mitigate the risks. In this paper, cybersecurity in ICS (Industrial Control Systems) is reviewed as a leading example of cyber physical security for critical infrastructures. Then as a future aspect of it, IoT security for consumers is explained. key words: security, Cyber Physical System, Industrial Control System, IoT, M2M

Cyber Physical Security for Industrial Control Systems and IoT

An authentication system wherein a terminal apparatus (1) uses a master key generator (36) to generate, based on an input password and a predetermined calculation, a value MK, and further uses an authentication result judging part (37) to calculate, from the value MK, values V1 and V2, and wherein the terminal apparatus (1) transmits the value V1 to a server (2) The server (2) uses a master key generator (45) to generates, based on a password of server registration of the terminal apparatus (1) shared and stored in advance through safe communication means and based on a predetermined calculation, a value MK, and further uses an authentication result judging part (46) to calculate, from the value MK, values V1 and V2 The server (2) transmits the value V2 to the terminal apparatus (1) Mutual authentications are performed dependently on whether these values can be calculated based on the predetermined calculations

Kazukuni Kobara

Papers

Semantic security for the McEliece cryptosystem without random oracles

Security of Reduced Version of the Block Cipher Camellia against Truncated and Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

A security framework for MQTT

Cyber Physical Security for Industrial Control Systems and IoT

Authentication system, and remotely distributed storage system