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Ke Wang

Bio: Ke Wang is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Ambidexterity & Digital transformation. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 19 citations.

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01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: Goldstein et al. as mentioned in this paper investigated the changeability of territorial values and its effects on territorial policies and found that the value of a territory may look very different to different state actors at one point in time, or to the same state actor at different points in time.
Abstract: What explains the timing of when states abandon a delaying strategy to change the status quo of one territorial dispute? And when this does happen, why do states ultimately use military force rather than concessions, or vice versa? This dissertation answers these questions by examining four major Chinese territorial disputes Chinese-Russian and Chinese-Indian frontier disputes and Chinese-Vietnamese and Chinese-Japanese offshore island disputes. I propose a new theory which focuses on the changeability of territorial values and its effects on territorial policies. I argue that territories have particular meaning and value for particular state in particular historical and international settings. The value of a territory may look very different to different state actors at one point in time, or to the same state actor at different points in time. This difference in perspectives may largely help explain not only why, but when state actors choose to suddenly abandon the status quo. Particularly, I hypothesize that a cooperative territorial policy is more likely when the economic value of the territory increases (contingent on low symbolic and military value), while an escalation policy is more likely when the symbolic or military value increases, independent of economic factors. As a result, disputes over territories with high economic salience are, all else equal, more likely to be resolved peacefully, while disputes over territories with high symbolic or military salience are more likely to either fester for long periods of time or escalate into armed conflict. Through historical process tracing and across-case comparison, this study found that (a) Chinese policies toward the frontier disputes conform well to large parts of my original hypothesis, which explains territorial policies in terms of changing territorial values; but that (b) Chinese policies towards offshore island disputes conform more clearly to state-centered theories based on opportunism, realpolitik, and changes in relative power. I suggest that as China's naval power becomes stronger, and it feels less vulnerable in the region, China will be less likely to escalate and more likely to cooperate over the disputed islands, particularly if such cooperation can draw allies closer to China rather than the United States. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Political Science First Advisor Avery Goldstein

20 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors conducted a longitudinal case study of a leading business firm in China's real estate industry, China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. (COLI), to investigate the role of digital transformation in strategic renewal from an ambidexterity perspective.
Abstract: Purpose Recent studies have indicated that digital transformation can benefit an organization’s strategic renewal. However, there is little knowledge on how business executives engage in digital transformation for this purpose, especially in the service sectors of emerging markets. Therefore, this study aims to examine how business managers accomplish strategic renewal through digital transformation in emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted a longitudinal single case study of a leading business firm in China’s real estate industry, China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. (COLI). Results of the analysis of semistructured interviews and rich secondary data allowed us to better understand how business managers react to changing customer demands by building and implementing divergent digital tools to fulfill strategic renewal. Findings The results showed that business executives of COLI developed the Whole Life Cycle Management System, to achieve strategic renewal. The system benefits resource allocation and potential adjustments to strategic goals. This study also helps update the organizational structure of the marketing and consumer services departments, helping better satisfy consumers’ demands and waste fewer resources. Thus, COLI accomplished structural, contextual and leadership-based ambidexterity. Originality/value This study provides a fresh understanding of the link between digitalization and strategic renewal by providing a fine-grained analysis of leading service providers in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the first to investigate the role of digital transformation in strategic renewal from an ambidexterity perspective.

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1,684 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Gries as discussed by the authors argues from a social psychological point of view that Chinese identity "evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past" and "involves both the Chinese people and other passions".
Abstract: China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, by Peter Hayes Gries. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. x + 215 pp. US$24.95/£15.95 (hardcover). The aim of this book, as stated in the Introduction, is to present a balanced view of "China's new nationalism", "one that acknowledges its legitimate grievances and recognizes its potential dangers" (p. 12). It argues from a social psychological point of view that Chinese identity "evolves in dynamic relationship with other nations and the past" and "involves both the Chinese people and other passions" (p. 19). These interrelated arguments are intended not only to challenge what the author calls "the dominant Western interpretation of Chinese nationalism" and the "West's state-centric view of Chinese nationalism" but also to draw attention to the dangers of China-bashing in the US and America-bashing in China. "Nationalism" in this book refers to "any behavior designed to restore, maintain, or advance public images" of a national community (p. 9). What seems to make "China's new nationalism" new is its "genuine popularity" and "independent existence". This conclusion is based on the evidence that Chinese nationalism increasingly challenges the Party-state; that the Chinese, like all peoples, have deep-seated emotional attachments to their national identity; and that Chinese public opinion now plays a role in national politics. Another new feature of today's Chinese nationalism is the way in which it constructs narratives of a "century of humiliation". The national narrative of heroism and victory that served the requirements of Communist revolutionaries and nation-building goals under Mao are now superseded by a new and popular victimization narrative that blames the West, including Japan, for China's suffering. It is not immediately clear in the book why long-suppressed memories of past suffering resurfaced in the 1990s, but this seems to have much to do with a psychological need to return continually to unresolved traumas in the hope of mastering them. These themes are developed through an examination of nationalist writings-mostly by Chinese intellectuals-and the official and popular responses to a number of well-known events in the 1990s and more recently. Chapter 1 looks at the protests in 1999 in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Chapter 2 discusses the ways that Chinese national identity is shaped in a dialogic process of comparison with and distinction from the US and Japan. Chapter 3 turns to the effect of Chinese visions of the "century of humiliation" on their self-image, as well as the impact of changes to their national identity on Chinese views of the century. Chapters 4 and 5 revisit Chinese views of the US and Japan, although this time the focus shifts to writings about past and future Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. In Chapter 6-probably the most substantive and interesting chapter-Gries explores the motivation of Chinese nationalists, focusing on China's apology diplomacy. Chapters 7 and 8 can be thought of as a conclusion in two parts, in that they pull together and highlight once again some of the book's main themes. The book does an admirable job in demonstrating that the way US policymakers and commentators talk about China dangerously distorts US interpretations of, and responses to, Chinese policies and actions, and influences Chinese understandings of the US. It also shows convincingly that anti-American and anti-Chinese polemics easily spiral into mutual dehumanization and demonization and thus lay the foundations for violent conflict. A no less significant contribution the book makes is its perspective on Chinese nationalism. Central to Gries' perception is the concept of face-so much so that he has consistently italicized the word in the book. What he means by face is not simply the figurative self shown to others but also a prerequisite for maintaining authority and the ability to pursue instrumental goals. …

89 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Goldstein this paper argues that beginning in 1996 China put in place a grand strategy designed to create an environment that would be favorable for its economic development and to reduce the risks of a backlash to its rise as an economic, diplomatic and military power.
Abstract: Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge. China's Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford, Stanford University Press, Studies in Asian Security, 2005, 274 pp.The central thesis of this book is that beginning in 1996 China put in place a grand strategy designed to create an environment that would be favourable for its economic development and to reduce the risks of a backlash to its rise as an economic, diplomatic and military power. In fact, many changes set out by Avery Goldstein-particularly the maintaining of very close and, in the end, relatively stable working relations with the United States-are testimony to the solid foundation of his analysis. However, this book also raises quite a few questions, both about the precise date of this new strategy and the nature of the changes observed in Beijing's foreign and security policy as a result.The author's demonstration is in many respects convincing. It is true that 1996 was the climax of SinoAmerican tension over Taiwan and more broadly of the difficulties between China and the West in the post-Tiananmen period, and the beginning of a new approach by Beijing to its relations with the outside world. In its realisation that the world was going to remain dominated, at least militarily, by a single superpower- the United States-for a long time to come, and would consequently evolve towards multi-polarity more slowly than it had hoped initially, that is, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China decided to open up more markedly to multilateralism and to establish with the other major countries (Russia, France, United States) or groupings of States (European Union, ASEAN) special partnership relations.It is abundantly clear that the growth of military pressures on Taiwan, the many gesticulations and shows of military muscle by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the South China Sea and the acceleration in the modernisation of Chinese defence system,-all of which was supported by a rhetoric that was at once anti-Western, nationalist and irredentist-could but favour the rise of the "Chinese threat" syndrome, not only in Japan but also in the United States, South-East Asia and to a certain extent Europe. As Goldstein well shows, the tightening of strategic links between Washington and its main allies in the Asia-Pacific region (Tokyo and Canberra in particular) has been one of the most direct factors in the "realignment" of Beijing's international policy.Why 1996? For the author, the year of the "missile crisis" is also that-inferred-of a reassessment by the Chinese Communist Party of its external strategy. In support of this thesis, Goldstein refers to a number of diplomatic initiatives taken by China in 1996. Among them he cites the setting up by China, Russia and three newly independent Central Asian republics of the "Shanghai group", the first regional multilateral structure that Beijing not only joined but to which it also gave an impetus, transforming it in 2001 into the Shanghai Organisation for Co-operation. He also discusses a strategic partnership with Russia put in place by China in April 1996, and its intention, which it made public in August of the same year, to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its openness to multilateral discussions with ASEAN, particularly concerning the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Mention is also made of Beijing's attitude, at the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which met with regional approval.Yet, in spite of all this, we may wonder whether this was a real turning point. Everyone agrees that China's global strategy has evolved since Tiananmen, and a fortiorisince 1979 and the start of the reform process. Moreover, through the study of many source documents, analyses by Chinese researchers and interviews conducted in China, Japan and the United States between 1998 and 2003, Goldstein sheds light on a whole set of gradual but profound transformations in Beijing's policy. …

70 citations