Showing papers by "Keith E. Whittington published in 2004"
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TL;DR: New originalist theories of judicial review and constitutional interpretation that have emerged since the 1980s can be distinguished from an older set of theories that were predominant in the 1970s and 1980s.
Abstract: New originalist theories of judicial review and constitutional interpretation that have emerged since the 1980s can be distinguished from an older set of theories that were predominant in the 1970s and 1980s. This article distinguishes these older and newer versions of originalism and places them within their intellectual and political contexts. Whereas the old originalism developed largely to serve as the basis for criticizing the constitutional doctrine developed by the Warren and early Burger Courts, the new originalism has developed with the Rehnquist Court in mind and is less concerned with criticizing judicial review than with guiding it.
41 citations
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TL;DR: In the early 1990s, the New York state court was notably unsuccessful in attempting to exercise these powers to lay claim to a larger share of the state budget as mentioned in this paper, and a decade later, the Kansas court was politically more successful by exercising such power to raise revenues on its own.
Abstract: State courts have claimed an inherent judicial power to order state and local legislative bodies to pay for specified judicial expenses. The centralization of state court administration and budgeting has created a context in which the inherent judicial power could pit the highest state courts against the state legislatures in constitutional battles over the general judicial budget. In the early 1990s, the New York state court was notably unsuccessful in attempting to exercise these powers to lay claim to a larger share of the state budget. A decade later, however, the Kansas court was politically more successful by exercising such power to raise revenues on its own. The episode raises basic questions about judicial independence and the separation of powers, while also exposing a political dynamic by which new political powers can be created.
5 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In the early 1990s, the New York state court was notably unsuccessful in attempting to exercise these powers to lay claim to a larger share of the state budget as discussed by the authors, and a decade later, the Kansas court was politically more successful by exercising such power to raise revenues on its own.
Abstract: State courts have claimed an inherent judicial power to order state and local legislative bodies to pay for specified judicial expenses. The centralization of state court administration and budgeting has created a context in which the inherent judicial power could pit the highest state courts against the state legislatures in constitutional battles over the general judicial budget. In the early 1990s, the New York state court was notably unsuccessful in attempting to exercise these powers to lay claim to a larger share of the state budget. A decade later, however, the Kansas court was politically more successful by exercising such power to raise revenues on its own. The episode raises basic questions about judicial independence and the separation of powers, while also exposing a political dynamic by which new political powers can be created.
2 citations
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TL;DR: The authors argued that the assumption of congressional dominance obscures many important features of American politics, and pointed out that institutional development has often been driven by either autonomous executive action or conflicts between Congress and the executive.
Abstract: Many scholars of American politics implicitly or explicitly assume a model of congressional dominance. This standard narrative has been made explicit in principal-agent models of interbranch relations, in which the executive serves as a mere agent of the legislative principal. There are important limitations to the applicability of principal-agent models in the political context, and the assumption of congressional dominance obscures many important features of American politics. Over the course of American history, institutional development has often been driven by either autonomous executive action or conflicts between Congress and the executive. The argument is illustrated by reference to three cases: the growth of the federal extension service, the rise of national security intelligence operations, and the growth of the presidential impoundment power.
1 citations