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Showing papers by "Kenneth J. Arrow published in 1991"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that elite control is connected with economies of scale in the process by which information is communicated and that it will pay to reduce the number of individuals among whom information is to be communicated and have each transmit more.
Abstract: It seems to be a broadly valid generalization that in organizations of any size the central decisions are made by a relatively small number of individuals. Before World War I, there was a considerable literature, associated with such names as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels, which argued in one form or another that power in organizations tends to be concentrated in the hands of small elites. This is true regardless of the intended purpose of the organization. The most striking analysis is Michels's study of the German Social Democratic party. An organization devoted by its nature to spreading political power widely among the entire working class was itself run by a relatively small and self-perpetuating group. Michels referred indeed to an "iron law of oligarchy." I raise the question of to what extent is this phenomenon of elite control, as I shall call it, explainable in terms of rational organization theory. That is, is there some sense in which elite control economizes on some resources used in the processes of organizational decision-making. The article is exploratory in nature; I have no specific models, but rather raise the questions and suggest the issues that should be addressed in the future by more specific models. I do indeed suggest the possibility that elite control is connected with economies of scale in the process by which information is communicated. Hence, it will pay to reduce the number of individuals among whom information is to be communicated and have each transmit more. However, to the extent that this proposition is true, it calls for new models of optimal commu

143 citations


BookDOI
01 Jan 1991

24 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors discusses varying views of Ricardo's work by later economists, particularly with regard to population pressure, and concludes that many economists in the decades after his death attacked the realism of his theories.
Abstract: : David Ricardo was a peaceful man, well liked and admired for both his intellectual and his personal traits by his colleagues and rivals whether on the Stock Exchange, in the nascent field of political economy, or among the members of Parliament. He could maintain personal friendship and well behaved exchange of ideas with someone as strongly removed in both religion and economic doctrine as Thomas Malthus. The intellectual strength of his written work could dominate the thought of such a great mind as that of John Stuart Mill and rouse the writer Thomas de Quincey from his opium-riddled state to renewed mental vigor. Yet Ricardo's posthumous reputation has been very variable. Many economists in the decades after his death attacked the realism of his theories, particularly with regard to population pressure. This document discusses varying views of Ricardo's work by later economists.

23 citations



Book
01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: Sen as mentioned in this paper discussed the nature of inequality and the role of the market in economic systems and proposed basic income schemes and the lessons from public economies, and discussed alternative approaches to Libertarian Rights in the theory of social choice.
Abstract: Preface A.Sen - The International Economic Association - Acknowledgements - IEA Programme Committee - List of Contributors and Section Leaders - Abbreviations and Acronyms - Introduction K.J.Arrow - PART 1: THE PLENARY PAPERS - Presidential Address: The Nature of Inequality A.Sen - Basic Income Schemes and the Lessons from Public Economies A.B.Atkinson - Economic Restructuring in the USSR and International Economic Relations A.G.Aganbegyan - The Mechanisms of Social Integration: The Role of the Market Z.Ferge - History and Economic Theory F.Hahn - Monitoring the Economic and Social Weather in the Philippines M.Mangahas - PART 2: MARKETS IN EQUILIBRIUM - General Equilibrium in an Imperfect World: Incomplete Markets F.Hahn - Comment R.Guesnerie - Microeconomic Foundations and Properties of a Macroeconomic Model with Imperfect Competition J-P.Benassy - The 'Folk Theorem' and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis J.W.Friedman - Price Dispersion: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence from the Marseille Fish Market A.Kirman & A.Vignes - Information and Regulation J-J.Laffont - Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History-Dependence J-F.Mertens - PART 3: WELFARE AND SOCIAL CHOICE - Alternative Approaches to Libertarian Rights in the Theory of Social Choice K.Suzumura - The Normative Economics of Unanimity and Equality: Equity, Adequacy and Fundamental Dominance with Applications to Matchings and Wages S-C.Kolm - A Solution to the Problem of Mass Elections B.Peleg

14 citations


01 Jan 1991

6 citations