https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE

/pdf/prospect-theory-an-analysis-of-decision-under-risk-4z6oysdahj.pdf

Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk

In this paper, we argue that the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities. We label this capability a firm's absorptive capacity and suggest that it is largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge. The discussion focuses first on the cognitive basis for an individual's absorptive capacity including, in particular, prior related knowledge and diversity of background. We then characterize the factors that influence absorptive capacity at the organizational level, how an organization's absorptive capacity differs from that of its individual members, and the role of diversity of expertise within an organization. We argue that the development of absorptive capacity, and, in turn, innovative performance are history- or path-dependent and argue how lack of investment in an area of expertise early on may foreclose the future development of a technical capability in that area. We formulate a model of firm investment in research and development (R&D), in which R&D contributes to a firm's absorptive capacity, and test predictions relating a firm's investment in R&D to the knowledge underlying technical change within an industry. Discussion focuses on the implications of absorptive capacity for the analysis of other related innovative activities, including basic research, the adoption and diffusion of innovations, and decisions to participate in cooperative R&D ventures. **

/pdf/absorptive-capacity-a-new-perspective-on-learning-and-1n1c9gg9x0.pdf

Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation

The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change. The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm's (specific) asset positions (such as the firm's portfolio of difftcult-to- trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has aflopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing retums exist. Whether and how a firm's competitive advantage is eroded depends on the stability of market demand, and the ease of replicability (expanding intemally) and imitatability (replication by competitors). If correct, the framework suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technological change depends in large measure on honing intemal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. In short, identifying new opportunities and organizing effectively and efficiently to embrace them are generally more fundamental to private wealth creation than is strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that keeps competitors off balance, raises rival's costs, and excludes new entrants. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/dynamic-capabilities-and-strategic-management-4iyi34iyh6.pdf

Dynamic capabilities and strategic management

Measuring the efficiency of decision making units

In classical theory, from Smith to Mill, fixed coefficients in production are assumed. In such a context, the individual firm plays little role in the general equilibrium of the economy. The scale of any one firm is indeterminate, but the demand conditions determine the scale of the industry and the demand by the industry for inputs. The firm’s role is purely passive, and no meaningful boundaries between firms are established. No doubt the firm or the entrepreneur was much discussed and indeed given a central role in the informal parts of the discussion; the role was that of overcoming disequilibria. When profit rates were unequal, profit-hungry entrepreneurs moved quickly, with the end-result of eliminating their functions.

The firm in general equilibrium theory

This paper reviews and discusses the pace and direction of the transformation of formerly socialist economies into market economies It points out the lack of credibility of slow reforms as well as the dangers of a radical big-bang approach The article recommends a gradual transition, starting with a rapid entry of private industry into commerce and light industry, followed by the gradual privatization of the more capital intensive industries, while keeping the government in charge of restructing legal and financial institutions and in the management of declining industries

Economic Transition: Speed and Scope

Markets are means for the mutually beneficial exchange of goods and for inducing the transformation of goods from one form to another We will take it as axiomatic that individuals are risk-averse, so that the bearing of risks is a cost and the shifting of risks to others a good The existence of insurance, common stocks, and many other devices testifies to the validity of the assumption of risk aversion, though it must be admitted that gambling and perhaps some speculative activity might be regarded as evidence for risk preference in some contexts

/pdf/risk-allocation-and-information-some-recent-theoretical-c216ia3hoj.pdf

Risk Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments

Studies in linear and non-linear programming

This paper deals with the application of certain computational methods to evaluate constrained extrema, maxima or minima. To introduce the subject, we will first discuss nonlinear games. Under certain conditions, the finding of the minimax of a certain expression is closely related to, in fact identical with, the finding of a constrained minimum or maximum. Let us consider then a game (in a generalized sense) where player 1 has the choice of a certain set of numbers x1, …, xm that are constrained to be nonnegative for present purposes and player 2 selects numbers y1, …, yn also constrained to be nonnegative but otherwise unrestricted. The payoff of the game, the payment made by player 2 to player 1, will be a function of the decisions made by the two players, the x's and the y's. This payoff will be designated by φ(x1, …, xm, y1, …, yn). To play the game in an ideal way is to find the minimax solution, we know this solution exists under certain conditions. That is, we arrive at a choice of strategies by t...

Kenneth J. Arrow

Papers

The firm in general equilibrium theory

Economic Transition: Speed and Scope

Risk Allocation and Information: Some Recent Theoretical Developments

Studies in linear and non-linear programming

Gradient Methods for Constrained Maxima