Kenneth L. Beals
Bio: Kenneth L. Beals is an academic researcher from Oregon State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: ABO blood group system & Osteology. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 19 publications receiving 913 citations.
TL;DR: Relations between body size and brain size indicate that human populations under severe cold stress obtain large volumes more from rounder cranial shape than from differentiation by total body size.
Abstract: A bioclimatic model is evaluated as an explanation of variation in cranial capacity among 122 ethnic groups. Distribution of absolute and relative endocranial volume is mapped. Significant correlations occur with all nine climatic variables examined. Major foci of adaptation occur with solar radiation, vapor pressure, and winter temperature. Global mean trait increase is 2.5 cm per degree of equatorial distance. The interactive geometry between cranial size and shape is described, with encephalization and brachycephalization considered as functionally connected trends. Breadth is the most important structural component determining capacity. Relations between body size and brain size indicate that human populations under severe cold stress obtain large volumes more from rounder cranial shape than from differentiation by total body size. A computerized mapping program is developed and applied to anthropometric, climatic, and HRAF files. Its potential to produce clinal depictions through the Pleistocene ("ti...
TL;DR: The four causal metatypes in science theories correspond to four cognitive/cogitative/perceptual types which vary from individual to individual as mentioned in this paper : non-reciprocal causality (either probabilistic or deterministic), independent events as most basic, reciprocal causal loops, change-counteracting, and change-amplifying.
Abstract: Four causal metatypes in science theories correspond to four cognitive/cogitative/perceptual types which vary from individual to individual. In any given culture, all individual types exist, but their percentage distribution varies from culture to culture. The four metatypes are (1) nonreciprocal causality (either probabilistic or deterministic), (2) independent events as most basic, (3) reciprocal causal loops, change-counteracting (either probabilistic or deterministic), (4) reciprocal causal loops, change-amplifying (either probabilistic or deterministic). They correspond to the following cognitive/cogitative/perceptual types: (1) H mindscapes: homogenistic, hierarchical, classificational; (2) I mindscapes: heterogenistic, individualistic, random; (3) S mindscapes: heterogenistic, interactive, homeostatic; (4) G mindscapes: heterogenistic, interactive, morphogenetic. Available data on cross-cultural migrants indicate that some aspects of mindscapes are formed in childhood and become irreversible at the...
TL;DR: In the 1970s, an increasing proportion of texts rejected the race concept, with the no-race view becoming the most frequent one by 1975-79 as mentioned in this paper, and the change in the social context of anthropology has also contributed to the decline of race in physical anthropology textbooks.
Abstract: Analysis of physical anthropology textbooks published in the United States in the years 1932-79 reveals a significant decline in support for the race concept, expecially in the 1970s. Before 1970 the great majority of texts expressed the view that races exist and that the race concept is a valid tool for the description and study of human variation. In the 1970s an increasing proportion of texts rejected the race concept, with the no-race view becoming the most frequent one by 1975-79. Although the accumulation of new knowledge about human variation has contributed to the dramatic shift in textbook treatments of race, we argue that changes in the social context of anthropology have also been important. The political milieu of the 1960s coupled with the rapid institutional expansion of anthropology and the changing sociocultural characteristics of anthropologists and their students have contributed to the decline of the race concept in physical anthropology textbooks.
TL;DR: Greater reproductive variance among males than among females is presented as a component of natural selection's influence in determining preferential treatment of males in the inheritance of wealth.
Abstract: Greater reproductive variance among males than among females is presented as a component of natural selection's influence in determining preferential treatment of males in the inheritance of wealth. In conjunction, the transmission of sex chromosomes and their attendant probabilities of carrying genes identical by descent are traced for several generations in order to illustrate a male bias in species whose male sex is heterogametic (XY) while the female sex is homogametic (XX). The effect of this bias on coefficients of relationship (direct and additive) leads to the hypothesis that the transmission of wealth (seen as an arbitrarily bestowable fitness advantage) along the male line is more efficient, in terms of maximizing ancestral fitness, than transmission along the female line.
TL;DR: Empiric evidence indicates that the general distribution of the cephalic index is explicable in terms of climatic adaptation, and it is argued that the occupation of cold climates is one of the circumstances increasing the frequency of brachycephaly through time.
Abstract: Empiric evidence indicates that the general distribution of the cephalic index is explicable in terms of climatic adaptation. Based on a sample of 339 populations, the magnitude of the index is statistically different between zones of predominantly dry heat, wet heat, wet cold and dry cold. There is an inverse relationship between the mean cephalic index and temperature. It is argued that the occupation of cold climates is one of the circumstances increasing the frequency of brachycephaly through time.
TL;DR: For the next few weeks the course is going to be exploring a field that’s actually older than classical population genetics, although the approach it’ll be taking to it involves the use of population genetic machinery.
Abstract: So far in this course we have dealt entirely with the evolution of characters that are controlled by simple Mendelian inheritance at a single locus. There are notes on the course website about gametic disequilibrium and how allele frequencies change at two loci simultaneously, but we didn’t discuss them. In every example we’ve considered we’ve imagined that we could understand something about evolution by examining the evolution of a single gene. That’s the domain of classical population genetics. For the next few weeks we’re going to be exploring a field that’s actually older than classical population genetics, although the approach we’ll be taking to it involves the use of population genetic machinery. If you know a little about the history of evolutionary biology, you may know that after the rediscovery of Mendel’s work in 1900 there was a heated debate between the “biometricians” (e.g., Galton and Pearson) and the “Mendelians” (e.g., de Vries, Correns, Bateson, and Morgan). Biometricians asserted that the really important variation in evolution didn’t follow Mendelian rules. Height, weight, skin color, and similar traits seemed to
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: A pesar de la relativamente corta historia de la Psicologia como ciencia, existen pocos constructos psicologicos que perduren 90 anos despues de their formulación and continuen plenamente vigentes in la actualidad as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A pesar de la relativamente corta historia de la Psicologia como ciencia, existen pocos constructos psicologicos que perduren 90 anos despues de su formulacion y que, aun mas, continuen plenamente vigentes en la actualidad. El factor «g» es sin duda alguna uno de esos escasos ejemplos y para contrastar su vigencia actual tan solo hace falta comprobar su lugar de preeminencia en los modelos factoriales de la inteligencia mas aceptados en la actualidad, bien como un factor de tercer orden en los modelos jerarquicos o bien identificado con un factor de segundo orden en el modelo del recientemente desaparecido R.B.Cattell.
20 Apr 1907
TL;DR: For instance, when a dog sees another dog at a distance, it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his whole manner suddenly changes, if the other dog be a friend as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ION, GENERAL CONCEPTIONS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, MENTAL INDIVIDUALITY. It would be very difficult for any one with even much more knowledge than I possess, to determine how far animals exhibit any traces of these high mental powers. This difficulty arises from the impossibility of judging what passes through the mind of an animal; and again, the fact that writers differ to a great extent in the meaning which they attribute to the above terms, causes a further difficulty. If one may judge from various articles which have been published lately, the greatest stress seems to be laid on the supposed entire absence in animals of the power of abstraction, or of forming general concepts. But when a dog sees another dog at a distance, it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his whole manner suddenly changes, if the other dog be a friend. A recent writer remarks, that in all such cases it is a pure assumption to assert that the mental act is not essentially of the same nature in the animal as in man. If either refers what he perceives with his senses to a mental concept, then so do both. (44. Mr. Hookham, in a letter to Prof. Max Muller, in the 'Birmingham News,' May, 1873.) When I say to my terrier, in an eager voice (and I have made the trial many times), "Hi, hi, where is it?" she at once takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally first looks quickly all around, and then rushes into the nearest thicket, to scent for any game, but finding nothing, she looks up into any neighbouring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly shew that she had in her mind a general idea or concept that some animal is to be discovered and hunted? It may be freely admitted that no animal is self-conscious, if by this term it is implied, that he reflects on such points, as whence he comes or whither he will go, or what is life and death, and so forth. But how can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shewn by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures or pains in the chase? And this would be a form of self-consciousness. On the other hand, as Buchner (45. 'Conferences sur la Theorie Darwinienne,' French translat. 1869, p. 132.) has remarked, how little can the hardworked wife of a degraded Australian savage, who uses very few abstract words, and cannot count above four, exert her self-consciousness, or reflect on the nature of her own existence. It is generally admitted, that the higher animals possess memory, attention, association, and even some imagination and reason. If these powers, which differ much in different animals, are capable of improvement, there seems no great improbability in more complex faculties, such as the higher forms of abstraction, and selfconsciousness, etc., having been evolved through the development and combination of the simpler ones. It has been urged against the views here maintained that it is impossible to say at what point in the ascending scale animals become capable of abstraction, etc.; but who can say at what age this occurs in our young children? We see at least that such powers
TL;DR: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as mentioned in this paper is a remarkable and strikingly original work which is published in German and English in parallel pages and it is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation.
Abstract: 13 EADERS of Mr. Bertrand Russell's philosophical £v works know that one of his pupils before the outbreak of the war, an Austrian, Mr. Ludwig Wittgenstein, caused him to change his views in some important particulars. Curiosity can now be satisfied. The “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus “which Mr. Ogden has included in his new library of philosophy is a remarkable and strikingly original work. It is published in German and English in parallel pages. It is difficult to appreciate the reason for this, seeing that the author is evidently familiar with our language and has himself carefully revised the proofs of the translation. Also we should have liked to have the Tractatus without Mr. Russell's Introduction, not, we hasten to add, on account of any fault or shortcoming in that introduction, which is highly appreciative and in part a defence of himself, in part explanatory of the author, but for the reason that good wine needs no bush and that Mr. Russell's bush has the unfortunate effect of dulling the palate instead of whetting the appetite. In his penultimate sentence Mr. Russell says; “To have constructed a theory of logic which is not at any point obviously wrong is to have achieved a work of extraordinary difficulty and importance.” We agree, but how uninspiring when compared with Mr. Wittgenstein's own statement of aim: “What can be said at all can be said clearly, and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.) Pp. 189. (London: Kegan Paul and Co., Ltd.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1922.) 10s. 6d. net.