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Kenneth L. Judd

Bio: Kenneth L. Judd is an academic researcher from Stanford University. The author has contributed to research in topics: General equilibrium theory & Dynamic programming. The author has an hindex of 50, co-authored 197 publications receiving 15931 citations. Previous affiliations of Kenneth L. Judd include Saint Petersburg State University & National Bureau of Economic Research.


Papers
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Book
01 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present techniques from the numerical analysis and applied mathematics literatures and show how to use them in economic analyses, including linear equations, iterative methods, optimization, nonlinear equations, approximation methods, numerical integration and differentiation, and Monte Carlo methods.
Abstract: To harness the full power of computer technology, economists need to use a broad range of mathematical techniques. In this book, Kenneth Judd presents techniques from the numerical analysis and applied mathematics literatures and shows how to use them in economic analyses. The book is divided into five parts. Part I provides a general introduction. Part II presents basics from numerical analysis on R^n, including linear equations, iterative methods, optimization, nonlinear equations, approximation methods, numerical integration and differentiation, and Monte Carlo methods. Part III covers methods for dynamic problems, including finite difference methods, projection methods, and numerical dynamic programming. Part IV covers perturbation and asymptotic solution methods. Finally, Part V covers applications to dynamic equilibrium analysis, including solution methods for perfect foresight models and rational expectation models. A web site contains supplementary material including programs and answers to exercises.

2,880 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the managers, and show that a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent competes with agents of competing principals.
Abstract: The authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the ir managers. Under Cournot quantity competition, each manager's margi nal payment for production will exceed the firm's marginal profit. De viations from profit maximization are reduced by ex ante uncertainty about costs and increased by ex ante correlation between the firms' c osts. In contrast, in a differentiated goods market with price compet ition, managers receive less than their marginal profit. In general, a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent compet es with agents of competing principals. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

1,273 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation and show that under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a Paretian social objective, the capital income tax will converge to zero.

1,271 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

1,261 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the managers, and show that a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent competes with agents of competing principals.
Abstract: The authors examine the incentives which competing principals give their agents, focusing on two oligopoly models where owners write incentive contracts with the ir managers. Under Cournot quantity competition, each manager's margi nal payment for production will exceed the firm's marginal profit. De viations from profit maximization are reduced by ex ante uncertainty about costs and increased by ex ante correlation between the firms' c osts. In contrast, in a differentiated goods market with price compet ition, managers receive less than their marginal profit. In general, a principal will distort his agent's incentives when the agent compet es with agents of competing principals. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.

1,148 citations


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ReportDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.
Abstract: Growth in this model is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, price-taking competition cannot be supported. Instead, the equilibrium is one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.

12,469 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.
Abstract: Growth in this model is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, price-taking competition cannot be supported, and instead, the equilibriumis one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.

11,095 citations

ReportDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a model of endogenous growth is developed in which vertical innovations, generated by a competitive research sector, constitute the underlying source of growth and equilibrium is determined by a forward-looking difference equation, according to which the amount of research in any period depends upon the expected amount of the research next period.
Abstract: A model of endogenous growth is developed in which vertical innovations, generated by a competitive research sector, constitute the underlying source of growth. Equilibrium is determined by a forward-looking difference equation, according to which the amount of research in any period depends upon the expected amount of research next period. One source of this intertemporal relationship is creative destruction. That is, the prospect of more future research discourages current research by threatening to destroy the rents created by current research. The paper analyzes the positive and normative properties of stationary equilibria, in which research employment is constant and GNP follows a random walk with drift, although under some circumstances cyclical equilibria also exist. Both the average growth rate and the variance of the growth rate are increasing functions of the size of innovations, the size of the skilled labor force, and the productivity of research as measured by a parameter indicating the effect of research on the Poisson arrival rate of innovations; and decreasing functions of the rate of time preference of the representative individual. Under laissez faire the economy's growth rate may be more or less than optimal because, in addition to the appropriability and intertemporal spillover effects of other endogenous growth models, which tend to make growth slower than optimal, the model also has effects that work in the opposite direction. In particular, the fact that private research firms do not internalize the destruction of rents generated by their innovations introduces a business-stealing effect similar to that found in the partial-equilibrium patent race literature. When we endogenize the size of innovations we find that business stealing also makes innovations too small.

5,657 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: A theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification.
Abstract: Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

4,284 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a document, redatto, voted and pubblicato by the Ipcc -Comitato intergovernativo sui cambiamenti climatici - illustra la sintesi delle ricerche svolte su questo tema rilevante.
Abstract: Cause, conseguenze e strategie di mitigazione Proponiamo il primo di una serie di articoli in cui affronteremo l’attuale problema dei mutamenti climatici. Presentiamo il documento redatto, votato e pubblicato dall’Ipcc - Comitato intergovernativo sui cambiamenti climatici - che illustra la sintesi delle ricerche svolte su questo tema rilevante.

4,187 citations