Kim C. Border

Bio: Kim C. Border is an academic researcher from California Institute of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Expected utility hypothesis & Conditional probability. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 35 publications receiving 5606 citations.

Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker's Guide

Abstract: Odds and ends- Topology- Metrizable spaces- Measurability- Topological vector spaces- Normed spaces- Convexity- Riesz spaces- Banach lattices- Charges and measures- Integrals- Measures and topology- Lp-spaces- Riesz Representation Theorems- Probability measures- Spaces of sequences- Correspondences- Measurable correspondences- Markov transitions- Ergodicity

Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory

Abstract: Preface 1. Introduction: models and mathematics 2. Convexity 3. Simplexes 4. Sperner's lemma 5. The Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma 6. Brouwer's fixed point theorem 7. Maximization of binary relations 8. Variational inequalities, price equilibrium, and complementarity 9. Some interconnections 10. What good is a completely labelled subsimplex? 11. Continuity of correspondences 12. The maximum theorem 13. Approximation of correspondence 14. Selection theorems for correspondences 15. Fixed point theorems for correspondences 16. Sets with convex sections and a minimax theorem 17. The Fan-Browder theorem 18. Equilibrium of excess demand correspondences 19. Nash equilibrium of games and abstract economies 20. Walrasian equilibrium of an economy 21. More interconnections 22. The Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley lemma 23. Cooperative equilibria of games References Index.

Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder

Abstract: A risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know, but may verify through a costly auditing procedure. We characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities, subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent. The main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent's wealth, audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent's wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities. In general, such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit. In this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns. We assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent's

Psychology and Economics

Abstract: UNTVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY Department of Economics Berkeley, CaHfornia 94720-3880 Working Paper No. 97-251 Psychology and Economics Matthew Rabin Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley January 1997 Key words: bounded rationality, decision making, fairness, framing effects, heuristics and biases, preferences, psychology, reciprocity, reference-dependent utility JEL Classification: A12, B49, D i l , D60, D81, D83, D91 This is a longer version of an essay under preparation for possible publication in the Journal of Economic Literature. I thank John Pencavel and anonymous referees for earlier comments on its structure and content. For comments on this draft, I thank Steven Blatt, Colin Camerer, Peter Diamond, Erik Eyster, Ernst Fehr, Danny Kahneman, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, and John Pencavel. For helpful conversations over the past several years on topics covered in this essay, I thank George Akerlof, Gary Chamess, Eddie Dekel, Peter Diamond, David Laibson, David I. Levine, George Loewenstein, Rob MacCoun, James Montgomery, Vai-Lam Mui, Drazen Prelec, and especially Colin Camerer, Danny Kahneman, and Richard Thaler. Co-authors on research related to the topics of this essay include David Bowman, Deborah Minehart, Ted O'Donoghue, and Joel Schrag. Helpful research assistance was provided by Gadi Barlevy, Nikki Blasberg, Gail Brennan, Paul Ellickson, April Franco, Marcus Heng, Bruce Hsu, Jin Woo Jung, and especially Steven Blatt, Jimmy Chan, Erik Eyster, and Clara Wang. I am extremely grateful for financial support from the Russell Sage and Alfred P. Sloan Foundations.

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

Abstract: This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

Finite-dimensional variational inequality and nonlinear complementarity problems: a survey of theory, algorithms and applications

Abstract: Over the past decade, the field of finite-dimensional variational inequality and complementarity problems has seen a rapid development in its theory of existence, uniqueness and sensitivity of solution(s), in the theory of algorithms, and in the application of these techniques to transportation planning, regional science, socio-economic analysis, energy modeling, and game theory. This paper provides a state-of-the-art review of these developments as well as a summary of some open research topics in this growing field.

Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

Abstract: The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable in a parameter and characterizing its derivative. This paper studies optimization with arbitrary choice sets and shows that the traditional envelope formula holds at any differentiability point of the value function. We also provide conditions for the value function to be, variously, absolutely continuous, left- and right-differentiable, or fully differentiable. These results are applied to mechanism design, convex programming, continuous optimization problems, saddle-point problems, problems with parameterized constraints, and optimal stopping problems.

Ambiguity, risk, and asset returns in continuous time

Abstract: Models of utility in stochastic continuous-time settings typically assume that beliefs are represented by a probability measure, hence ruling out a priori any concern with ambiguity. This paper formulates a continuous-time intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility, where aversion to ambiguity is admissible. In a representative agent asset market setting, the model delivers restrictions on excess returns that admit interpretations reflecting a premium for risk and a separate premium for ambiguity.