Kim Pernell

Bio: Kim Pernell is an academic researcher from University of Toronto. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Asset (economics). The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 38 citations.

The Hazards of Expert Control: Chief Risk Officers and Risky Derivatives

Abstract: At the turn of the century, regulators introduced policies to control bank risk-taking. Many banks appointed chief risk officers (CROs), yet bank holdings of new, complex, and untested financial derivatives subsequently soared. Why did banks expand use of new derivatives? We suggest that CROs encouraged the rise of new derivatives in two ways. First, we build on institutional arguments about the expert construction of compliance, suggesting that risk experts arrived with an agenda of maximizing risk-adjusted returns, which led them to favor the derivatives. Second, we build on moral licensing arguments to suggest that bank appointment of CROs induced “organizational licensing,” leading trading-desk managers to reduce policing of their own risky behavior. We further argue that CEOs and fund managers bolstered or restrained derivatives use depending on their financial interests. We predict that CEOs favored new derivatives when their compensation rewarded risk-taking, but that both CEOs and fund managers op...

Market governance, financial innovation, and financial instability: lessons from banks’ adoption of shareholder value management

Abstract: As the economy has grown increasingly financialized, the relationship between financial innovation and instability has attracted more attention. Previous research finds that the proliferation of complex financial innovations, like asset securitization and new financial derivatives, helped to erode the market governance arrangements that kept excessive bank risk-taking in check, inviting instability. This article presents an alternative way of understanding how financial innovations and market governance arrangements combine to shape instability. Market governance arrangements also shape how financial firms receive innovations, leading to greater or lesser instability at particular times and places. I illustrate this argument by tracing the effects of changing corporate governance arrangements at large US banks in the 1990s and 2000s. Like non-financial firms in the preceding decade, banks adopted reforms associated with the shareholder value model of corporate governance. These changes to internal bank governance arrangements affected the agendas of bank executives in ways that encouraged expanded use of securitization and derivatives. Drawing from this case, I argue that a full understanding of instability in the financialized era requires closer attention to the (institutionally-structured) interests of financial innovation users—not just to features of financial innovations themselves.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It

Abstract: What is wrong with today's banking system? The past few years have shown that risks in banking can impose significant costs on the economy. Many claim, however, that a safer banking system would require sacrificing lending and economic growth. The Bankers' New Clothes examines this claim and the narratives used by bankers, politicians, and regulators to rationalize the lack of reform, exposing them as invalid. Admati and Hellwig argue we can have a safer and healthier banking system without sacrificing any of the benefits of the system, and at essentially no cost to society. They show that banks are as fragile as they are not because they must be, but because they want to be--and they get away with it. Whereas this situation benefits bankers, it distorts the economy and exposes the public to unnecessary risks. Weak regulation and ineffective enforcement allowed the buildup of risks that ushered in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Much can be done to create a better system and prevent crises. Yet the lessons from the crisis have not been learned. Admati and Hellwig seek to engage the broader public in the debate by cutting through the jargon of banking, clearing the fog of confusion, and presenting the issues in simple and accessible terms. The Bankers' New Clothes calls for ambitious reform and outlines specific and highly beneficial steps that can be taken immediately.