Author
Kjell Arne Brekke
Other affiliations: Statistics Norway
Bio: Kjell Arne Brekke is an academic researcher from University of Oslo. The author has contributed to research in topics: Public good & Consumption (economics). The author has an hindex of 28, co-authored 98 publications receiving 3339 citations. Previous affiliations of Kjell Arne Brekke include Statistics Norway.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an economic model of moral motivation, where the self-image as socially responsible is determined by a comparison of one's actual behavior against an endogenous morally ideal behavior.
461 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an economic model of moral motivation is presented, where the self-image as socially responsible is determined by a comparison of one's actual behavior against an endogenous moral ideal.
Abstract: In this paper, we present an economic model of moral motivation. Consumers prefer regarding themselves as socially responsible individuals. Voluntary contributions to public goods are motivated by this preference. The self-image as socially responsible is determined by a comparison of one's actual behavior against an endogenous moral ideal. Public policy influences voluntary contributions through its effects on relative prices and budget or time constraints, but also indirectly through the policy's effect on the moral ideal. This implies that economic incentives may have adverse effects on contributions. We present survey data on recycling behavior and voluntary community work, which is consistent with the model predictions.
285 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors show that if a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation, which can produce multiple equilibria with either high or low demand for green products.
263 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of finding the optimal sequence of starting and stopping times of a multi-activity production process, given the costs of opening, running, and closing the activities and assuming that the economic system is a stochastic process, is formulated as an extended impulse control problem and solved using stochochastic calculus.
Abstract: This paper considers the problem of finding the optimal sequence of opening (starting) and closing (stopping) times of a multi- activity production process, given the costs of opening, running, and closing the activities and assuming that the state of the economic system is a stochastic process. The problem is formulated as an extended impulse control problem and solved using stochastic calculus. As an application, the optimal starting and stopping strategy are explicitly found for a resource extraction when the price of the resource is following a geometric Brownian motion.
227 citations
TL;DR: This article showed that if both socially responsible (green) and non-responsible (brown) firms exist in equilibrium, workers with high moral motivation, who shirk less than others, will self-select into the green firms.
212 citations
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01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss leading problems linked to energy that the world is now confronting and propose some ideas concerning possible solutions, and conclude that it is necessary to pursue actively the development of coal, natural gas, and nuclear power.
Abstract: This chapter discusses leading problems linked to energy that the world is now confronting and to propose some ideas concerning possible solutions. Oil deserves special attention among all energy sources. Since the beginning of 1981, it has merely been continuing and enhancing the downward movement in consumption and prices caused by excessive rises, especially for light crudes such as those from Africa, and the slowing down of worldwide economic growth. Densely-populated oil-producing countries need to produce to live, to pay for their food and their equipment. If the economic growth of the industrialized countries were to be 4%, even if investment in the rational use of energy were pushed to the limit and the development of nonpetroleum energy sources were also pursued actively, it would be extremely difficult to prevent a sharp rise in prices. It is evident that it is absolutely necessary to pursue actively the development of coal, natural gas, and nuclear power if a physical shortage of energy is not to block economic growth.
2,283 citations
TL;DR: Sustainability indicators and composite index are increasingly recognized as a useful tool for policy making and public communication in conveying information on countries and corporate performance in fields such as environment, economy, society, or technological improvement as mentioned in this paper.
2,181 citations
TL;DR: This paper developed a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect, and analyzed the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it.
Abstract: We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.
2,094 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect, and analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality of incentives.
Abstract: We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this "overjustification effect" can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.
1,880 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the Stern Review argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, but it relies on the assumption of a near-zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function.
Abstract: How much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming? The Stern Review argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. An examination of the Review’s radical revision of the economics of climate change finds, however, that it depends decisively on the assumption of a near-zero time discount rate combined with a specific utility function. The Review’s unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today’s marketplace real interest rates and savings rates.
1,502 citations