Klaus Tuori

Bio: Klaus Tuori is an academic researcher from University of Helsinki. The author has contributed to research in topics: Constitution & Economics. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 4 publications receiving 116 citations.

The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis

Abstract: Part I. Setting the Scene: 1. Introduction: framework of the analysis 2. Two layers of the European economic constitution 3. Towards the crisis: an economic narrative 4. Responses to the crisis Part II. Constitutional Mutation: 5. Constitutionality of European measures 6. Realignment of the principles of the macroeconomic constitution 7. Democracy and social rights Part III. What Next?: 8. Initiatives on the table.

Enlarged Scope and Competences of the ECB Economic Constitutional Analysis

Abstract: The paper focuses on the constitutional analysis of the European Central Bank (ECB). During the financial and fiscal crisis the role and actions of the ECB have far exceeded what was traditionally considered normal conduct of monetary policy and also what was envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. However, it is a complicated task to judge whether the actions are constitutionally suspect or not .The constitutional position of the ECB was stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, but there is a wide list of other sources that are needed to complement relevant Treaty articles, including broader European economic constitution, the model of Deutsche Bundesbank and the consensus of monetary theory. Reading the Treaty articles in the light of these complementary sources helps to form a coherent list of of constitutional principles covering the ECB. It is found that during the first decade of its operation, the ECB followed the constitutional principles very closely. However, during the financial and fiscal crisis, the ECB started to deviate from the principles to the extent that it raises concerns on the constitutional acceptability. The list of actions are explained and constitutionally analysed, including expanding the collateral, new money market measures, involvement in rescue measures and purchasing of government bonds (SMP). The constitutional principles that have become causes of concern are the overriding objective of price stability, prohibition of public financing as well as the institutional independence of the ECB.

Banking Union — a stability-oriented macroeconomic or an efficiency-oriented microeconomic project?

Abstract: ABSTRACT The article analyses the Banking Union from an economic-constitutional perspective. It argues that the areas covered by the Banking Union fall substantively mainly under the internal market area of EU law, where the microeconomic efficiency-based rationales and objectives are essential in legal assessments. In contrast, the euro area macroeconomic and stability-oriented rationales guided the decision on the Banking Union and the allocation of banking supervision to the ECB. The article claims that these different constitutional rationales, and the constitutional locus of the Banking Union, could have implications for the broader constitutional architecture and even for the EU legal order. Indeed, the microeconomic part of the EU economic-constitutional model suits legal approach to integration, but the macroeconomic rationales have a more problematic relation with law and courts. This could call for a resurgence of the internal market perspective in Banking Union going forward to remedy some of the constitutional concerns.

Which European Union?: Europe after the Euro Crisis

Abstract: Preface: how many Unions? Part I. Institutionalisation of Multiple Unions: 1. From Rome to the Lisbon Treaty 2. The Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis 3. Institutionalisation and constitutional divisions Part II. Main Perspectives on the European Union: 4. The perspective of the economic community 5. The perspective of intergovernmental union 6. The perspective of parliamentary union Part III. Towards the Compound Union Perspective: 7. Comparing democratic models 8. Compound unions and the EU 9. A new political order in Europe.

Euro crisis responses and the EU legal order : increased institutional variation or constitutional mutation?

Abstract: Euro crisis reforms as major example of interstitial institutional change in the EU - Forms of institutional change : unusual sources of law, new tasks for the EU institutions, new organs, competence creep, institutional hybrids, and more differentiated integration - Question whether some or all of this amounts to a ‘constitutional mutation’ of the EU legal order - Reasons to doubt whether the constitutional fundamentals have changed - Alternative thesis: increased institutional variation, deepening the differences between EMU law and the rest of EU law.

Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB and EU constitutionalism in the crisis

Abstract: Rather than halting European integration, the euro crisis, in some ways, has accelerated it. However, it is integration of a different type, which departs significantly from the rule of law-based model of integration that traditionally burnished the European Union’s legitimacy. The crisis-induced transformation of the European Central Bank (ECB) captures this trend. Through schemes such as Outright Monetary Transactions, the Bank bolstered its capacity to stabilize the euro without having its mandate formally enlarged, thus confirming the ascendency of technocratic, and often ad hoc, governance over democratically and legally circumscribed alternatives. This article posits the ECB’s expanded and politicized role as the manifestation of a new mode of integration – integration through the disintegration of law – which inverts the court-driven integration-through-law that consolidated the single market. However, the lack of a solid legitimacy base casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of this i...