Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Bio: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Nuclear strategy. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 7 citations.

Nuclear stability in Southern Asia

Abstract: Introduction Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia Nature of the Strategic Triangle in Southern Asia Indo-Pakistan Ties & Nuclear Confidence Building in Southern Asia Strategic Stability & the Evolution of India's Nuclear Strategy Nuclear Safety Nuclear Doctrine in South Asia Nuclear Stability, Deterrence & Terrorism Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia: An Indian Perspective Interview with General V P Malik Index.

Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability

Abstract: A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—have interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense ...

Nuclear Proliferation and International Security

Abstract: Foreword Hans Blix (TBC) Editors' Preface 1. Introduction Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard Part 1: Growing Pressures, Fragile Policies 2. Ban on Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in Light of International Law Jozef Goldblat 3. Preventive War as an Alternative to Treaty-Based Nuclear Non-Proliferation Astrid Forland 4. Proliferation, Disarmament and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Steven Miller Part 2: Encountering Proliferators, Real or Potential 5. The Exceptional End to the Extraordinary Libyan Nuclear Quest Harald Muller 6. Iran's Uncertain Nuclear Ambitions Sverre Lodgaard 7. North Korean Proliferation and the End of US Nuclear Hegemony Peter Hayes 8. Israel and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East Lawrence Scheinman and Marvin Miller 9. India's Nuclear Exceptionalism Raja Mohan 10. Pakistan as a Receptive Proliferator Talat Masood 11. Non-State Actors and Nuclear Proliferation William Potter Part 3: Building Restraint, Reducing Risks 12. The Fizzling Fervency of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Annette Schaper 13. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty as a Nuclear Security Policy Driver Annette and Morten Bremer Maerli 14. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance Across Borders Lars van Dassen 15. Export Controls and Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements Tariq Rauf Part 4: Assessments and Recommendations 16. Regaining Common Ground Sverre Lodgaard

Nuclear learning in Pakistan since 1998

Abstract: Nuclear learning is a process through which states that acquire nuclear weapons capability learn to manage it through the development of nuclear doctrines, command and control structures, safety and security mechanisms, regulatory regimes and acquire an understanding of both the technological characteristics of these weapons as well as their politico-strategic ramifications. This enables them to achieve a stable strategic balance through a sagacious application of these formidable instruments of power. Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always been beset with controversies and viewed with concern by the international community. These concerns have been accentuated by the spill over of the war in Afghanistan and the widespread incidence of terrorism and extremism within the country itself. In the pre-1998 period Pakistan had adopted a policy of ambiguity and denial of a nuclear weapons programme which combined with the secrecy surrounding the programme had stifled any discussion of issues related to management of an operational nuclear capability and it only started coming to grips with these issues after the May 1998 nuclear tests. This study about Pakistan’s learning experience in managing its nuclear capability suggests that a state that is perpetually afflicted by political instability and weak institutional structures could effectively handle its nuclear arsenal like a normal nuclear state provided it expends requisite effort and resources towards this end. The ability of the state and its institutions to learn through their experiences and from others is also very important in this regard. While the literature on ‘nuclear learning’ is not very exhaustive, the concept is sufficiently well developed to provide an adequate framework for study of Pakistan’s evolution as a nuclear power since 1998.The study helps ascertain the nature and the magnitude of learning by Pakistan to manage various facets of its nuclear capability in the past decade and a half. The study has tried to identify the discernible manifestations of nuclear learning and has tried to determine the reasons for disparity in learning amongst the civilian and military institutions in view of the troublesome civilmilitary balance in Pakistan. This study brings out Pakistan’s difficult progression to a nuclear weapons capable state and how this bitter historical experience has predisposed it to adopt a particular learning path. It also highlights the dynamic nature of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear doctrine which has been adjusted and adapted to meet the demands of its ever changing security environment. It establishes that Pakistan’s nuclear command and control is a reflection of the existing civil-military balance and is line with the traditional division of labour between the two institutions in the realm of security policy making. The study finds sufficient evidence to suggest that given its precarious internal and external security situation Pakistan has invested heavily in augmenting its nuclear safety and security and this effort has clearly manifested itself and has also received international recognition. After the embarrassment of the AQ Khan episode as well as the emerging international trends evident in the form of UNSC Resolution 1540, Pakistan has also paid attention to strengthening its export control system and to bring it in conformity with international standards. Discernible learning is also apparent in the field of nuclear regulation which has also been acknowledged by the IAEA.

India-Pakistan: Nuclear Stability and Diplomacy

Abstract: The conceptual discourse, contributed to in the main by Western scholars, on the security and strategic stability of new nuclear weapon states like India and Pakistan seems alarmist. In reality, however, India and Pakistan have been mutually deliberating on various aspects of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). This article is an effort to identify the issues of nuclear security concerns in two spheres – academic and policy formulations. The emphasis is more on the nuclear thinking of the two countries and the diplomatic challenges ahead particularly on the nuclear CBMs.