scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Konstan

Bio: Konstan is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Parrhesia & Criticism. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 11 citations.

Papers
More filters
01 Jan 1998

11 citations


Cited by
More filters
Dissertation
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a systematic analysis of the philosophical history of fear and its philosophical remedies through the work of western philosophers and thinkers selected based on their overall contributions in conceptualizing fear and suggesting therapies for reducing its more damaging effects.
Abstract: Fear is a critical emotion in everyday life as it permeates many of our minor and major decisions. Explicitly or implicitly, fear is one of the emotions that most strongly shape human life. In this thesis fear and its philosophical remedies will be analysed through the work of western philosophers and thinkers selected based on their overall contributions in conceptualizing fear and suggesting therapies for reducing its more damaging effects. The study will show how Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca considered fear as the main obstacle in achieving peace of mind, and their ethical systems were primarily focused on dealing with this emotion by proposing eclectic philosophical therapies. Montaigne presented a humanist therapy of fear instrumented as a critical self-analysis. In contrast, a reductionist trend in thinking about fear emerged during the 17th century with the growth of materialistic philosophy. Thomas Hobbes reduced fear into a necessary tool for social control, whereas Rene Descartes demoted fear to a secondary emotion enacted by a dualist mechanism. This trend continued with William James’s conception of fear as a sensory-somatic reflex, and with Sigmund Freud’s hypothesis of a neurotic fear resulting from universal unconscious laws. I will also discuss how current neuroscience has reduced fear to decontextualized neural changes, and how the dominant trend in psychiatry has reified anxiety into arbitrary nomenclatures of unclear validity. On a completely different tack Ludwig Wittgenstein provided a broad ‘perspicuous presentation’ of fear, but his nuanced analysis has been largely ignored in philosophical studies. Overall it can be seen that, in keeping with the scientific revolution, the influential perspectives throughout the philosophical history of fear change from understandings that philosophy itself and reason are the best therapies for fear towards the medicalization of fear that is dominant today. By following these specific and diverse historical convergences, however, their criss-crossing insights and oversights, the thesis aims to enhance the conceptual understanding of fear and the variety of perspectives and therapies available for accommodating its enduring influence in our lives.

13 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy as discussed by the authors, and both renditions of the analogy may be said to declare that philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health.
Abstract: Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli, nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy is ‘a medical science for the mind.’ He thought we should ‘hand ourselves over to philosophy, and let ourselves be healed.’ ‘For as long as these ills [of the mind] remain,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot attain to happiness.’ There are many different forms of medical analogy in these two traditions, but the most general form may be stated as follows: just as medicine cures bodily diseases and brings about physical health, so Buddhist dharma or Hellenistic philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health—where psychological health is understood as the highest form of happiness or well-being. Insofar as Buddhist dharma involves philosophy, as it does, both renditions of the analogy may be said to declare that philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health. This feature of the analogy—philosophy as analogous to medical treatment—has attracted considerable attention.

13 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the Nicomachean Ethics, a detailed account of the μγαλόψυχχος, the "great-souled man" who is virtuous to an exceptional degree and justly superior, rising above ordinary people and mundane concerns is given in this paper.
Abstract: i n the nicomachean ethics Aristotle provides a detailed account of the μεγαλόψυχος, the “great-souled man” who is virtuous to an exceptional degree and justly superior, rising above ordinary people and mundane concerns (4.3, 1123a34 –1125a35; cf. Eth. Eud. 3.5, 1232a18–1233a30). This man is distinguished by μεγαλοψυχία, or “greatness of soul,” which Aristotle declares to be the crowning virtue—a virtue in its own right that elevates all the others to a higher level and that is not to be found apart from them (4.3, 1123b28–1124a5). Aristotle argues, notoriously, that only an elite, high-status male can realize μεγαλοψυχία: possessing the other virtues is not sufficient, but one must also be fortunate enough to have noble birth, extensive wealth, and power, since such things are goods that make a person superior and worthy of greater honor (4.3, 1124a20–6)—μεγαλοψυχία concerns “great things” (4.3, 1123a34 –b8; 4.4, 1125b1–8) and involves “honor on a grand scale” (4.3, 1125a34 –5; cf. 4.2, 1122a18–25). from a moral point of view it is more admirable to be great-souled than not, despite the fact that only a select few people are in a position to develop the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία in the first place. 1

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The author of Hebrews directly shames his audience in 5.11-12: ‘you have become νωθρoί in hearing... you need someone to teach you... You need milk not solid food' as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The author of Hebrews directly shames his audience in 5.11-12: ‘you have become νωθρoί in hearing ... you need someone to teach you ... You need milk not solid food’. Taking into account occurrence...

6 citations

Book
21 Jun 2018
TL;DR: McClure as discussed by the authors examines the intellectual tradition of challenges to religious and literary authority in the early modern era, and explores the hidden history of unbelief through the lens of Momus, the Greek god of criticism and mockery.
Abstract: In this book, George McClure examines the intellectual tradition of challenges to religious and literary authority in the early modern era. He explores the hidden history of unbelief through the lens of Momus, the Greek god of criticism and mockery. Surveying his revival in Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and England, McClure shows how Momus became a code for religious doubt in an age when such writings remained dangerous for authors. Momus ('Blame') emerged as a persistent and subversive critic of divine governance and, at times, divinity itself. As an emblem or as an epithet for agnosticism or atheism, he was invoked by writers such as Leon Battista Alberti, Anton Francesco Doni, Giordano Bruno, Luther, and possibly, in veiled form, by Milton in his depiction of Lucifer. The critic of gods also acted, in sometimes related fashion, as a critic of texts, leading the army of Moderns in Swift's Battle of the Books, and offering a heretical archetype for the literary critic.

6 citations