Kristina Bitsch

Bio: Kristina Bitsch is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Subsidiary & Institutional theory. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 19 citations.

Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption

Abstract: Corrupt practices in organizations are commonly explained via the rational choice of individual employees, with the benefits of deviant actors at the heart of the theoretical approach. This Article challenges the rational choice perspective with reference to cases of corruption in which the organizational benefits are crucial and personal gains negligible. The authors propose to embed the concept of “useful illegality” (Luhmann) into an institutional theory framework and develop a set of indicators for the systematic comparison of individual case studies. Exemplary analyses of two landmark cases of corporate bribery on behalf of German corporations' subsidiaries abroad (Siemens Argentina and Magyar Telekom) show that active corruption was neither simply a function of individual deviance, nor of personal gain. In contrast, institutional theory allows the modeling of organizational deviance as a function of unwritten rules that lend legitimacy to the deviant behavior of bribe payers. Despite plentiful opportunities in the periphery of these two multinational corporations, the few instances of personal gain were either in line with the organizational incentive structures (as in Telekom) or attributable to the loss of membership (as in Siemens). Mostly high-ranking employees, loyal to their organization, committed those crimes at high personal risks. The discussion of factors that explain why these “company men” nonetheless complied with the unwritten rules, in support of organizational benefits, leads the authors to conclude with likely consequences for effective regulation. They argue that it is the usefulness of the illegal behavior for the organization, its entrenchment in organizational cultures, and amplified adaptation problems with regard to changing institutional environments that explain what makes corrupt practices so hard to control and to regulate in a formal legal organization.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

Organizational crime and corruption in Brazil a case study of the “Operation Carwash” court records

Abstract: This paper aims to examine the informal mechanisms and factors of corporate crime in Brazil that contribute to the persistence of political corruption. For this analysis, official records, e.g. closed criminal trials produced by Operation Carwash, one of the biggest cases of white-collar crime and political corruption in Brazil's history, will be used. The focus of the analysis is on the criminal trials, generated in the early phases of the investigation, which revealed the illegal activities of large Brazilian construction companies as well as its cartel-building to defraud the Petrobras' contracts. The analysis on the modus operandi of this cartel served to reconstruct the unwritten rules inside organizations that are involved in the bribery-scheme. The analysis showed that Brazilian private enterprises, represented by its senior executives and top managers, used the lack of regulation and informal rules, rooted in the political system, to achieve illegal profits.

Manipulationen in der Transplantationsmedizin. Ein Fall von organisationaler Devianz

Abstract: Die Manipulationen der Wartelisten fur ein Organ durch Transplantationsmediziner haben in den letzten Jahren in Deutschland Aufsehen erregt Der Artikel behandelt die Frage, wie sich diese Manipulationen erklaren lassen Er tut dies mittels der Analyse von Gerichtsakten und Prufberichten sowie der Durchfuhrung von Interviews Er legt die theoretische Perspektive organisationaler Devianz zugrunde und pruft, inwiefern sich die Manipulationen durch individuelle und/oder organisationale Devianz erklaren lassen Dazu werden die inhaltsanalytisch gewonnenen Strukturdaten mit den in einer Deutungsmusteranalyse herausgearbeiteten Deutungs- und Handlungsregeln in diesem Feld verbunden Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Haufigkeit und Art der Manipulationen fur ein organisiertes Handeln sprechen, das sich mittels des medizinischen Wettbewerbsdrucks, der straffen fachautoritaren Hierarchien und der Sozialisation in einem Pionierfeld der Medizin etablieren konnte Dazu waren nach bisherigem Kenntnisstand keine personliche Bereicherung und keine kriminelle Energie notwendig Diese Form organisationaler und „professioneller“ Devianz kann stattdessen durch organisationale Anreizstrukturen und professionsbezogene Autonomie und Reputationsorientierungen erklart werden Sie unterscheidet sich masgeblich von der Wirtschaftskriminalitat, weil der okonomische Nutzen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt und die tragische Wahlsituation unter der Bedingung der Organknappheit dafur sorgt, dass sowohl bei Regeleinhaltung als auch bei Regelabweichung bestimmte Patienten sterben

Unable to Resist the Temptation to Tell the Truth or to Lie for the Organization? Identification Makes the Difference

Abstract: Previous research indicates that the depletion of self-regulatory resources can promote unethical behavior that benefits the self. Extending this literature, we focus on norm-transgressing behavior that is intended to primarily benefit others. In particular, we predicted a differing effect of self-regulatory resource depletion on dishonesty that benefits one’s group, depending on the degree of identification with the group. Following a dual process approach, we argue that if identification with the group is strong, then people may have an automatic inclination to benefit their group even perhaps by lying. In contrast, if identification with the group is weak, then the default, uncontrolled impulse may be to tell the truth. Accordingly, identification with the social group should interact with self-regulatory resource depletion in predicting group-benefiting dishonesty. Focusing on pro-organizational dishonesty, we tested our hypotheses in one field study with 1269 employees and in one experimental study with 71 university students. As predicted, the results revealed a highly significant interaction of organizational identification and self-control strength: Depletion of self-regulatory resources increased the level of pro-organizational dishonesty among those who identify highly with the organization, but decreased the level of such behavior among those who identify less.

The profile and detection of bribery in Norway and England & Wales: A comparative study:

Abstract: This paper provides the first significant profile of offenders convicted of bribery in England & Wales (EW the sectors experiencing the most bribes paid are public administration and defence and the sector paying the most bribes is construction. In both countries, the period from the start of the crime to conviction was around six years. The paper also notes some significant differences between the two countries. In Norway there was a larger percentage of higher-grade professionals involved in bribery and in E&W detection by law enforcement was more common, suggesting greater interest by such bodies. The average sentence received by offenders was also ...