Rule of law.

1. The Committee welcomes the submission of the second report of Kyrgyzstan, in response to the list of issues prior to reporting (CAT/C/KGZ/Q/2). However, the Committee regrets that it was submitted 10 years late, which prevented the Committee from conducting an analysis of the implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the State party following the consideration of its initial report in 1999.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Annex I. Treaty On Principles Governing The Activities Of States In The Exploration And Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies

The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century

This article considers a novel and potentially controversial issue: whether non-state armed groups can, do and should play a role in the creation of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. International law was traditionally understood as the law created by, and binding upon, states and states alone. It is now broadly accepted that international law regulates the rights and obligations of many non-state actors as well as those of states. Yet any corresponding suggestion that non-state actors could or should play a role in international law-making remains highly contentious. In analyzing the potential role that such actors could play in law creation, we reject the traditional state/non-state distinction underlying the doctrine of sources in favor of a tripartite framework of states, state empowered bodies (such as international courts and international governmental organizations), and non-state actors (such as individuals, businesses, NGOs and armed groups). Focusing on the last category, we explore various theories for justifying some or all non-state actors playing a role in international law-making. In particular, we assess the merits of giving armed groups a role in the creation of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Drawing on a wide range of rarely discussed practice, we demonstrate that armed groups already participate in law-making in a number of circumstances. Building on these developments, we contend that it is possible to move away from the traditional statist approach to sources, which denies armed groups any role in law-making, without moving to the extreme position of giving such groups complete control over their obligations or equal law-making powers with states. Accordingly, we put forward a theory of hybrid sources under which armed groups could be permitted to recognize existing international obligations or undertake new ones, without raising concerns about placing armed groups and states on a par or downgrading international legal standards.

Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law

Several indicators point to a crisis at the heart of the emerging area of international cyber security law. First, proposals for binding international treaties by leading stakeholders, including China and Russia, have been met with little enthusiasm by other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of controversial legal questions and thus to express their cyber opinio juris. Third, instead of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the more ambiguous term ‘norms’. This article argues that the reluctance of states to engage in international law-making has left a power vacuum, lending credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed by rapid technological development. In response, several non-state-driven norm-making initiatives have sought to fill the void, including Microsoft's cyber norms proposals and the Tallinn Manual project. The article then contends that this emerging body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to reclaim a central law-making position, similar to historical precedents including the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed crisis will lead to the demise of inter-state cyberspace governance or a recalibration of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a central role if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that would upset their ability to achieve strategic and political goals.

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From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers

Research on this topic was supported by the Major Projects of National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No: 16ZDA074)

Towards the International Rule of Law in Cyberspace: Contrasting Chinese and Western Approaches

Several indicators suggest that the international law of cyber security is in the midst of a crisis. First, proposals of internationally binding treaties by the leading stakeholders, including Russia and China, have been met with little enthusiasm by other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of the controversial legal questions and thus to express their opinio juris. Third, instead of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the vacuous term ‘norms’. This paper argues that the reluctance of states to engage themselves in international law-making has generated a power vacuum, lending credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed by the rapid development of information and communication technologies. In response, a number of non-state-driven norm-making initiatives have sought to fill this vacuum, such as Microsoft's cyber norms proposal or the Tallinn Manual project. The paper then contends that this emerging body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to reclaim a central law-making position, similarly to historical precedents including the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed crisis of international law will lead to the demise of inter-state governance of cyberspace or the recalibration of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a central role in the process if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that would upset their ability to achieve their strategic and political goals.

Is the international law of cyber security in crisis

This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in international humanitarian law (IHL), bringing computer data within the scope of this concept. The advent of cyber military operations has presented a dilemma as to the proper understanding of data in IHL. The emerging orthodoxy, represented by the 2013 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, advances the argument that the intangible nature of data renders it ineligible to be an object for the purposes of the rules on targeting in IHL. This article, on the contrary, argues that due to its susceptibility to alteration and destruction, the better view is that data is an object within the meaning of this term under IHL and thus it may qualify as a military objective. The article supports this conclusion by means of a textual, systematic, and teleological interpretation of the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law. The upshot of the analysis presented here is that data that does not meet the criteria for qualification as a military objective must be considered a civilian object, with profound implications for the protection of civilian datasets in time of armed conflict.

Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law

The article examines the problem of the absence of an express legal basis to detain in the law of non-international armed conflict. It considers the attempts to locate the legal basis by way of logical inference either from a putative power to kill in non-international armed conflicts or from the power to detain in international armed conflicts. It also considers teleological and practical arguments posed against the existence of a legal power to detain. It then argues that the preferred interpretation is to view the legal basis to detain as inherent in the law of non-international armed conflict. The existence of an implicit legal basis is consistent with the understandings and expectations of the drafters of Additional Protocol I, as evidenced by a close examination of the travaux preparatoires. Moreover, the post-World War II practice and some modern-day pronouncements corroborate the existence of an inherent legal basis in customary IHL. Finally, in light of the challenges posed by modern conflicts marked by the asymmetry of the parties and by the extraterritoriality of the hostilities, the law of NIAC is far more effective if it is interpreted to contain a legal power to detain than if it is not.

Kubo Mačák

Papers

From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers

Towards the International Rule of Law in Cyberspace: Contrasting Chinese and Western Approaches

Is the international law of cyber security in crisis

Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law

A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict