Kyle Herkenhoff

Bio: Kyle Herkenhoff is an academic researcher from University of Minnesota. The author has contributed to research in topics: Unemployment & Recession. The author has an hindex of 15, co-authored 46 publications receiving 973 citations. Previous affiliations of Kyle Herkenhoff include Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis & University of California, Los Angeles.

An SEIR infectious disease model with testing and conditional quarantine

Abstract: We extend the baseline Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) infectious disease epidemiology model to understand the role of testing and case-dependent quarantine. Our model nests the SEIR model. During a period of asymptomatic infection, testing can reveal infection that otherwise would only be revealed later when symptoms develop. Along with those displaying symptoms, such individuals are deemed known positive cases. Quarantine policy is case-dependent in that it can depend on whether a case is unknown, known positive, known negative, or recovered. Testing therefore makes possible the identification and quarantine of infected individuals and release of non-infected individuals. We fix a quarantine technology-a parameter determining the differential rate of transmission in quarantine-and compare simple testing and quarantine policies. We start with a baseline quarantine-only policy that replicates the rate at which individuals are entering quarantine in the US in March, 2020. We show that the total deaths that occur under this policy can occur under looser quarantine measures and a substantial increase in random testing of asymptomatic individuals. Testing at a higher rate in conjunction with targeted quarantine policies can (i) dampen the economic impact of the coronavirus and (ii) reduce peak symptomatic infections-relevant for hospital capacity constraints. Our model can be plugged into richer quantitative extensions of the SEIR model of the kind currently being used to forecast the effects of public health and economic policies.

Labor Market Power

Abstract: What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver moderate, and limited, welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive firms.

Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default

Abstract: Using new household level data, we quantitatively assess the roles that (i) job loss, (ii) negative equity, and (iii) wealth (including unsecured debt, liquid, and illiquid assets) play in default decisions. In sharp contrast to prior studies that proxy for individual unemployment status using regional unemployment rates, we find that individual unemployment is the strongest predictor of default. We find that individual unemployment increases the probability of default by 5-13 percentage points, ceteris paribus, compared to the sample average default rate of 3.9%. We also find that only 13.9% of defaulters have both negative equity and enough liquid or illiquid assets to make 1 month’s mortgage payment. This suggests that “ruthless,” or “strategic” default during the 2007-2009 recession is relatively rare, and suggests that policies designed to promote employment, such as payroll tax cuts, are most likely to stem defaults in the long run rather than policies that temporarily modify mortgages.

Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default

Abstract: This paper exploits matched data from the PSID on borrower mortgages with income and demographic data to quantify the relative importance of negative equity, versus lack of ability to pay, as affecting default between 2009 and 2013. These data allow us to construct household budgets sets that provide better measures of ability to pay. We use instrumental variables to quantify the impact of ability to pay, including job loss and disability, versus negative equity. Changes in ability to pay have the largest estimated effects. Job loss has an equivalent effect on default likelihood as a 35 percent decline in equity.

Can’t Pay or Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default

Abstract: This paper uses new data from the PSID to quantify the relative importance of negative equity versus ability to pay, in driving mortgage defaults between 2009 and 2013. These data allow us to construct household budgets sets that provide better measures of ability to pay. Changes in ability to pay have large estimated effects. Job loss has an equivalent effect on the propensity to default as a 35% decline in equity. Strategic motives are also found to be quantitatively important, as we estimate more than 38% of households in default could make their mortgage payments without reducing consumption. Received September 29, 2015; editorial decision June 2, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University PressWeb site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Competitive Search Equilibrium

Abstract: In this paper, I construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions, which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters. I show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal. I also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay.

The Macroeconomics of Epidemics

Abstract: We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. Our model implies that people’s decision to cut back on consumption and work reduces the severity of the epidemic, as measured by total deaths. These decisions exacerbate the size of the recession caused by the epidemic. The competitive equilibrium is not socially optimal because infected people do not fully internalize the effect of their economic decisions on the spread of the virus. In our benchmark model, the best simple containment policy increases the severity of the recession but saves roughly half a million lives in the U.S.

Monopsony in the Labor Market

Abstract: This paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets, broadly defined as upward-sloping labor supply to an employer. We compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search. We also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage-concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics. Our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large, while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average.

Optimal Mitigation Policies in a Pandemic: Social Distancing and Working from Home

Abstract: We study the response of an economy to an unexpected epidemic. Households mitigate the spread of the disease by reducing consumption, reducing hours worked, and working from home. Working from home is subject to learning-by-doing and the capacity of the health care system is limited. A social planner worries about two externalities, an infection externality and a healthcare congestion externality. Private agents’ mitigation incentives are weak and biased. We show that private safety incentives can even decline at the onset of the epidemic. The planner, on the other hand, implements front-loaded mitigation policies and encourages working from home immediately. In our calibration, assuming a CFR of 1% and an initial infection rate of 0.1%, private mitigation reduces the cumulative death rate from 2.5% of the initially susceptible population to about 1.75%. The planner optimally imposes a drastic suppression policy and reduces the death rate to 0.15% at the cost of an initial drop in consumption of around 25%.