Today, it is widely acknowledged that war is primarily a question of technology. From this, as J.F.C. Fuller once said, it is but a short step to the conclusion that “weapons, if only the right ones can be found, constitute ninety-nine percent of victory.”1 While the face of war has changed out of recognition in the 20th century, this appreciation retains its full force. And in the development of new weapons, the Great War retains its role as a pivotal carrefour of history during which a new infrastructure of war was invented, and science-based technologies — some new, others familiar — were applied.2 A decade into the century of General Relativity and quantum mechanics, the war celebrated the destructive power of ‘classical’ physics. At the same time that new narratives unfolded in aviation, machine guns, armour, and submarine warfare, new international industrial alliances were formed: among the Central Powers, integrating aspects of German and Austrian manufacturing; among the Allies, linking Dominion resources, French designs, British experiments, and American practices of industrialization.3 In applied chemistry and chemical industry, it became a war of largely familiar knowledge but with new applications, with catastrophic consequences for Europe, and important lessons for science.

L. J. Henderson

Papers

America's opportunity in chemistry