Author
Larry H.P. Lang
Other affiliations: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, New York University
Bio: Larry H.P. Lang is an academic researcher from The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Capital market. The author has an hindex of 49, co-authored 72 publications receiving 33084 citations. Previous affiliations of Larry H.P. Lang include Hong Kong University of Science and Technology & New York University.
Papers published on a yearly basis
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TL;DR: The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
4,195 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Abstract: This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
3,190 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries were analyzed, and the majority of firms were either widely held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%).
2,934 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Abstract: This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.
2,910 citations
TL;DR: The authors showed that Tobin's q and firm diversification are negatively related throughout the 1980s, and that this negative relation holds for different diversification measures and when we control f...
Abstract: In this paper, we show that Tobin's q and firm diversification are negatively related throughout the 1980s. This negative relation holds for different diversification measures and when we control f...
2,766 citations
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TL;DR: The authors surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and presents a survey of the literature.
Abstract: This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
13,489 citations
TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
Abstract: This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor
10,954 citations
TL;DR: The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit as mentioned in this paper, which is a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Abstract: Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
7,121 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, and find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations.
6,611 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems, and discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.
6,387 citations