Leigh Thompson

Bio: Leigh Thompson is an academic researcher from Northwestern University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Negotiation & Creativity. The author has an hindex of 61, co-authored 145 publications receiving 16289 citations. Previous affiliations of Leigh Thompson include Duke University & University of Washington.

Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts

Abstract: Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies I and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of satisfaction with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is steeply increasing and convex for disadvantageous inequality and weakly declining and convex for advantageous inequality. We manipulated dispute type (personal, business) and disputant relationship (positive, neutral, or negative) and found that both strongly influence preferences for advantageous but not disadvantageous inequality. A third study contrasted implications of the social utility functions with predictions of individual utility theories. People care about the outcomes of others. We sacrifice our own interests to help loved ones or harm adversaries. Participants withdraw from profitable participation in a laboratory experiment if they perceive inequity in remuneration (Schmitt & Marweli, 1972). Players in two-person ultimatum games (in which one player proposes a distribution of a fixed amount of money that the other has the option of either accepting or rejecting) frequently reject a positive but inequitable offer even though the alternative is no gain at all (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Negotiations between parties often collapse when one party becomes incensed with the other and attempts to "maximize his opponent's displeasure rather than his own satisfaction" (scigel & Fouraker, 1960, p. 100). In general, disputants are concerned not only with the outcomes they receive, but also with the outcomes of their opponents (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).

Learning and Transfer: A General Role for Analogical Encoding

Abstract: Teaching by examples and cases is widely used to promote learning, but it varies widely in its effectiveness. The authors test an adaptation to case-based learning that facilitates abstracting problem-solving schemas from examples and using them to solve further problems: analogical encoding, or learning by drawing a comparison across examples. In 3 studies, the authors examined schema abstraction and transfer among novices learning negotiation strategies. Experiment 1 showed a benefit for analogical learning relative to no case study. Experiment 2 showed a marked advantage for comparing two cases over studying the 2 cases separately. Experiment 3 showed that increasing the degree of comparison support increased the rate of transfer in a face-to-face dynamic negotiation exercise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues.

Abstract: This article examines the ability of the individual differences, motivational, and cognitive approaches of negotiation to account for empirical research on dyadic negotiation. Investigators have typically focused on objective, economic measures of performance. However, social-psychological measures are important because negotiators often do not have the information necessary to make accurate judgments of the bargaining situation. Negotiators' judgments are biased, and biases are associated with inefficient performance. Personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior; their impact may be dampened by several factors, such as homogeneity of subject samples, situational constraints, and self-selection processes. Motivational and cognitive models provide compelling accounts of negotiation behavior. A psychological theory of negotiation should begin at the level of the individual negotiator and should integrate features of motivational and cognitive models. Negotiation is a pervasive and important form of social interaction. Negotiation is necessary whenever conflict erupts and there are no fixed or established rules or procedures to resolve conflict and whenever people want to search for agreement without resorting to aggression or open fighting (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985). Negotiation occurs in business and academic environments and in informal social interactions such as deciding with a friend or spouse where to dine or vacation. Clearly, negotiation is essential for anyone who must interact with other people to accomplish their objectives. There is broad interest in the study of negotiation behavior. This interest is evident in the interdisciplinary history of the study of negotiation in the fields of psychology, economics, industrial relations, organization behavior, sociology, and law. The theoretical goal is to predict the processes and outcomes of negotiation. The practical or applied goal is to help people negotiate more effectively (Bazerman, 1986; Raiffa, 1982). The fundamental and enduring questions raised by the growing body of research on negotiation behavior include the following: What factors lead to negotiation success or failure? Which theoretical perspective provides the best account of negotiation behavior? What empirical findings must a theoretical approach to negotiation explain? The purpose of this article is to address these theoretical and empirical issues. A variety of theoretical analyses of negotiation behavior have been developed. An important theoretical distinction is that between normative and descriptive approaches (Neale & Northcraft, in press; Raiffa, 1982). Normative models are based on axioms of individual rationality (cf. von Neumann &

Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations.

Abstract: The authors examined how gender stereotypes affect negotiation performance. Men outperformed women when the negotiation was perceived as diagnostic of ability (Experiment 1) or the negotiation was linked to gender-specific traits (Experiment 2), suggesting the threat of negative stereotype confirmation hurt women's performance relative to men. The authors hypothesized that men and women confirm gender stereotypes when they are activated implicitly, but when stereotypes are explicitly activated, people exhibit stereotype reactance, or the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. Experiment 3 confirmed this hypothesis. In Experiment 4, the authors examined the cognitive processes involved in stereotype reactance and the conditions under which cooperative behaviors between men and women can be promoted at the bargaining table (by activating a shared identity that transcends gender).

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes.

Abstract: Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion--that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation--extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures--which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.

ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

Abstract: We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)