Bio: Leonardo Armati is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications & Competition law. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publication(s) receiving 4 citation(s).
05 Aug 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the practical implications of the implementation of the Antitrust Damages Directive, which gives decisions issued by National Competition Authorities (NCAs) a key role in “follow-on” damages actions, are analyzed.
Abstract: This article analyses the practical implications of the implementation of Article 9 of the Antitrust Damages Directive, which gives decisions issued by National Competition Authorities (“NCAs”) a key role in “follow-on” damages actions. After setting the scene, by giving a short overview of the legal status prevailing before the Directive and of the institutional process that led to its adoption, the authors propose a critical analysis of Article 9 of the Directive and put forward some considerations on the main practical issues than can surface in its implementation. In this respect, a number of critical points are identified and discussed, most notably in connection with due process rights for defendants and, more generally, potential “interoperability” issues between civil and public proceedings.
31 Aug 2009
TL;DR: The Fifth annual conference of the Global Competition Law Centre, held in Brussels on 11-12 June 2009, was dedicated to the Commission's review of EC Regulation 1/2003, and the contributions are the contributions as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The Fifth annual conference of the Global Competition Law Centre, held in Brussels on 11-12 June 2009, was dedicated to the Commission's review of EC Regulation 1/2003. These contributions are the…
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States, and assess the impact of this Directive on the enforcement of competition law.
Abstract: Directive EU/2014/104 is the latest legal instrument that crystalizes the evolution of EU competition law enforcement. This paper assesses critically the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States. The Directive codifies the case law of the EUCJ and it encroaches upon the autonomy of Member States in setting the institutions, remedies and procedures available for victims’ of antitrust infringements. Although the Directive provides a fragmented and incomplete set of rules that only partially harmonizes antitrust damages claims in the EU, and it’s slanted towards follow-on cartel damages claims, it has publicised the availability of damages claims, creating momentum that will transform how competition law is enforced in the future.
01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: In this paper, the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.
Abstract: One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Directive, final national decisions on competition infringements shall have binding effect in follow-on litigations. What is to be understood under ‘binding effect’, and the potential effects thereof, has been subject to a lively debate among academics and practitioners. It has been questioned if decisions of an executive body can bind the judiciary, and if so, to what extent. What is the evidentiary value of a formal decision of a NCA regarding national courts, but also on the court of another Member State. The article deals with the main issues and arguments presented in the general debate on the binding effect of national competition law decisions, and provides a closer look on this topic with regard to specific CEE countries.
••17 Mar 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact on re-nationalising EU competition law and policy, and assess the impact of renationalizing EU competition policy.
Abstract: The decentralisation of the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU under Regulation 1/2003 altered not only its institutional setup by delegating enforcement responsibilities to national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts, but also the possibilities for Member States to implement their respective national competition policies and the domestic interest considerations embedded therein. In the multilevel governance framework established by Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement of EU competition law takes place exposed to the national political, institutional and procedural context. In particular, national laws and legal and administrative practices, which bind NCAs and national courts, directly influence the application of Articles 101 and 102 in the national territory. This chapter examines examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact of re-nationalising EU competition law and policy.
01 Jan 2020
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the Commission's use of commitment decisions, arguing that the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also a modest negative impact on legal certainty.
Abstract: So far, the present study has argued that most of the criticism that is levelled at the Commission’s use of commitment decisions is not justified. In the view defended here, the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also only a modest negative impact on legal certainty. It is submitted that these modest shortcomings are, from an abstract point of view, acceptable in view of the consensual nature of commitments and of their underlying goal of procedural economy. This conclusion applies without prejudice to the necessity to balance the respective costs and benefits of Article 7 and Article 9 in each individual case according to the circumstances of the case at hand.