L
Leonid Reyzin
Researcher at Boston University
Publications - 147
Citations - 10535
Leonid Reyzin is an academic researcher from Boston University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cryptography & Random oracle. The author has an hindex of 44, co-authored 144 publications receiving 9453 citations. Previous affiliations of Leonid Reyzin include Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data
TL;DR: This work provides formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning biometric information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and reliably and securely authenticating biometric data.
Journal ArticleDOI
Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, reliably and securely authenticating biometric data.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Dynamic authenticated index structures for outsourced databases
TL;DR: This work defines a variety of essential and practical cost metrics associated with ODB systems and looks at solutions that can handle dynamic scenarios, where owners periodically update the data residing at the servers, both for static and dynamic environments.
Proceedings Article
Physically Observable Cryptography (Extended Abstract).
Silvio Micali,Leonid Reyzin +1 more
TL;DR: This paper considers an adversary that has full (and indeed adaptive) access to any leaked information; shows that some of the basic theorems and intuitions of traditional cryptography no longer hold in a physically observable setting; and constructs pseudorandom generators that are provably secure against all physical-observation attacks.
Book ChapterDOI
Physically observable cryptography
Silvio Micali,Leonid Reyzin +1 more
TL;DR: The physical observation attacks as discussed by the authors bypass the impressive barrier of mathematical security erected so far, and successfully break mathematically impregnable systems, and threaten the very relevance of complexity-theoretic security.