Liang Liang

Bio: Liang Liang is an academic researcher from University of Science and Technology of China. The author has contributed to research in topics: Data envelopment analysis & Supply chain. The author has an hindex of 51, co-authored 224 publications receiving 8736 citations. Previous affiliations of Liang Liang include Harbin Institute of Technology & Hefei University of Technology.

Measuring performance of two-stage network structures by DEA: A review and future perspective

Abstract: Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs). An important area of development in recent years has been devoted to applications wherein DMUs represent two-stage or network processes. One particular subset of such processes is those in which all the outputs from the first stage are the only inputs to the second stage. The current paper reviews these models and establishes relations among various approaches. We show that all the existing approaches can be categorized as using either Stackelberg (leader-follower), or cooperative game concepts. Future perspectives and challenges are discussed.

DEA models for supply chain efficiency evaluation

Abstract: An appropriate performance measurement system is an important requirement for the effective management of a supply chain. Two hurdles are present in measuring the performance of a supply chain and its members. One is the existence of multiple measures that characterize the performance of chain members, and for which data must be acquired; the other is the existence of conflicts between the members of the chain with respect to specific measures. Conventional data envelopment analysis (DEA) cannot be employed directly to measure the performance of supply chain and its members, because of the existence of the intermediate measures connecting the supply chain members. In this paper it is shown that a supply chain can be deemed as efficient while its members may be inefficient in DEA-terms. The current study develops several DEA-based approaches for characterizing and measuring supply chain efficiency when intermediate measures are incorporated into the performance evaluation. The models are illustrated in a seller-buyer supply chain context, when the relationship between the seller and buyer is treated first as one of leader-follower, and second as one that is cooperative. In the leader-follower structure, the leader is first evaluated, and then the follower is evaluated using information related to the leader's efficiency. In the cooperative structure, the joint efficiency which is modelled as the average of the seller's and buyer's efficiency scores is maximized, and both supply chain members are evaluated simultaneously. Non-linear programming problems are developed to solve these new supply chain efficiency models. It is shown that these DEA-based non-linear programs can be treated as parametric linear programming problems, and best solutions can be obtained via a heuristic technique. The approaches are demonstrated with a numerical example.

DEA Models for Two-Stage Processes: Game Approach and Efficiency Decomposition

Abstract: Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs). This tool has been utilized by a number of authors to examine two-stage processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are the only inputs to the second stage. The current article examines and extends these models using game theory concepts. The resulting models are linear, and imply an efficiency decomposition where the overall efficiency of the two-stage process is a product of the efficiencies of the two individual stages. When there is only one intermediate measure connecting the two stages, both the noncooperative and centralized models yield the same results as applying the standard DEA model to the two stages separately. As a result, the efficiency decomposition is unique. While the noncooperative approach yields a unique efficiency decomposition under multiple intermediate measures, the centralized approach is likely to yield multiple decompositions. Models are developed to test whether the efficiency decomposition arising from the centralized approach is unique. The relations among the noncooperative, centralized, and standard DEA approaches are investigated. Two real world data sets and a randomly generated data set are used to demonstrate the models and verify our findings. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 55: 643-653, 2008

The DEA Game Cross-Efficiency Model and Its Nash Equilibrium

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the cross-efficiency concept in data envelopment analysis (DEA). Cross efficiency links one decision-making unit's (DMU) performance with others and has the appeal that scores arise from peer evaluation. However, a number of the current cross-efficiency approaches are flawed because they use scores that are arbitrary in that they depend on a particular set of optimal DEA weights generated by the computer code in use at the time. One set of optimal DEA weights (possibly out of many alternate optima) may improve the cross efficiency of some DMUs, but at the expense of others. While models have been developed that incorporate secondary goals aimed at being more selective in the choice of optimal multipliers, the alternate optima issue remains. In cases where there is competition among DMUs, this situation may be seen as undesirable and unfair. To address this issue, this paper generalizes the original DEA cross-efficiency concept to game cross efficiency. Specifically, each DMU is viewed as a player that seeks to maximize its own efficiency, under the condition that the cross efficiency of each of the other DMUs does not deteriorate. The average game cross-efficiency score is obtained when the DMU's own maximized efficiency scores are averaged. To implement the DEA game cross-efficiency model, an algorithm for deriving the best (game cross-efficiency) scores is presented. We show that the optimal game cross-efficiency scores constitute a Nash equilibrium point.

I and i

Abstract: There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality. Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index