Lin Jiang

Bio: Lin Jiang is an academic researcher from University of Liverpool. The author has contributed to research in topics: Electric power system & Control theory. The author has an hindex of 50, co-authored 389 publications receiving 10061 citations. Previous affiliations of Lin Jiang include University of Sheffield & Xiamen University.

Delay-Dependent Stability for Load Frequency Control With Constant and Time-Varying Delays

Abstract: Load frequency control (LFC) requires transmitting measurements from remote RTUs to control center and control signals from the control center to plant side. Constant delays exist in the conventional dedicated communication channels, while the future usage of open communication networks will introduce time-varying delays. Those delays would degrade the dynamic performance of LFC and in the worst case, cause instability. The maximal delay time which allows an LFC scheme embedded with controllers to retain stable is defined as the delay margin. This paper investigates the delay-dependent stability of the LFC scheme by using Lyaponuv-theory based delay-dependent criterion and linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) techniques. Case studies are carried out based on one-area and multi-area LFC schemes installed with proportional-integral (PI) controllers, respectively. Relationship between the gains of PI controller and the delay margin of the LFC scheme are investigated and results obtained can be used to tune the PI controllers to achieve a compromise between the dynamic performance and the delay margin. Both constant and time-varying delays are considered. The effectiveness of the criterion used is verified by simulation studies.

Delay-Dependent Stability of Single-Loop Controlled Grid-Connected Inverters with LCL Filters

Abstract: LCL filters have been widely used for grid-connected inverters. However, the problem that how time delay affects the stability of digitally controlled grid-connected inverters with LCL filters has not been fully studied. In this paper, a systematic study is carried out on the relationship between the time delay and stability of single-loop controlled grid-connected inverters that employ inverter current feedback (ICF) or grid current feedback (GCF). The ranges of time delay for system stability are analyzed and deduced in the continuous s -domain and discrete z -domain. It is shown that in the optimal range, the existence of time delay weakens the stability of the ICF loop, whereas a proper time delay is required for the GCF loop. The present work explains, for the first time, why different conclusions on the stability of ICF loop and GCF loop have been drawn in previous studies. To improve system stability, a linear predictor-based time delay reduction method is proposed for ICF, while a time delay addition method is used for GCF. A controller design method is then presented that guarantees adequate stability margins. The delay-dependent stability study is verified by simulation and experiment.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index